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Public discourse in contemporary Germany is marked by an
open, vibrant, sometimes caustic exchange of the central issues of
the day. As in the United States, guarantees of freedom of expres-
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sion are central to the constitutional order and structure of German
society. Unlike speech freedoms in the United States, however,
German communication rights are carefully circumscribed by dis-
tinct textual, legal, cultural, and civility limits. Notwithstanding
those limits, contemporary German expression is a spirited and
sophisticated body of law that presents both lessons and pitfalls to
an American observer.
This article explores the concept of public discourse in con-
temporary Germany, with a. view toward comparing German law to
its American counterpart. By public discourse, I mean public dis-
cussion of issues, personalities, or items of general concern to
society. Through this critical exchange of ideas, a democracy deter-
mines its purposes and a culture is constructed.' A comparative
exploration of the quality and range of public discourse in each
country can shed light on the role free expression plays, or should
play, in western constitutional democracies.
Part I examines the historical, legal, and textual context of the
German Basic Law and its guarantees of expression. Part II de-
scribes the nature and evolution of modem German public dis-
course. Part III evaluates the seminal 1958 decision of the German
Constitutional Court on freedom of opinion, the Liith2 case, where
the Court envisioned expression of opinion to be both an integral
component of the human personality and constitutive of a demo-
cratic society. Part IV describes later cases of the 1970s in which
the Court retracted preference of free expression. Part V examines
cases of the late 1970s and 1980s in which the Court strove to
achieve an intermediate level of protection for communication free-
doms. Part VI examines current public discourse in Germany by
reviewing important cases of the 1990s. These modem cases evi-
l. As developed by the United States Supreme Court, public discourse entails discus-
sion of all "ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern" and not just
governmental policies, actions, or actors. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50
(1988). The concept of public discourse relates both to the building of culture and the
functioning of a democracy. These ideas are developed more fully in Edward J. Eberle,
Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public Discourse in America, 29 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1135, 1179-81 (1994). For comparative purposes, I am tracing the same essential
concept of public discourse in German law. Under German law "public opinion" can be
thought of as the "central structural element of modem democracy." Walter Schmitt
Glaeser, Die Meinungsfreiheit in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgererichts (1.
Tell) in 97 ARcHly DES 6FFENTuCHEN REcHTs 60, 107 (1972).
2. 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958). For discussion of LUth, see infra notes 47-130 and accom-
panying text.
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dence a return to the view in Lfith that freedom of expression is a
preferred freedom in the German constitutional order. Part VII
concludes with some comparative observations about public dis-
course in Germany and the United States.
I. HISTORY OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER AND
ITS PROTECTION OF ExPREssION
The adoption of the Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, in 1949
marked a new constitutional order for modem Germany. Emerging
from the darkness of the Nazi period, the Basic Law sought to
capture the best aspects of German thought and experience of the
preceding one hundred years. Tracing its lineage to the 1849
Frankfort (Paulskirche) Constitution and the 1918 Constitution of
the Weimar Republic, the Basic Law sought to base the social
order on the liberal, social, and democratic principles of those
earlier constitutions.3 The Basic Law departed from those constitu-
tions, among other ways, in that it instituted a comprehensive
system of judicial review, whereby legislative, executive, and judi-
cial action would be judged for conformity with the Basic Law.4
The American and German constitutions differ in their philo-
sophical grounding. While the Basic Law arose from three major
legal traditions--classical liberalism, democratic socialism, and
3. German constitutionalism began with the constitutions of the south German states.
These constitutions tended to couple rights with duties; they did not contain basic rights
in the American or French sense. Representative of these constitutions were those of
Baden (1818), Bavaria (1818), and Wilrttemberg (1819). See BoDO PIEROTH & BERNHARD
ScHLiNK, GRuNDRcHTE STAATSRECHT I 9 (10th ed. 1994). The first national constitution
arose out of the revolution of 1848, resulting in the 1849 St. Paul's Church (Paulskirche),
Frankfurt Constitution. This constitution, heavily influenced by leading academics, never
came into effect The first national constitution to come into effect was that of the
Weimar Republic in 1918. Both the Frankfurt and Weimar constitutions influenced the
framing of the current Basic Law.
4. The institution of comprehensive judicial review of basic rights flows from Article
1(3) of the Basic Law, which provides: "The following basic rights shall bind the legisla-
ture, the executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law." By contrast, in the
Weimar period, fundamental rights limited only the executive and judicial branches, not
the legislative branch. Instead, parliamentary democracy, representing the supreme will of
the people, was thought a sufficient guarantee of freedom. See DAviD P. CURIE, THE
CONSTrUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBiC op GERMANY 185 (1994). Thus, comprehensive
judicial review was a new development in German constitutional history. See Peter E.
Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV.
247, 248 (1989). Indeed, institution of comprehensive judicial review in any country is
notable.
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Christian-natural legal thought-the United States Constitution
drew its inspiration from liberalism and natural law. Further, the
Basic Law obligates the state to realize a set of objectively ordered
values and sets forth both rights and duties,6 whereas the United
States Constitution is value-neutral pursuant to a scheme of nega-
tive liberties, specifically enumerating rights upon which govern-
ment may not infringe, but not stating comparable duties citizens
must assume or values government must realize. These philosophi-
cal differences reflect differing historical impulses and events. In
the United States, the struggle over the law of seditious libel
formed an important background to the development of First
Amendment law.7 In Germany, the totalitarian control of informa-
tion by the Nazi regime formed a main motivation for the drafters
of the Basic Law; they sought to guarantee broad expression and
informational rights as a means to prevent any recurrence of total-
itarianism.8
The Basic Law contains a number of distinct provisions that
protect expression freedoms. The main provision is Article 5,
which contains seven separate freedoms.9 The most important of
5. Each of these traditions played a formative role in German legal history and was
represented at the 1949 Constitutional Convention. These traditions corresponded to the
leading political parties then active in Western Germany. Classical liberalism was associat-
ed with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the social democratic tradition with the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), and Christian natural law with the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU). The liberal tradition was mainly responsible for the Bill of Rights provisions
Articles 1 through 19, while the socialist tradition influenced social welfare clauses; and
Christian thought added provisions on morality, family, education, and enshrinement of
institutionally established churches. See DONALD P. KOMMEEs, THE CoNsTrrutnoNAL JU-
RISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBIC OF GERMANY 36-37 (1989).
6. In actuality, duties are only sparingly spelled out in the Basic Law. For example,
Article 6(2) provides that "[t]he care and upbringing of children is a natural right of and
a duty primarily incumbent on the parents. The state shall watch over their endeavors in
this respect." Art. 6 § 2 GG. Article 14(2) states that "[piroperty imposes duties. Its use
should also serve the public weal." Art. 14 § 2 GG. Article 5(3) provides that freedom of
teaching "shall not release anyone from his allegiance to the constitution." Art. 5 § 3 GG.
In fact, "duties" may arise more from internationalization of cultural norms (of how one
ought to exercise rights) than from textual enumeration. For elaboration of the Basic
Law's concept of duties, and how they mirror basic rights, see PiERoTH-SCHRJK, supra
note 3, at 55-56.
7. See Quint, supra note 4, at 249.
8. See id. at 249-50.
9. Article 5 of the Basic Law provides:
(1) Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion
in speech, writing and pictures and freely to inform himself from generally
accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of
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these are freedom of opinion, freedom to inform oneself, and
freedom to pursue art, science, teaching, and research. In addition,
Article 5 provides for freedom of the press and reporting through
broadcasts and film, and prohibits censorship. Article 5 is thus
notable for its specificity and provision of modem communicative
methods, in comparison to the older and more generally phrased
First Amendment." Freedoms of opinion, information, press, and
reporting are subject to the limitations in "the provisions of general
statutes," in statutory provisions for the protection of youth, 2
and in the right to respect for personal honor,"'" while artistic, re-
search, and scientific freedoms remain unbounded. 4 The limitation
placed upon the main communicative freedoms would imply that
expression should not be an absolute value. Indeed, Article 5 ex-
broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.
(2) These rights are subject to limitations in the provisions of general statutes,
in statutory provisions for the protection of youth, and in the right to respect
for personal honour.
(3) Art and science, research and teaching shall be free. Freedom of teaching
shall not release anybody from his allegiance to the constitution.
Art. 5 §§ 1-3 CG.
10. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST.
amend. I; see also KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 366-67. These differences should be ex-
pected in provisions drafted in 1949 (Article 5) as compared to 1791 (First Amendment).
11. Art. 5 § 2 GG. The general law limitation is a generally applicable neutral law
that is not directed at expression. Thus, the law must further a legal interest independent
and separable from expression itself, it cannot be directed at the content of the speech.
Despite its similarity to the American concept of First Amendment content neutrality, the
two are not the same. In German law, a "general law" can affect speech and yet be
permissible so long as it applies "generally" and is not aimed at expression. The general
civil code provision at issue in Liith is an example of such a law. See infra note 53 and
accompanying text; see also CuRM, supra note 4, at 179. This concept of the "general
law" arose in connection with interpretation of the Weimar Constitution and is meant to
counter the notion that the legislature can change speech protections at will. See PRERoT
& SCHLUK, supra note 3, at 161-63.
12. The concern for protection of youth reflects the family and social interests that the
young be able to develop with proper nurturing and care. It might be linked to Article 6
family guarantees, including the parental right to bring up children. See Art. 5 § 2 GG.
13. The limitation of personal honor seems attributable to Germany's aristocratic tradi-
tion, which places comparatively high value on one's good name and honor. See id.
14. The right to freely pursue art, research and science reflects the influence of the
1849 Frankfurt Constitution. This provision, written by leading intellectuals, was designed
to assure the autonomy of academic work and the German university. See KOMMERS,
supra note 5, at 426. Unlike art, research, and scientific freedoms, teaching is subject to
the qualification that it "not release anyone from his allegiance to the constitution." Art 5
§ 3 3G.
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pressly limits freedom of expression through the triad of qualifi-
cations.1 5
Article 5 is not expressly directed at the government, in con-
trast to the First Amendment. The text of the Article is phrased in
positive, declarative form, not prohibitory language. However, since
Article 1(3) provides that "basic rights shall bind the legislature,
the executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law,"16
communication rights appear to restrain only official actions. The
apparent discrepancy between these provisions raises an important
question: whether Article 5 is limited to official action, as with the
First Amendment, or whether it also applies to private actors.1
Not until 1958 did the Constitutional Court resolve this question,
in the decisive Liith case, determining that the Basic Law "influ-
ences" interpretation of ordinary law. Thus, to the extent private
individuals seek settlement of their disputes through the courts, the
Basic Law is enforceable against them as well."
Article 8 protects the right of assembly, while Article 9 se-
cures rights of political association. Article 17 provides for the
right of petition and Article 21 guarantees rights of political par-
ties, which are to participate in the formation of the public will.
The German enumeration of all these freedoms encourages separate
analytical treatment of each right.' By comparison, the United
States Constitution groups all expressive freedoms in the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court has tended to develop all First
Amendment freedoms within the same basic construct of a funda-
mental right to expression and thought."
15. Professor Kommers observes that the Article 5 limitations on expression "invite
[their] interpretation in light of other basic value decisions of the Constitution whose
effect is often to confine the range or intensity of speech." KOMMERS, supra note 5, at
413.
16. Art. 1 § 3 GO.
17. See KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 366; Quint, supra note 4, at 257-58.
18. See LDth, 7 BVerfGE 198, 204-05 (1958). Thus, Article 1 seems to require that
the courts (civil and public) are bound by basic rights. For ordinary courts, this means
that they too must enforce these rights, a conclusion that gave rise to the Basic Law's
"indirect" influence on private law through the Reciprocal Effect Theory. For discussion of
these points, see infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text. By ordinary courts, I mean
those courts that apply the general law; that is, all law-civil, criminal, or administra-
tive-other than constitutional law. Thus, the ordinary law is the background against
which constitutional law is applied.
19. See Quint, supra note 4, at 250.
20. See id.
1997]
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Despite their contemporaneous growth in the period following
World War II, the development of both countries' laws reflect
differences in doctrine and technique. Demonstrating the contrasting
doctrines and quality of public discourse in each country may
thereby shed light on the role free speech plays in comparable
western constitutional democracies. Such a comparative examination
is meaningful for several reasons. First, it is worthwhile to explore
the similarities and differences in constitutional doctrine and legal
culture-in itself and as a basis for assessing the transplantation of
legal norms. Second, this comparison may yield a set of higher
principles of constitutional order or a sounder public law philoso-
phy. Third, the foreign legal regime may serve as an alternative
standard by which to measure the work of the native court.2
Fourth, this examination may lead to the realization of a mutual
cultural influence-a benefit to both societies in an increasingly
interdependent world.'
HI. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF GERMAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE
A. The Nature of German Public Discourse
American free expression law encourages individuality and
diversity in the dissemination of opinions as well as tolerance with
respect to the consideration of differing opinions.' The American
system seeks to foster tolerance and open-mindedness among its
individual citizens as well as a" more "perfect policy," evidenced
ideally by a more democratic, informed, and just society.24
German law similarly values expression along both individual
and social dimensions, although their contours differ. The personal
dimension of communication entails the individual right to speak,
think, and inform oneself free from official and, notably, private
intrusion.25 Historically, this individual strand has been rooted in
21. See Donald P. Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States
and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 658-59 (1980).
22. See Bodo Pieroth, An Essay on an Export from the United States: Constitutional
Doctrine and Ideas, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUBL. L. REV. 311, 322 (1990).
23. These ideas are elaborated in Eberle, supra note 1, at 1137, 1180-82.
24. See id. at 1137-38.
25. For example, see the recent case of Soldiers are Murderers 1, 45 NJW 2943
(1994), discussed infra at notes 372-86 and accompanying text. "The right to freedom of
opinion guarantees everyone the right to assert freely their opinion: Everyone has the right
to say what she thinks, even when she does not provide or cannot provide any verifiable
[Vol. 47:797
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the human need for intellectual and spiritual communication and
dialogue. Recent cases of the Constitutional Court markedly empha-
size the importance of speaker autonomy as an integral component
to the unfolding of human personality (Persdnlichkeitsentfaltung), a
distinct rooting of free speech in human personality rights, which
enjoy high status in Germany.6 This enhanced commitment to an
individual's right to speak one's mind is a notable characteristic of
German law in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, while enjoying enhanced prominence in recent
years, the individual strand of German communication law has
historically been subordinate to its more highly valued social com-
ponent. 7 Communication is valued to the extent it contributes to
the battle of opinions (Meinungskampj) over matters of public
concern, especially what the Constitutional Court views as funda-
mentally essential questions (wesentliche beriihrende Frage).' As
in America, speech is thus valued most highly to the extent it aids
democratic self-government, facilitating discussion, and formation
of the public will.29
In part, this reflects the value-ordering function basic rights
perform in Germany, including communication rights. Speech is
valued according to its utility in promoting desirable ends. At the
reasons for her view." Id.
26. See, e.g., Soldiers Are Murderers I, 45 NJW at 2943 (holding that communication
freedoms are "in the interest of the right to personal development, with which communi-
cation is closely linked, as well as in the interest of the democratic process, for which it
has constitutive meaning.").
27. A prominent commentator, current Justice of the Constitutional Court Dr. Dieter
Grimm, asserts that German law solved the ongoing struggle in American law of whether
to prefer the individual component of speech (self-determination) or the social component
(self-government) by treating both as important and equally weighted. See Dieter Grimm,
Die Meinungsfreiheit in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 48 NJW 1697,
1698 (1995). However, a review of German case law reveals the same essential develop-
ment as in American law. The main emphasis on both laws has been on the value of
expression in relation to democracy. Recently, the focus of both laws has shifted to a
heightened emphasis of the individual dimension of expression.
28. See LUth, 7 BVerfGE 198, 208 (1958). Under Article 5, the key determinant is
whether the communication contains opinion, not whether a communication is made, as in
America. See Grimm, supra note 27, at 1698. Classification as an opinion depends on
whether the statement contains elements of taking a position, personal valuation, or esti-
mation. See NPD Europe, 61 BVerfGE 1, 8 (1983); GRUNDGESEiZ, KOMMENTAR, Art. 5,
16 (Theodor Maunz, et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter MAUNZ COMMENTARY].
29. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); AmcANDER
MmxiLOHN, POLMCAL F M (2d ed. 1965) (original title: FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)).
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top of this hierarchy is public or political speech because it is
essential to the operation of democracy. German courts view com-
munication through the prism of its contribution to "public" dia-
logue. To the extent speech possesses "public" importance, it is
presumptively protected through operation of the Presumption Prin-
ciple (Vermutungsprinzip), a key tool by which the Constitutional
Court structures public discourse." While such public or political
communication is perhaps most prized, art, academic research, or
scientific communication also enjoy high status. In contrast, speech
that concerns private or self-interests, such as commercial or eco-
nomic goals, is considered less valuable. Such communication will
often yield to higher valued constitutional principles, such as Arti-
cle 1 human dignity or Article 2 personality rights." Purely com-
mercial speech is not principally protected. However, expression of
commercial topics is protected to the extent it involves opinion or
is covered under press rights, which include publication of certain
informational advertisements.32 Other content-based exceptions in-
clude expression that threatens the democratic social order,33 vio-
30. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Soraya, 34 BVerGE 269, 283-84 (1973) ("An imaginary interview adds
nothing to the formation of real public opinion. As against press utterances of this sort,
the protection of privacy (derived from Articles I and 2) takes unconditional priority.").
For a discussion of Soraya, see notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
32. The status of commercial speech, as conventionally understood under American law,
see, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473 (1989) (commercial speech is that
which "proposes a commercial transaction"), is complicated under German law. Pure com-
mercial speech in the sense of the proposal of an economic transaction or advertising has
been held to be unprotected. See Chemist Advertising Case, 53 BVerfGE 96 (1980); see
also Physician Advertising Case, 71 BVerfGE 162 (1985) (prohibition on advertising up-
held on ground that the government must protect public from undue influence and pre-
serve public confidence in physicians). Thus, this form of German commercial speech can
be regulated by the legislature through operation, essentially, of a deferential rational basis
review test. However, to the extent commercial speech contains elements of opinion, it
may receive protection under Article 5. See, e.g., Physician Advertising Case, 71 BVerfGE
at 175; see generally Glaeser, supra note 1, at 72.
Advertisements may also be protected as news under the press freedom or under
citizens' general right to inform themselves. See, e.g., Siidkurier, 21 BVerfGE 271, 278-80
(1967) (invalidating prohibition on advertisement of foreign job opportunities as violating
press freedoms and the individual right to inform oneself from "generally available sourc-
es."). With these toeholds, it is quite possible German law will develop as American law
has, resulting in general protection for commercial speech. Moreover, pure commercial
advertising may receive constitutional protection under the Article 12 occupational guaran-
tees.
33. See Flag Desecration Case, 81 BVerfGE 278 (1990) and National Anthem Case,
81 BVerfGE 1 (1990) discussed infra at notes 288-324 and accompanying text.
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lence,' hate speech, 5 group defamation, and incitement to
hate.36 These exceptions are attributable to the German preoccupa-
tion with preventing the recurrence of totalitarianism and the rise
of extremist groups and to preserve social harmony.37 Such excep-
tions stand in dramatic contrast to American law, which protects
seditious libel,38  hate speech,39  and group defamation,' and
places expression beyond the limitations of the general law.
B. Historical Evolution of German Law
Critical to an understanding of contemporary law is its evolu-
tion through four distinct phases since the founding of the Federal
Republic in 1949. The first phase is marked by Liith,4' distin-
guished by the Constitutional Court's application of heightened
scrutiny to evaluate incursions on communication. During this
phase, the Court independently examined the underlying facts and
interests at issue with a view toward protecting speech.
A second, more deferential approach was employed by the
Constitutional Court in the 1970s. This phase was initiated by the
Mephisto case.42 While Mephisto concerned artistic rights, the
Court extended the deferential approach of that case to other com-
munication freedoms. Under this approach, the Constitutional Court
tended to defer to the ordinary courts' balancing of expression
rights against countervailing rights or interests. Given the resur-
gence of Article 1 human dignity and Article 2 personality rights
in this era, these rights tended to predominate over communication
rights.
34. See Horror Film Case, 87 BVerfGE 209 (1992). See infra notes 334-37 and ac-
companying text.
35. See Cripple, 86 BVerfGE 1 (1992). See infra notes 341-51 and accompanying text.
36. See Auschwitz Lie, 90 BVerfGE 241 (1994). See infra notes 447-60 and accom-
panying text.
37. These content-based exceptions are also attributable to the fundamental German
concept of a "militant democracy," which underlies the Basic Law. This term refers to
government's obligation actively to protect society against threats to its stability or well-
being. See infra note 110 and accompanying text (elaborating on the concept of "militant
democracy"). They might also be thought to flow from the Article 5(2) triad of limita-
tions. See supra note 9.
38. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
39. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
40. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See infra note 457 and
accompanying text.
41. 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958). See discussion infra notes 47-130 and accompanying text.
42. 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971). See discussion infra notes 156-88 and accompanying text.
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The case of Deutschland-Magazin43 marked the third phase.
Under this approach, the Court moved away from the extreme
deference of Mephisto and sought to strike a middle position be-
tween such deference and the heightened approach of Liith." The
Court announced a variable standard of review; the degree of the
Court's scrutiny depended on the severity of the incursion of the
constitutional right. The Deutschland-Magazin approach thus result-
ed in enhanced protection of rights. Paradoxically, this had mixed
results for communication. On the one hand, the Court employed
the variable standard of review to vindicate speech interests. 5 On
the other hand, the Court used the technique to enhance protection
of other constitutional rights, such as dignity and personality
protections. When juxtaposed against communication interests,
personality rights tended to prevail.'
The 1990s have evidenced yet another phase. Under current
German law, the Constitutional Court applies intensive scrutiny to
incursions of expression freedoms to determine whether the lower
courts correctly assessed the facts, interpreted accurately the ordi-
nary law and Basic Law, and explained its conclusions thoroughly
and convincingly. The result of this approach is a more conscious
acceptance of critical, sharp, and polemical expression and a more
heightened emphasis of the individual right to speak one's mind. In
these respects, the 1990s signal a return to the view in Liith that
expression is a preferred right. With this overview in mind, a more
detailed examination of German law can proceed.
Il. THE FOUNDATIONAL CASE OF LOTH AND rrs PROGENY
A. Lilth
Modem German public discourse jurisprudence begins with
Liith.47 In its first major case dealing with Article 5 freedoms, the
Constitutional Court laid out the objective set of constitutionally
mandated values (eine objektive Wertordnung) that must be realized
43. See 42 BVerfGE 143 (1976). See infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
44. See Quint, supra note 4, at 318.
45. See, e.g., Art Critic Case, 54 BVerfGE 129 (1980). See discussion infra notes 212-
15 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Bll, 54 BVerfGE 208 (1980). See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying
text
47. 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958).
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in German society. In so doing, the Court clarified the relationship
between basic constitutional rights and private law. The Court
further identified freedom of opinion as central to the value struc-
ture of the Basic Law, elaborated the basic rationale of free expres-
sion, underscoring its individual and social dimensions, discussed
the essential purposes served by communication, and, finally, set
forth the general balancing of interests test to be applied to deter-
mine Article 5 protections.'
The controversy in Lath concerned a Hamburg press official,
Erich Lfith, who called for the boycott of a new film by an infa-
mous film director, Veit Harlan. Harlan had produced notoriously
anti-Semitic films during the Nazi period.49 During that time he
had worked under the general direction of Nazi propaganda minis-
ter Josef Goebbels, producing Nazi propaganda and anti-semitic
films, some of which were later determined to be crimes against
humanity.50
Lfth was active in a group seeking to repair relations between
Christians and Jews. Incensed by Harlan's reemergence on the
German film scene, Lith's call for a boycott was motivated by his
desire to demonstrate to the world that the new German cinema
was free from the darkness of the Nazi period." He believed
Harlan's Nazi past would bring moral condemnation to Germany,
inside and outside.52 Suing in the civil courts, the producer and
distributor of Harlan's film were able to obtain an injunction
against Lith that prohibited him from continuing the call for a
boycott on the theory that this caused injury to their business inter-
ests under Section 826 of the German Civil Code (BGB). Section
826 is one of the famous general clauses of the Code.53 The Con-
48. See KOMMmS, supra note 5, at 368.
49. Erich Lith was the Director of the Hamburg press office. See Lrth, 7 BVerfGE at
198, 199. In that capacity and as Chairman of the Hamburg Press Club, he addressed a
group of film producers and distributors as part of a celebration of German film. He
called upon them and all Germans not to attend the newly released film Immortal-Lover
directed by Veit Harlan. See id. at 199-200.
50. After the war, a criminal court convicted Harlan of a crime against humanity by
making a film, the notorious Sweet Jew (Jud Sdss), that contributed to the persecution of
Jews during the Nazi period. He was subsequently acquitted of the crime because the war
tribunal could not disprove his assertion that he worked under "compulsion." He was also
later "exonerated" in de-Nazification proceedings. See id. at 219, 222-26; see also Quint,
supra note 4, at 253 n.16.
51. See Lath, 7 BVerfGE at 199-200; see also Quint, supra note 4, at 253.
52. See Lath, 7 BVerfGE at 199-200.
53. Id. at 200-02. The court regarded Lith's action as an incitement in violation of
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stitutional Court overturned the injunction, elaborating the funda-
mental principles governing interpretation of Article 5 freedoms
and the general relationship between basic rights and the private
law.
Because this was the first case involving important issues of
freedom of opinion, the Constitutional Court had to clarify a num-
ber of preliminary points concerning the Basic Law, freedoms of
communication and private law 4 First, it was necessary for the
Constitutional Court to clarify the nature of basic constitutional
rights in Germany, and then determine their relationship to the
body of private law. As foreseen in the Basic Law, basic rights
are, above all, defensive rights, safeguarding a personal sphere of
liberty.5' By their enumeration of basic rights, the Framers of the
Basic Law meant to stress the primacy of the human being and her
dignity before the power of the state. 6 In rights theory, such de-
fensive rights are characterized as negative liberties, meaning that
they delimit a sphere of personal autonomy beyond governmental
control. In German law, such rights are referred to as "subjective,"
denoting a set of rights exercisable by individuals. The essential
character of this subjective dimension to rights corresponds to the
American conception of individual constitutional rights.
However, the nature of German rights differs from American
rights in that German rights also possess an objective dimension
that obligates the government to create the proper conditions to
effectuate their realization. For example, this objective component
requires affirmative state support and protection of broadcasting
institutions such as television and radio stations.57 A comparison
Article 826 of the Civil Code which reads: "Whoever causes damage to another person
intentionally and in a manner offensive to good morals is obligated to compensate the
other person for the damage." KoMMERS, supra note 5, at 368 (trans.). The "general
clauses" of the German Civil Code contain open language designed to bring the Code
into conformity with contemporary needs, as determined by courts and scholars. The col-
laborations facilitate the Code's "interpretation out of itself," constituting a living, com-
plete law. Certainly this runs counter to the prevailing view that European codes are so
specific that they allow for the rote-application of cases to enumerated language. Instead,
the general clauses allow for significant judicial creativity. See Quint, supra note 4, at
253. An integral aspect of "good morals" is the principle of free speech, given effect
through the famous Reciprocal Effect Theory (Wechselwirkung) developed in Liith. See
infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
54. See Quint, supra note 4, at 254.
55. See Lath, 7 BVerfGE at 204.
56. See id. at 205.
57. See CuRmiE, supra note 4, at 184 n.37.
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of the constitutions further illustrates this difference. Unlike the
United States Constitution, the Basic Law is value-ordered, not
value-neutral. "This value-system, which centers upon human digni-
ty and the free unfolding of the human personality within the
social community, must be looked upon as a fundamental constitu-
tional decision affecting all areas of law, public and private....
Thus, basic rights obviously influence civil law too.""8
"The concept of an 'objective' ordering of values ... [is] a
central concept in German constitutional doctrine." ' 9 In German
legal theory, an "objective" value is one that applies in general and
in the abstract, quite apart from any tangible or specific relation-
ship.' By interpreting basic rights as establishing an "objective"
ordering of values, the Constitutional Court was stating that those
values were so important that they must exist "objectively"--as an
independent force, separate from their specific manifestation in a
concrete legal relationship. So conceived, objective rights form part
of the legal order, the ordre public, thereby possessing significance
for all legal relationships.61 In short, basic rights are a constituent
part of the "objective" order of fundamental principles that governs
German society. They might even be viewed as "permanent ends
of the state, . . . [that] cannot be changed, even by constitutional
amendment." 2
Because basic rights are essential to the public good, it fol-
lows that basic rights must be protected against impairment from
private as well as public actors. Since basic rights form part of the
58. Lath, 7 BverfGE at 205.
59. Quint, supra note 4, at 261. Many commentators have focused on the defensive
character of rights, especially as an outgrowth of classical liberal theory. See, e.g.,
KOMMENTAR ZUM GRuNDoEsamra FIR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DETrrSCHLAND 415 (Rudolf
Wassermann ed., 2nd ed. 1989) [hereinafter WASSERMANN ComMENTARY]. But the objec-
tive dimension of rights is just as relevant. Under this concept, rights influence not only
interpretation of the legal norms, but also obligate the state to realize rights and to sup-
port, secure, and solidify them. This means that the state must create the proper cultural,
economic, and social conditions for realization of rights. See id. at 418. Thus, the rela-
tionship between objective and subjective dimensions is best seen as a mutually supportive
one. In fact, one could say that the function of objective principles is to make the subjec-
tive component real. See hi. at 429. Accord, MAUNZ CoMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 9;
Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 1, at 114.
60. See Quint, supra note 4, at 261.
61. The "ordre public" means the mandatory law of the state. Liith, 7 BVerfGE at
206.
62. Quint, supra note 4, at 261 (noting Art. 79 § 3 GG), which prohibits amendments
of the Basic Law that affect certain constitutional principles, including basic rights).
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"objective" legal order, they must apply generally in soci-
ety-against both state and private actors that would act to curtail
them.63 Thus, basic rights must also affect private individuals in-
sofar as they seek enforcement of their claims and interests through
the rules of private law.
The Basic Law's "influence" on civil law contrasts notably
with that of American law. The United States Constitution applies
when the government acts. In the absence of official action, the
Constitution does not apply. This is, however, subject to the con-
tours of the state action doctrine under which some private actors
are held to be acting as "public" officials, thereby triggering appli-
cation of the Constitution.6' The state may also "act" when the
rule enforced by the court has been formulated by government,
even if the parties in dispute are private. The rules of libel at issue
in cases following New York Times fit this category.6 Since the
business law claim at issue in Liith was formulated by government,
Liith might likewise make out state action under this doctrine of
American law. However, in comparison to the Basic Law's "objec-
tive" ordering of society, the United States Constitution withdraws
from the important private sector of society. For example, except
63. See id. at 261-62:
The permanence of these fundamental values in the Basic Law was intended to
contrast with what was seen as the legal relativism of the Weimar Constitution,
in which basic principles could be easily altered by constitutional amendment,
and seems to reinforce the view that the basic rights are intended not only to
grant individual rights against the state but also to apply more generally in all
legal relationships.
Il
64. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding
that the close relationship between coffee shop and state-owned enterprise led to state
action); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-06 (1946) (holding that town citizens may
not be denied freedom of press and religion merely because the town is owned by a
private as opposed to a municipal corporation). Under American law, there are also more
elaborate notions of state action. For example, in the leading case of Shelley v. Kramer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court found state action in the judicial enforcement of a racially
restrictive covenant. In Shelley, the dispute was between private parties. State action was
found solely through judicial enforcement of the covenant, which was held to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Because Shelley involves judicial enforce-
ment of constitutional norms against a purely private dispute, it is perhaps the closest
analogue to the German concept of the influence of the Constitution on private norms. Cf
Art. 1 § 3 GG. For elaboration of these points, see Quint, supra note 4, at 267-72.
65. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 323 (1974) (holding that New
York Times protection against liability for defamation does not apply where the defamed
individual is neither a public official or public figure).
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as noted above, the United States Constitution ordinarily has no
impact on private law relations, such as those governed by con-
tract, tort, or trusts and estates. In this way, the reach of the Ger-
man Basic Law is broader than its American counterpart.
When state action triggers application of the United States
Constitution-whether on account of government action or private
actors acting under cloak of the state-the Constitution applies
fully and directly. The Basic Law likewise applies fully and direct-
ly against governmental action in Germany. On the other hand, the
Basic Law theoretically only "influences" the civil law's regulation
of private actors, even if they might be deemed to be acting under
color of state action. In this respect, it would seem that the Basic
Law would have a weaker influence on society than the United
States Constitution. However, while this was so in the past, we
shall see that the contemporary Constitutional Court has consid-
erably tightened its review of the ordinary courts' interpretation and
application of expression rights even in purely private disputes. In
significant part, this reflects the belief that the real threats to ex-
pression in German society come from private actors and social
forces, and not from the state.6 Thus, from the standpoint of law
in the 1990s, there is effectively no difference in the standard of
review applied by the Constitutional Court to purely private or
public law disputes.67 Still, the nature of the Constitutional Cour-
t's review of expression rights, while probing, still falls short of
the intensity of strict scrutiny review conventionally applied in free
speech cases by the Supreme Court. In summary, the impact of the
American Constitution on society is in some respects stronger than
the Basic Law (when state action applies and the Supreme Court
applies strict scrutiny review) and in some respects weaker than the
Basic Law (when purely private law disputes are at issue).'
A return to Lith illuminates these matters. Liith presented the
Constitutional Court with its first opportunity to clarify the nature
66. Interview of Dr. Albert Bleckmarm, Professor of Law, Westfalische Wilhelms-Uni-
versity, Milnster, Germany, by Edward J. Eberle (May 12, 1995) (on file with author).
67. Letter from Dr. Bodo Pieroth, Professor of Law, Westfalische Wilhelms-University,
to Edward J. Eberle (Aug. 26, 1995) (on file with author); Letter from Dr. Stefan Pieper,
Assistant Professor of Law, to Edward J. Eberle (Sept. 15, 1995) (on file with author).
68. For elaboration of these points, see Quint, supra note 4, at 272-80. The stronger
impact of the American Constitution on society relates to the Supreme Court's application
of strict scrutiny review to free speech cases, a more heightened standard of review than
employed by the Constitutional Court. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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of the relationship between basic rights and private law
(Drittwirkung).69 It was necessary for the Court to resolve the
question because the plaintiff in Liith raised a public law freedom
of opinion claim against the private business law claims of
Harlan's producer and distributor. A plaintiff in Lfith's position
might have asserted that because Article 5 reads in a positive,
declarative form, and because there is no express limit to its reach,
private actors can be held liable. Indeed, if basic rights form part
of the "objective" legal order, they govern all legal relations, pub-
lic and private.
70
69. In Germany, the relationship between public and private law remains a question of
deep and long-running dispute. Historically, German law has distinguished sharply between
public and private law. Private law refers to the body of law governing relations between
private individuals. For example, tort, contract, and trusts and estates would be subjects of
private law. Deeply influenced by the philosophical theories of Kant and his emphasis on
free will, autonomy, and equality, the framers of the German Civil Code:
[Viewed the civil law primarily as a means of adjusting purely individual and
private rights in [these] traditional areas.... The apparatus of the state was
excluded from private law, except to the extent necessary for the judiciary to
enforce the rights agreed upon by private parties, as recognized by the Civil
Code, and these rights generally implied a maximum of individual autonomy
and a minimum of intervention to redress individual or group inequalities al-
ready existing in society.
Quint, supra note 4, at 255. One might even argue that "the rules of private law were
thought to enhance a more general freedom of individuals not to be interfered with by
the state-particularly in commercial relationships but also in other areas of everyday
life." Id. at 256.
Public law, by contrast, is the body of law governing the relationship between the
government and individuals. Constitutional and administrative law are paradigms of this
law. In Germany, public law has always been the domain of special tribunals, not the
ordinary courts--perhaps because it "was relatively new . . . [or] because it was thought
to require a special perspective." Id.
This public/private distinction relies on Roman law roots, and is typical of European
legal systems. German theorists of the 18th and 19th Centuries, including such notable
figures as Kant, Herder, von Savigny, and Windscheid, also exerted significant influence
on this development of German law.
70. This conclusion could derive support from records of the constitutional convention
indicating that the human dignity concept anchored in Article 1(1) was meant to bind
individuals as well as government, and that all basic rights were meant to protect human
dignity. See CURRIE, supra note 4, at 183. In addition, an influential decision of the
Federal Labor Court concluded that a private employer offended speech protections if it
dismissed a worker on political grounds. To reach this decision, the Court concluded that
the basic right to expression applied against private persons too:
Not all, but a number of significant basic constitutional rights are meant not
only as guarantees of freedom vis-d-vis state authority but also as organizing
principles [Ordungsgrundsdtze] for the entire society which, to an extent to be
determined from the nature of each right, have immediate significance for the
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On the other hand, since opinion freedoms are themselves
facially limited in article 5(2), one in Harlan's position could argue
that his business law claims were general law limitations on the
reach of freedom of opinion. In fact, several influential commenta-
tors argued that the Basic Law only applies against government.7
If that were the case, the controversy in Lith would be resolved
only by reference to the rules of civil law. In short, the textual
evidence was inconclusive. Thus, much depended on the Constitu-
tional Court's interpretation of the relationship of the Basic Law to
the civil law.
The Constitutional Court opted for an intermediate, but cre-
ative, solution to this relationship. Between the extremes of the
Basic Law being limited to governmental action and its application
to any action that curtails rights, public or private, the Court struck
a compromise; it decided that the Basic Law should apply "indi-
rectly" to private law. By "indirect" application, the Constitutional
Court meant that constitutional norms should "influence" rather
than govern private law norms.' "A certain intellectual content
legal relations of citizens with one another.... The basic right to free expres-
sion of opinion ... would be rendered [largely] ineffective ... if... indi-
viduals and others with economic and social power ... were in a position by
virtue of that power to restrict this right at will ....
I BAGE 185, 192-94 (1954); CtURRE, supra note 4, at 182 (trans.). Thus, the Federal
Labor Court concluded that speech protections had an immediate limiting impact
(unmittelbare Drittwirkung) on the actions of private parties. Not surprisingly, not every-
one agreed with the conclusion of the Federal Labor Court. See, e.g., MAUNz COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 28, at Art. I Abs. I, Rdnr. 129-30 (arguing that direct application of
basic rights to private actions "strikes at the root of private autonomy"); see also CURRIE,
supra note 4, at 183.
71. In German legal theory, at least two opposing views have been asserted concerning
the reach of basic rights. On the one hand, commentators have asserted that constitutional
rights are directed only against the state. In this view, therefore, a dispute between solely
private parties, as in Liith, would be decided solely by the rules of private law. See Ct-
Rm, supra note 4, at 257. See generally 1 H. voN MANGOLDT, F. KLEIN & C. STARCK,
DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETz 136 (3d ed. 1985); see also CURIE, supra note 4, at 182
(arguing that Article 1(3) means that basic rights only apply against the state).
On the other hand, other commentators have asserted the opposite view that basic
rights apply generally, against both individuals and the state. See, e.g., ALBERT
BLECKMANN, STAATsREcrr 11. ALLGEMEINE GRuNDRECTLEHtREN 162 (2d. ed. 1985).
The court in Lith discussed both theories, before opting for the intermediate solution
discussed above. See Lth, 7 BVerfGE at 204-06.
72. LUith, 7 BVerfGE at 205 (the Basic Law "influences obviously also civil law; no
civil law provision may contradict the Basic Law; all (legal provisions) must be interpret-
ed consistent with its spirit").
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'flows' or 'radiates' from the constitutional law into the civil law
and affects the interpretation of existing civil law rules." 3
Therefore, when faced with Article 5(1) claims, ordinary
courts must view the "general law" textual constraint not as a one-
sided limitation on communication freedoms. Rather, Article 5
freedoms and general law norms have a mutual effect on one an-
other. It is as much the case that Article 5 can influence interpreta-
tion of the general law as the opposite. Under the theory of objec-
tive values, general laws "must be interpreted in light of the value-
establishing significance of the basic right in a free democratic
state, and so any limiting effect on the basic right must itself be
restricted."74 In German law, the mutual reciprocal effect that ba-
sic rights and the general law have on each other is known as the
Reciprocal Effect Theory (Wechselwirkung).75
The Court's conclusion is somewhat startling when one con-
siders that it implied a fundamental limitation on the reach of the
express general law limitations on communication rights. This
illustrates the profound effect of the objective theory on German
constitutionalism. It also illustrates the high regard the Court placed
on the value of free expression in a democratic society.
Under the Reciprocal Effect Theory, the Constitutional Court
had to assure that the private law courts adequately take into ac-
count the "objective" order of values.76 Exactly what this entails
has varied over time, as the Court has taken both speech protective
73. Quint, supra note 4, at 263; see also Liih, 7 BVerfGE at 205 (from the Basic
Law "flows a certain constitutional content").
74. LUth, 7 BVerfGE at 209.
75. Id. at 208. The Liith court noted:
The relationship between basic rights and the private legal order must be cali-
brated as follows: general statutes must be interpreted in light of the important
limiting effect of basic rights, so that a specific content of the basic rights
carries over into all areas of law out of recognition of the fundamental impor-
tance of free discussion to a free democratic order. This leads to a presumption
that free discussion is protected, and must be preserved especially concerning
matters of public life. The mutual relationship between basic rights and general
statutes is thus not a one-sided limitation of the effect of basic rights through
'general statutes' but must be interpreted in light of recognition of the value-
establishing significance of basic rights for a free democratic state so that the
basic right itself establishes a limitation on general statutes.
Id at 208-09.
76. See id. "The Constitutional Court must test to see whether the ordinary courts have
adequately taken into account the scope and impact of basic rights on civil law." Id.
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and speech restrictive approaches.' Still, the dispute "remains
substantively and procedurally a dispute of civil law."T Thus, the
civil law courts will have the last word, subject to the Court's
control of constitutional principles. The interpretations of the ordi-
nary courts must be harmonious with the objective system of val-
ues.
With this background, we are now in a position to evaluate
the Court's view of expression. According to the Court, freedom of
opinion occupies a central place in the scale of constitutional val-
ues. Theoretically, the Court values communication both as an end
in itself and as a means to accomplish other worthy ends:
As the most immediate manifestation of the human person-
ality in society, the basic right to free expression of opin-
ion is one of the noblest of all human rights .... To a
free democratic constitutional order it is absolutely basic
[schlechthin konstituierend], for it alone makes possible the
continuing intellectual controversy, the contest of opinions
that forms the lifeblood of such an order. In a certain sense
it is the basis of all freedom whatever, "the matrix, the
indispensable condition of nearly every other form of free-
dom." 79
Viewed as an intrinsic value, communication is an important
facet of being human. Free expression is therefore an immediate
and tangible manifestation of human character that is necessary for
spiritual and moral growth.'o The linkage of communication to
77. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
78. Lijth, 7 BVerfGE at 205.
79. lId at 208 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo, J.),
translated in CURRIE, supra note 4, at 175.
Professor Wassermann observes that while both the individual and social components
to speech are especially valued today, particularly for their worth in promoting truth and
justice, this dual character of speech has roots that go back to the 1800s. See WASSER-
MANN COMmENrARY, supra note 59, at 415. From the standpoint of today, Professor
Kriele notes that expression promotes many values, including self-realization, truth, democ-
racy, and a checking value. See Martin Kriele, Ehrenschutz und Meinungsfreiheit, 30 NJW
1897 (1994). As in American law, German law is thus seeking to support expression on a
multi-valued foundation, as compared to reliance on any single root value. See Edward J.
Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
411, 429-31 (1992) (arguing that a web of mutually reinforcing values provides a surer
footing for expression freedoms). American and German law thus may be pursuing similar
theoretical rationales.
80. This reflects the basic human desire that one's opinion count for something-that
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human personality has deep roots in modem German law. The
Basic Law's protection of human dignity in Article 1 is the su-
preme value in the constitution's ordering of objective values. The
Article 2 rights to free development of personality are perhaps the
next most valued norm. Together, these two articles form a certain
sphere of inviolable human autonomy. Thus, the interaction be-
tween human communication and human dignity may itself be a
constitutive element of being human.
The German valuation of communication for its own intrinsic
worth has close parallels to American law. In American law, vari-
ous nonconsequential justifications for speech have been put forth,
including the views that speech is an integral part of personal
development; it is necessary to the achievement of control over our
destinies; 1 it is a constituent element of our moral autonomy that
entitles us to dignity and respect; 2 and it provides a basis for
self-determination or self-realization in defining who we are.83
Also, as in American law, German law supports communication
on consequential rationales. The main German consequential ratio-
nale mirrors the American one: the promotion of democracy. In
German law, free communication is absolutely constitutive
(schlechthin konstituierend) to a free democratic order." Commu-
nication facilitates the ongoing public dialogue necessary for the
success of democratic society.8 5 American law has similarly
one be able to influence the world. See Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 1, at 68-69.
81. See Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy and Freedom of Expression: A
Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 679-80 (1982) (justifying speech
because it may aid self-realization, including the ability to achieve control over one's
destiny); David AJ. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory
of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974) (arguing that the value of
speech rests on its relation to self-respect and thus self-determination).
82. See Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles Over Free Speech, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, June 11, 1992, at 55, 56-57 (asserting that the constitutive feature of a just, polit-
ical society is that government treats its people as responsible moral agents); Richards,
supra note 81, at 62-63 (stating that the value of speech is as strong as its "best moral
argument").
83. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LmERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-48 (1989)
(noting that self-fulfillment and participation in change are key values, together implying
"a notion of freedom oriented toward self-realization and self-determination"); MARTN H.
REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRrTICAL ANALYSIS 11-13 (1984) (claiming that
self-realization is the only true value served by free speech).
84. See Lath, 7 BVerfGE 198, 208 (1958).
85. The articulation of an opinion (Meinungsiiusserung) has an immediate "intellectual
effect on the world.. . that helps build public opinion and attempts to convince adher-
ents." Id. at 210.
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viewed democratic self-government as a central justification for
speech.86 In this way, both societies see communication as a pre-
ferred freedom-indeed, "the matrix, the indispensable condition of
nearly every other form of freedom."'  The difference in the two
societies is that free speech is the preferred legal value in America,
whereas it is an important, but not the preeminent, value in Germa-
ny; human dignity is the most favored German value.
In view of the German focus on communication as central to
the functioning of democracy, it is not surprising that public speech
lies at the core of Article 5 protection. A central determination in
German law, accordingly, is whether communication contributes to
the formation of public opinion. If it does, it is presumptively
protected. 8 German expression is consequential; its value depends
on the ends it produces. Specially prized is communication with
important political or social content. A consequence of this
preferencing of public speech is that it can impact detrimentally on
private rights. For example, in Lith, the high value of the public
communication concerning Harlan's reemergence in German culture
eclipsed the specific private right issues of Harlan's reputation and
business interests.
The public/private distinction is a central determination in Ger-
man communication law. Both terms differ somewhat from conven-
tional uses in American law. The definition of "public" for purpos-
es of fixing the boundaries of public discourse is similar in that
both German and American law interpret the term broadly to in-
clude matters of general or public interest.89 Thus, in both cul-
tures public speech can relate to the formation of political will
necessary to democratic self-government or to the discussion of
general social matters necessary to the building of culture.
86. See, e.g., ALExANDER MlmEJON, POLrFnCAL FkEEDOM 55-56 (1960). Free speech
"stands alone, as the cornerstone of the structure of self-government. If that uniqueness
were taken away, government by consent of the governed would have perished from the
earth." Id.
87. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), as cited in Lilth, 7 BVerfGE at
208. The Constitutional Court's patterning of expression on American roots was not coin-
cidental.
88. See Liith, 7 BVerfGE at 212 (stating that when expression "makes a contribution
to the intellectual struggle for formation of public opinion through one of the publicly
important questions, the expression is presumptively protected').
89. "Free expression possesses special value to a free democracy because it facilitates
open discussion over all matters of general interest and serious content." Id. at 219.
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A main difference is that the German court more actively eval-
uates corm-nunication to determine whether it is "public," whether it
is "serious" enough to make a contribution to public discussion,
whether it is an opinion and not a fact, and whether a fact is true
or false. The German Constitutional Court also actively probes a
speaker's motives and purposes to determine the value of the com-
munication pursuant to these goals. For example, in Lith the Court
determined that the speaker genuinely desired to influence public
opinion, as compared to speaking out of a selfish motivation.' °
This was significant in determining the high level of protection
accorded the communication. In American law, by contrast, motive
or intent is irrelevant to fixing the boundaries of public dis-
course.
91
"Private" speech has a different connotation in German law. It
means speech uttered for a private purpose or out of self-interest.
Pursuit of economic motives is a pristine example of this, as illus-
trated in the BlinklVier case, where the Springer publishing house's
self-interest in promoting an economic boycott of publication of
East German programming was deemed subordinate to the
speaker's interest and social interests in the dissemination of such
information.92 Private or economic communication will often yield
to higher valued constitutional principles, such as the core speech
rights in Blinkfiier or dignity or personality rights. By contrast, in
American law such economic or purely self-interested speech is
likely to be accorded intermediate protection under the commercial
speech doctrine.93 In American public discourse "private" denotes
speech communicated privately or in a nonpublic forum.94
90. See id. at 215-16.
91. Public discourse in America means any communication uttered "publicly," regard-
less of motive or intent. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)
(First Amendment protects speaker's deliberate vilification of Fundamentalist minister).
Assessment of the value of the communication lies more with the people than the Court.
See Eberle, supra note 1, at 1183 (arguing that the speaker controls the legality of the
speech).
92. 25 BVerfGE 256 (1969).
93. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment protects basic advertising).
94. See Eberle, supra note 1, at 1186 & n.361. An example of such private speech is
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985), in which the Court al-
lowed a defamation award against a credit reporting agency for false reporting of a
company's bankruptcy on the theory that only "private" speech, not public defamation,
was involved. Such private speech was entitled to less protection.
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On account of these fundamental principles, the Reciprocal
Effect Theory requires that the general law must be interpreted in
light of the significance of the communication. In this way, Article
5 exerts a powerful limiting influence on private legal relation-
ships.9" It is the special role of the Constitutional Court, as guard-
ian of the Constitution, to control interpretation of expression free-
doms and other Basic Law norms in the German legal order.
To accomplish this, the Constitutional Court reviews decisions
of the ordinary courts to see whether the scope and impact of basic
rights are adequately considered.9" However, the Court only re-
views the constitutional aspect of the case. The Constitutional
Court is not a court of general, ultimate jurisdiction like the United
States Supreme Court. Rather, it is a specialized court, hearing
only constitutional claims and certain public law controversies.'
This is in keeping with the Continental tradition of centralized
judicial review. In Germany, the court system is organized by
subject matter, with separate courts for administrative, labor, social
welfare, civil, and criminal matters, among others.9"
In reviewing the constitutional aspects of a case, the Constitu-
tional Court does not engage in the comprehensive review of lower
court decisions in the fashion familiar to American court observers.
Instead, the Constitutional Court tests the lower court decision to
determine whether appropriate weight was given the basic right,
and that its essential content (Wesensgehalt) was respected. The
Court does not make factual determinations nor does it always
independently scrutinize factual questions. Rather, it mainly relies
on the ordinary courts for the fixing of factual relationships. How-
ever, while the Court tries not to substitute its judgment for that of
the lower court in these matters, its pronouncements on constitu-
tional issues often anticipate desired solutions of concrete cases. 99
Thus, the main goal of the Court is to supervise and guide the
95. See Liith, 7 BVerfGE at 209.
96. See id. at 207.
97. See KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 3. For example, the Court decides separation of
powers controversies, disputes between the federal and state governments, international law
cases, and abstract questions of constitutional law (akin to advisory opinions). Letter of
Dr. Bodo Pieroth, Professor of Law, Westfalische Wilhelms-University, MOnster, Germany,
to Edward J. Eberle (Nov. 27, 1995) (on file with author).
98. See KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 3.
99. See Letter of Professor Dr. Bodo Pieroth to Edward J. Eberle (November 27, 1995)
(on file with author).
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ordinary courts' interpretation and application of constitutional
norms.
Within this framework, the intensity of the Court's scrutiny has
varied. The Court's approach in Liith was quite intensive, whereas
in Mephisto it was deferential. Today, the Court has returned to the
more exacting standard of Liith.1°' Still, the nature of review em-
ployed by the German Court is less probing than the "strict scruti-
ny" applied by the United States Supreme Court in conventional
First Amendment cases. The review is more akin to that applied by
the Supreme Court in administrative law decisions.'
To assure compliance with Article 5 norms, the Constitutional
Court employs a general balancing of interests test
(Giiterabwiigung). "The decision can only be supported upon a
consideration of the effect of all essential circumstances of the
individual case. An incorrect balancing of these factors can lead to
a violation of basic rights."'" This test is familiar enough to an
American observer. it is essentially a full consideration of all rele-
vant factors. In American balancing regimes, its most similar ana-
logue would be an ad hoc balancing test.0 3 As with an ad hoc
balancing test, the balancing must be performed anew in each case.
There is no preconceived weighing of the values to be applied.
Thus, communication values are balanced against countervailing
interests in the circumstance of each case to see which is weight-
ier.1o4
One difference is that the German version of balancing includes
a wider range of interests than is typical in America. For example,
in Lfith the Court considered aspects of Ltith's career and activities,
his motives, and the general underlying social and cultural milieu
that arguably justified his call for a boycott."5 The nature of this
balancing regime is best viewed through an assessment of its appli-
100. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
101. Compare, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978) (courts should guide but not dictate the decision
making process of agencies) with Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 231 (1987) (strict scrutiny necessary to protect First Amendment freedoms).
102. Lith, 7 BVerfGE at 212.
103. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE LJ. 943, 979 (1987) ("'[AId hoc' balancing . . . demands a new balance in every
case.,).
104. See Quint, supra note 4, at 283-84.
105. See Liith, 7 BVerfGE at 215-16; see also Quint, supra note 4, at 285.
[Vol. 47.797
PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN CONTEMPORARY GERMANY
cation. In Liith, constitutional protection of the call for a boycott
could only be determined by balancing Lifth's communication
rights against the business interests of Harlan's distributors. Assess-
ing Lith's speech interests, the Court observed that the issues he
raised were of great importance to the German people. Following
Germany's emergence from the horror of World War II, it was
extremely important to show the world that Germany was no lon-
ger associated with its Nazi past. Ltith genuinely believed that the
reemergence of the former Nazi director of anti-Semitic films
would lead the world to think that nothing had changed in Germa-
ny. His call for a boycott was a clear attempt to demonstrate that
Harlan was not a fit representative of the German people. He acted
out of genuine conviction, and not for personal or economic gain.
His statements could thus be viewed in light of these general polit-
ical and cultural goals."3 To the Court, these matters were very
essential questions for the German people."° Accordingly, they
were of strong public concern and merited the highest value. Under
the operation of the Presumption Principle, the communication was
presumptively protected because it was an indispensable contribu-
tion to the formation of public opinion.
Against these powerful communication interests, Harlan's pri-
vate economic interests were distinctly subordinate.108 "When the
formation of public opinion on a question important to the general
welfare is at stake, private and particularly economic interests of
individuals must basically yield.""° The remedy for the harmful
speech in Lith, according to the Court, was more speech or
counterspeech;110 a solution familiar enough to American read-
ers."' "Only in an equal competition of viewpoints can public
opinion be realized, and can individual members of society form
their personal views." ' 2 Unmistakably, the German Constitutional
Court pursued its own "marketplace of ideas" metaphor, phrased as
106. See Liith, 7 BVerfGE at 215-16.
107. See id. at 216.
108. See Quint, supra note 4, at 286.
109. Liith, 7 BVerfGE at 219.
110. See id. "Whoever feels slighted by the public utterance of another, can nevertheless
seek recourse through public channels." Id.
111. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring)
("If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence").
112. Lilth, 7 BVerfGE at 219.
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"an intellectual struggle of opinions" (geistigen Meinungs-
kampo),n3
While the result in Liith is speech protective, it is easy enough
to imagine speech restrictive outcomes given the Court's reliance
on a general balancing of interests test. The Liith Court itself rec-
ognized this possibility. "Speech rights must yield to protectable
interests of another of a higher rank that are violated by the exer-
cise of expression. . . . Whether such private interests of another
are to be preferred depends on an assessment of all relevant cir-
cumstances.""' 4 As we shall see, the seeds sown by Liith bear
fruit in subsequent cases, especially those in the 1970s, where
dignity and personality interests generally eclipsed communication
rights."15
Even at this early stage, there are obvious problems for a com-
munication regime founded on a general balancing of interests
methodology. First, the balancing depends on the balancer. Without
objective rationalizing norms, the balancing is likely to reflect the
prejudice of the balancer. This presents a great danger of subjectiv-
ity and manipulation. Second, this calls into account the legitimacy
of the Court. Lacking cabining principles, the Court's exercise
seems more like the raw exercise of power than the work of the
law. This exercise also seems more appropriate to the legislature
than the judiciary. Third, there is a general lack of structure to
such regimes. Each case presents a new set of factors to be bal-
anced. No two cases are likely to be exactly the same. Thus it will
take some time to identify an organizing principle by which to
structure the law. In the meantime, however, uncertainty as to the
range of basic rights is likely to arise. Since communication rights
are justifiably assumed to be fragile, such uncertainty is likely to
chill or discourage exercise of communication freedoms."6 For
113. Compare id. at 208 ("For a free democratic state order is (expression) absolutely
fundamental because it facilitates the ongoing intellectual exchange, the struggle (or battle)
of opinions that is its life element.") with Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market."). Choice of this metaphor in Germa-
ny seems designed mainly to facilitate the structure of public discourse, especially for
achievement of a political will, as compared to seeking a more central value, like truth or
advancement of knowledge more common to the American scheme.
114. Lith, 7 BVerfGE at 210-11.
115. See infra notes 155-88 and accompanying text.
116. See generally Quint, supra note 4, at 288-90 (discussing the effect of uncertainty
resulting from general balancing methods).
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many of these reasons, American free speech law has mainly aban-
doned general balancing of interest methodologies in favor of
weighted forms of balancing. 7
As is obvious in the Liith decision, the Constitutional Court
actively realized the "objective" order of values set in the Basic
Law. Freedom of opinion is a central value in this order, both for
its own sake and for its support of other values, especially the
functioning of democracy.' The self-governmental aspect of
communication is tangibly linked to specific textual mandates in
the Basic Law which, in turn, make up other parts of this "objec-
tive" order of values. For example, the Basic Law provides for a
"militant-democracy," which refers to the state's authorization to
defend society against threats to the basic democratic order."9
For example, all basic rights are subject to forfeiture when used to
"combat the free democratic basic order" under Article 18.'20 Ar-
ticle 19(2), however, provides that "[i]n no case may the essence
of a basic right be encroached upon.' 21 Under Article 21 politi-
cal parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of
the people." Their internal structure, however, must conform to
democratic principles. By contrast, parties that seek to impair or
117. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974) (rejecting ad
hoc balancing in libel actions). While the Supreme Court has generally rejected ad hoc
balancing in questions dealing with regulation of the content of speech, it does employ
the technique in regulation of the time, place, manner, or circumstance of the speech. See,
e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981) (balancing the interests of the religious organization with the interests of the state
regarding a regulation of the place of the speech). Weighted forms of balancing place
emphasis on a particular interest which is to apply generally as a legal principle. See,
e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that libel is protect-
ed speech in absence of actual malice).
118. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Klass Case, 30 BVerfGE 1, 19-20 (1970), translated in KOMMERS, supra
note 5, at 230 (citation omitted):
Constitutional provisions must not be interpreted in isolation but rather in a
manner consistent with the Basic Law's fundamental principles and its system
of values. . . . In the context of this case it is especially significant that the
Constitution . .. has decided in favor of 'militant democracy' that does not
submit to abuse of basic rights or an attack on the liberal order of the state.
Enemies of the Constitution must not be allowed to endanger, impair, or de-
stroy the existence of the state while claiming protection of rights granted by
the Basic Law.
120. Art. 18 GG.
121. Art 19 § 2 GG.
122. See Art 21 GG.
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abolish the free democratic order are unconstitutional under
Article 21(2).'" The Constitutional Court has twice outlawed po-
litical parties under this Article; the Socialist Reich Party, successor
to the Nazi party in 1952,124 and the Communist Party in
1956.25 Under Article 79(3), basic rights are inviolable against
future amendment.'2
Other content-based restrictions on communication are also
designed to safeguard German democracy from extremism, thereby
helping safeguard it. Article 5(3) requires teachers to be loyal to
the 'Basic Law. 27 The ban on speech advocating Nazism and mil-
itarism, which was instituted in the denazification period following
World War II, remains beyond constitutional attack."n Likewise,
limitations on group defamation, incitement of hate, and hate
speech are designed to safeguard the social order and promote
social harmony. And, of course, Article 5 communication freedoms
are themselves expressly subject to the triad restrictions of the
general laws, and laws protecting youth and personal honor.'29
Each of these content-based restrictions are policed by the Consti-
tutional Court to limit their abuse by social actors. 30 Still, it is
123. See Art 21 § 2 GG.
124. 2 BVerfGE 1 (1952).
125. 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956). The Constitutional Court has not reviewed the constitution-
ality of a political party since the Communist Party Case. In the current political climate,
it is unlikely that the government will move to have a political party banned. The old
communist party ("KPD") reorganized itself in 1968 in West Germany as the German
Communist Party ("DKP"). The government failed to move against the DKP, even though
it resembled the old KPD. Similarly, the government did not initiate proceedings to have
declared unconstitutional an extremist right wing party, the National Democratic Party of
Germany ("NPD"). However, the government did monitor the organization and publicize
its findings, including its conclusion that the NPD was a "party engaged in anti-constitu-
tional goals and activity," was "radical right and an enemy of freedom," and "a danger to
the free democratic basic order. 40 BVerfGE 287 (1975), translated in KOMMERS, supra
note 5, at 231. The toleration of these extremist parties would seem to evidence the
heightened sense of toleration and security of modem Germany. With the reunification of
Germany, the Party of Democratic Socialism ("PDS"), successor to the old controlling
East German Socialist Unity Party ("SED"), is active.
126. See Art. 79 § 3 GG. ("Amendments of this Basic Law affecting the division of
the Federation into LUnder, the participation in principle of the U.nder in legislation, or
the basic principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.").
127. Art. 5 § 3 GG.
128. See Art. 139 GG. For description of how this problem is treated in contemporary
Germany, see Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the
"Auschwitz"-And Other-"Lies," 85 MICH. L. REV. 277 (1986).
129. See Art. 5 § 2 GG; see supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
130. See Art. 5 § 2 GG; KoMMmts, supra note 5, at 377 (noting that approval of the
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notable that most of the German content-based exceptions would be
unacceptable under American free speech doctrine. This points out,
again, the value-ordered nature of the German Constitution as com-
pared to the value-neutral American one. Of course, there is cer-
tainly more justification for such content-based exceptions in Ger-
many than the United States. Unlike Germany, the United States
has never experienced as severe a threat to its stability nor the
ensuing horrors of Nazism or militarism.
In sum, Lith is the foundational case for interpretation of free-
doms of opinion. First, the Constitutional Court established the
objective ordering of values that must influence the social structure.
Second, the Court determined that basic rights are integral to this
order and, therefore, affect private law. By doing so, the Court also
saw to it that the ordinary courts take proper cognizance of this
aspect of the basic order. Third, the Court established the basic
individual and social dimensions of free communication. Fourth,
the Court set forth the basic structure of public discourse. Commu-
nication that contributes to the formation of public opinion is most
highly valued and, therefore, presumptively protected. The more
significant the public issue addressed, the more enhanced protection
the communication receives. Lastly, the Court established the gen-
eral balancing of interest test used to control the ordinary courts'
interpretation of Article 5. This essential framework has been ad-
hered to by all communication decisions coming after Liith.
B. Cases Following Liith
In view of its explication of the central value of communica-
tion, and its careful assessment and ultimate preference of commu-
nication, Liith can fairly be characterized as a speech-protective
case. Other cases followed the Liith paradigm. For example, in the
Schmid-Spiegel' case, a high-ranking state judge (Schmid) lam-
basted the German press, asserting that it favored employers in
labor strikes. The famous German weekly newsmagazine,. Der
Spiegel, responded, characterizing the judge as having communist
sympathies even though it had information to the contrary. Judge
Schmid struck back by writing in a daily newspaper, accusing the
magazine of lying about him and comparing its political reporting
to pornography. Der Spiegel was able to secure a libel judgment
Federal Constitutional Court is necessary to carry out these articles).
131. 12 BVerfGE 113 (1961).
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against Schmid, which became the basis of the lawsuit.'32 On ap-
peal, the Constitutional Court concluded that the lower courts had
inadequately balanced communication freedoms against the interest
in enforcing private law rules regulating defamation. Accordingly,
the Court overruled the lower court decision. Applying the theory
of Reciprocal Effect (Wechselwirkung), it held that private law
norms are influenced by basic rights, just as basic rights may be
influenced by the "general laws."'33 In view of the intrinsic and
social value of communication, such freedoms are entitled to
heightened protection in the general balancing of interests test:
Only a free public discussion over all matters of general
significance guarantees the free building of public opinion
that is necessary to a free democratic state. This dialogue
necessarily occurs pluralistically involving contrasting views
arising from contrasting motives, freely disseminated.
Above all, it consists of speech versus counterspeech. Ev-
ery citizen is guaranteed the right through Article 5 to take
part in this public discussion. 1
34
As with the reputation of the German film industry in Liith, the
personal politics and trustworthiness of an important judge is a
matter of deep public significance. Accordingly, the communication
was entitled to presumptive protection under the application of the
Presumption Principle (Vermutungsprinzip).
In structuring public discourse, the Constitutional Court added
an important doctrinal tool, the concept of counter-attack
(Gegenschlag), which complements the Presumption Principle. As
developed in Schmid-Spiegel, the harsh nature of the Spiegel article
justified Schmid's harsh public reply to counter its impact on the
formation of public opinion. 3' That a sharp attack merits a reply
in kind has become a central feature of German law since Schmid-
Spiegel.'36 Schmid-Spiegel is also important for announcing the
132. See id. at 126-31. For a summary of these facts, see Koma¢s, supra note 5, at
377.
133. See 12 BVerfGE at 124-25 (citing Liith, 7 BVerfGE at 207).
134. 12 BVerfGE at 125.
135. See id. at 128-32. "An attack on the periodical's general reputation for veracity
was a more powerful defense than denial of its particular allegations standing alone, and
'Der Spiegel' had opened itself up to such charges by its unreliable treatment of the facts
in this case." CURRm, supra note 4, at 190.
136. See, e.g., the Art Critic Case, 54 BVerfGE 129 (1980) (holding that a radio
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doctrine that false statements of fact, in comparison to value judg-
ments (Werturteil), are a verifiable limit on public discourse. 3 '
False facts can mislead or distort and thus hinder the quality of
public discourse. This truth/falsity dichotomy has general resonance
in American law.'38
To an American observer, the Constitutional Court's structuring
of public discourse as an open, robust, even caustic dialogue is
reminiscent of American doctrine.' In both the American "mar-
ketplace of ideas" and German "battle of opinions"
(Meinungskampr), the remedy for sharp or harsh speech is not
suppression but more speech. Both countries seem committed to
entrusting the nature of this aspect of public discourse to the peo-
ple. In this way, Schmid-Spiegel mirrors certain of the great Su-
preme Court cases, decisions like Whitney v. California"40 or Co-
hen v. California.141
commentator's nasty response to a sculptor's harsh criticism of the practices of art critics
and museums was justified under the Counter-Attack Theory). For comparative purposes, it
is worth noting that a similar right of reply has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court
with respect to newspapers. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (invalidating a state statute granting a right of reply to political candidates attacked
by newspapers). Of course, Tornillo is premised on newspapers' First Amendment right
not to speak. Moreover, Tornillo does not prohibit a victim from counter-attacking in
other forums.
137. Schmid-Spiegel, 12 BVerfGE at 130. "Since the press has responsibility for contrib-
uting to the formation of public opinion, it must test for truth news and statements it
publishes .... [lt is impermissible to lightly publish false news .... Mhe truth may
not consciously be distorted." Accord B611, 54 BVerfGE 208, 219 (1980) (holding that
false quotations are not protected); see also MAUNZ COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 52.
138. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (while "[ulnder the
First Amendment there is no such thing as false idea... there is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact."). Id. A key difference in the two laws is that American law
is "more careful not to punish false statements without more when central speech values
are at [issue]." Letter of David Currie, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law
School, to Edward J. Eberle (Nov. 3, 1995) (on file with author); see, e.g., New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (speech protected despite false statements of fact).
By contrast, German courts actively police the truth/falsity of statements. See, e.g.,
Schmid-Spiegel, 12 BVerfGE at 130 (quoted supra note 137).
139. A difference between the laws is, as Professor Kommers notes, that German law
"protects robust and caustic speech but not always reckless speech." KOMMER, supra note
5, at 381. For example, the use of false quotations in B11,.54 BVerfGE 208, 219 (1980),
could be considered reckless and, therefore, unprotected. See infra notes 225-28 and
accompanying text.
140. 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring) ("If there be time
to expose through discussion . . . falsehood and fallacies . . . the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence.").
141. 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) ("The constitutional right of free expression . . . is de-
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The Blinkfdier142 decision of 1969 reveals another important
limitation on public discourse. Coercive economic force may not be
used to support viewpoints in the contest for public opinion. The
powerful Springer publishing house called for an economic boycott
of news dealers who sold program guides to East German televi-
sion and radio. According to the Court, calls for boycotts that
express opinions are valid contributions to the intellectual struggle
of opinions.143 However, Springer's use of economic force in
threatening to boycott noncomplying dealers severely distorted the
free formation of public opinion by violating the equality of oppor-
tunity necessary to that free formation.'" As conceived by the
Constitutional Court, public opinion may not be stifled by the
pressure of economic force. In this respect, Springer's call for a
boycott differed fundamentally from Liith's, which "was simply an
appeal to the moral and political responsibility of his audi-
ence.
145
The German limitation of economic coercion is similar to
American free speech doctrine, which also excepts from constitu-
tional protection coercive boycotts.' 46 But in another respect, Ger-
man law is fundamentally different. Out of commitment to the
"objective" constitutional order, the Constitutional Court actively
regulates the structure of public discourse to help assure an equali-
ty of opportunity in the dissemination of opinions, as delineated in
Blinkfier.47 Out of concern that weaker or disfavored social
signed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the area of public discussion
142. 25 BVerfGE 256 (1969).
143. See id. at 264. The Constitutional Court relied on Lifth, 7 BVerfGE 198, 212
(1958), in reaching its decision.
144. See id. at 264-65 (holding that boycotts are not protected insofar as they rely upon
social or economic pressure to force their will upon listeners: "The exploitation of eco-
nomic pressure . . . violates equality of opportunity in the process for formation of public
opinion."). The emphasis on autonomous self-determination reflects the influence of Kant,
particularly his view that opinions and actions be freely chosen. See also PIEROTH-
SCHLqNK, supra note 3, at 152 (indicating that coercion or pressure is not part of the
"intellectual struggle for opinion" that the Constitutional Court has emphasized).
145. Blinkfiier, 25 BVerfGE at 267, translated in KomimERs, supra note 5, at 383.
146. See generally NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607
(1980) (holding that picketing designed to encourage consumers to boycott a secondary
business is not protected by the Frst Amendment).
147. Under the "objective" dimension of the Basic Law, the Court is obligated to real-
ize the fundamental norms of the constitution. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying
text; see also WASSERMANN CoMMENTARY, supra note 59, at 418, 432.
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groups not be drowned out by those more powerful, the Court
limited the use of coercive silencing measures by powerful eco-
nomic groups."~ By contrast, the United States Supreme Court
has consistently rejected the notion that it ought to police the effect
of powerful economic groups' might or otherwise regulate opportu-
nity to communicate, relying instead on the American conception
of a value-neutral constitutional order under which social members
will fight it out in the "marketplace of ideas.""
The Blinkfler Court went on to hold that Springer's call for a
boycott violated Blinkfier's right to publish information about East
German programs.'50 The implication of this result, derived from
the reciprocal "indirect" effect of the Basic Law on private law, is
that Blinkffier had an enforceable claim against Springer to vindi-
cate its press rights. Thus, the theory of Reciprocal Effect seeming-
ly created "a constitutional cause of action [authorizing] private
individuals to enforce their constitutional interests against other
private individuals."'' Later, the Constitutional Court expressly
approved creation of a constitutional cause of action by one private
individual against another to vindicate basic rights pursuant to the
148. See Blinlgker, 25 BVerfGE at 268-69. The Court stated-
In order to protect the institution of a free press, the independence of organs of
the press must be assured against the incursions of powerful economic groups
using inappropriate means .... The goal of freedom of the press-to encour-
age and protect the formation of free public opinion-thus requires protection
of the press against attempts to suppress the competition of ideas by means of
economic pressure.
Id., translated in Quint, supra note 4, at 277-78 n.100. As Professor Quint notes:
[Tihis language suggests that in a system in which the constitution may impose
some limitations on private persons, the question of whether the constitution
limits a private person in any specific case may sometimes depend upon the
social or economic power wielded by the person. The danger to objective con-
stitutional rights presented by a person or group with strong social or economic
power is naturally greater than the danger presented by other private individu-
als.
Id. These concerns may require the government to adjust private law relations to redress
social and economic imbalances. See id.
149. See generally First National Bank v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down a
Massachusetts statute that prohibited certain corporations from making contributions to
influence voters on matters not materially affecting such corporations).
150. See Blinkiler, 25 BVerfGE at 267-69; see generally Quint, supra note 4, at 275-
78.
151. Quint, supra note 4, at 277. Blinkfller "was constitutionally entitled to an interpre-
tation of the general clauses of the private law that would afford it a remedy against
another private individual for a constitutional violation under these circumstances." Id.
19971
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theory of Reciprocal Effects. 15 2 These developments are attribut-
able to the objective German constitutional order, obligating gov-
ernment to realize the fundamental values of the Basic Law. In
Blinkfier and Soraya, this was accomplished through the Court's
insistence on the "influence" of constitutional principles on private
law relations. It is hard to imagine a more dramatic contrast with
American law. 15
3
A final notable development in Blinkfiier is its solicitude for
listener interests. Article 5 protects the right to gather information
from generally available sources, such as the East German pro-
gramming guide at issue in Blinkfier. This informational right,
152. See Soraya, 34 BVerfGE 269 (1974) (holding that pursuant to Reciprocal Effect
Theory individual may sue magazine for fabricated interview on theory this violates con-
stitutional right of privacy). In Soraya, the Constitutional Court approved a line of cases
developed by the Federal Supreme Court ("BGl"), the ultimate interpreter of the civil
code, in which the BGH had found a "general right of personality" in Articles 1 and 2
of the Basic Law, and that this constitutional right was enforceable against infringement
by the state and also by individuals. See id. As a next step, the BGH found that this
constitutional right of personality could be invoked to create a damage remedy for viola-
tion of the right, enforceable by one private individual against another individual. See id.
Professor Quint notes:
"[I]n the Soraya case, the BGH found that the influence of Articles 1 and 2 of
the Basic Law overrode the clear statutory command (excluding a damage rem-
edy) and established a damage remedy by one private individual against another
for the invasion of the constitutional right or personality. The BGH found that
the impact of the constitution on private law required this result because other-
wise the values of Articles 1 and 2 would not be adequately protected against
the actions of individuals.
Quint, supra note 4, at 280; see also id. at 278-81 (discussing extensively those develop-
ments); infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
The results in Blinkftier and Soraya dramatically contrast with the American concept
of state action. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. In these cases, the Court
implied a private right of action, derived from the Reciprocal Effect Theory, so that pri-
vate individuals could enforce constitutional rights against other private individuals. In
essence, this is "a constitutional requirement that a new cause of action be created to
protect one private individual against the actions of another." Quint, supra note 4, at 281
(noting that no such constitutional requirement exists in American law).
153. See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189
(1989). In DeShaney, the Court stated.
[Nothing] in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to
protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not
as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. ... [Its] pur-
pose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State
protected them from each other.
Id. at 195-96.
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separate from the freedom of opinion guarantee, is designed to
allow people freely to determine what information they need and
how to use it. It is part of an overall theory of self-governmental
control of information. These developments led to the Constitution-
al Court's announcement of a general right to inform oneself in the
leading Leipzig Newspaper case.1
5 4
IV. DEFERENTIAL REvmw AND THE SPEECH RESTRICrIvE
APPROACH OF THE 1970s
Implicit in the general balancing of interests methodology intro-
duced in LIth is the notion that protection of communication de-
pends on the nature of the balancing and the sense of the balancer.
Under the Liith approach, application of the test yielded communi-
cative-protective results because the Constitutional Court placed
high value on expression and scrutinized ordinary courts' valuation
of speech in relation to interests of the private law under the theo-
ry of Reciprocal Effects. However, altering the weight assigned to
private law interests (such as reputation, honor, or rights of person-
ality) over the weight assigned to expression would convert the
methodology from speech-protective to speech-restrictive. This was
the approach used by the Constitutional Court in the 1970s.
Under this deferential approach, the Constitutional Court tended
to prefer human dignity and personality rights over communication.
They did so by relying on Article 5(2), which states that communi-
cation rights expressly find their limits in "the provisions of gener-
al statutes, in statutory provisions for the protection of youth, and
in the right to respect of personal honor."'55 Under the Recipro-
cal Effect theory, the values of the general law influence interpreta-
tion of basic rights, as basic rights influence interpretation of the
general law. The courts of the 1970s essentially heightened empha-
sis of Article 1 human dignity values and Article 2 personality
interests to justify their preference of these values over expression
154. 27 BVerfGE 71 (1969). In the Leipzig Newspaper case, customs officials seized
copies of the Leipzig Tageszeitung, an East German newspaper, because they believed it
contained communist propaganda. A subscriber to the newspaper successfully challenged
the seizure. The Constitutional Court reasoned that a general "right to inform oneself is a
necessary foundation of the right to speech itself." KOMMEmS, supra note 5, at 385. This
"right to inform oneself" was not part of the Weimar Constitution. See id. Rather, it is a
reaction against the Nazi's totalitarian control of information. See MAUNZ COMMENTARY,
supra note 28, at 31.
155. Art 5 § 2 GG.
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rights. In relation to Article 5(1) freedoms, this approach represent-
ed, in essence, an application of the Reciprocal Effect Theory
inverse to that of Liith; the general law limitations were interpreted
to exert a powerful limiting effect on communication freedoms.
A. Mephisto
The case cementing the shift was Mephisto, decided on artistic
rights, not opinion guarantees.156 In Mephisto, the Constitutional
Court split 3-3 in upholding an injunction against publication of a
novel by Klaus Mann, son of the great German writer Thomas
Mann, on the ground that the novel defamed the memory of a
famous deceased actor.'57 The central character of the novel was
an actor named Hendrik H6fgen, who Mann portrayed as having
made his name by playing the devil in Goethe's Faust during the
Nazi period. While other artists were persecuted, H6fgen "betrayed
his own political convictions and cast off all ethical and humanitar-
ian restraints to further his career by making a pact with...
[those in] power in Nazi Germany."'15  Interestingly, like Lath,
Mephisto had its roots in the Nazi era.
The story was based on a real life actor, Gustaf Grfindgens,
whose career paralleled the fictitious H6fgen in important re-
spects.' 59 Mann never claimed to be presenting an accurate por-
trait of Grflndgens.' ° Instead, his aim was to portray a general
type of opportunistic artist during the Third Reich. The novel was
a product of Mann's imagination.' 6' Nevertheless, the civil courts
relied upon differences between Mann's portrayal and Grfindgen's
156. 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971).
157. Under German law, a tie vote results in the lower court ruling remaining in effect.
See Federal Constitutional Court Law (BVerfGG) § 15(3).
158. Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE at 174, translated in CURRIE, supra note 4, at 193.
159. Mann and Grindgens were friends in the 1920s. Grindgens married Mann's sister,
although the marriage did not last. With the rise of Hitler, the Mann family was forced
to emigrate, spending the war years in America and Switzerland, among other places.
Grflndgens' career soared as an actor. Eventually, he became a director of the Prussian
State Theater, accomplished through his friendship with Hermann G6ring, leader of the
Luftwaffe.
160. In the foreword to the book, Mann had written that "all characters in this book
represent [general] types, not portraits." Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE at 177. On the other hand,
the fictitious Hdfgen was clearly modeled on Grrndgens. Ironically, Thomas Mann was
also accused of falsifying portraits of prominent Lfibeck citizens in his classic novel
Buddenbrooks. See CURRIE, supra note 4, at 196 n.88.
161. The Constitutional Court conceded that the novel was a work of art. Mephisto, 30
BVerfGE at 189-91.
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actual life to conclude that Griindgens was defamed by making
him appear to be more evil than he actually was. The suit on
behalf of Grdndgens was successful, even though he had died
before it was initiated. 62
Mephisto thus became the first occasion for the Constitutional
Court to decide the scope of artistic freedom under Article 5. Tex-
tually, artistic freedom is separate from Article 5(1) general com-
munication rights.16 Unlike those freedoms, art, science and re-
search guarantees are not subject to the general restraints of the
law, nor youth, nor personal honor protections. Instead, these free-
doms are textually unbounded. Thus, it would seem logical to view
artistic freedoms as meriting higher protection than even political
speech or other expression of opinion. One might even argue that
art should be viewed in an "absolutist" sense, not unlike the fa-
mous position of Justice Black concerning the first amendment."
The German preference of art over other expression seems
consistent with the German emphasis on a strong right of personal-
ity rooted in Articles 1 and 2, which can outweigh speech interests.
Such German preference is also consistent with German history and
culture, which has tended to place a premium on individuals' inner
162. Grilndgens' adopted son "proceeded under BGB Section 823(1), a general tort
provision that provides a civil remedy against any person who 'intentionally or negligently
infringes on the life, body, health, freedom, property or other right of another person, in
a manner contrary to law."' Quint, supra note 4, at 291 n.147.
Some years later, the novel was published again, with appropriate explanations of the
relationship of Grdndgens to the book. This publication did not trigger any legal limita-
tions. See Letter of Professor Dr. Bodo Pieroth, Professor of Law, Westflische Wilhelms-
University, Mdrnster, Germany, to Edward J. Eberle (Nov. 27, 1995) (on file with author).
163. These include the freedoms of opinion, to inform oneself, press and reporting by
means of broadcasts and films. This last right is a particularly important guarantee of
electronic media and film freedom. See supra note 9; see also Letter of Professor Dr.
Bodo Pieroth to Edward J. Eberle (November 27, 1995) (on file with author).
164. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Black stated.
I believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be
no abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men
who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in
this field ... . mhe very object of adopting the First Amendment... was
to put the freedoms protected there completely out of the area of any congres-
sional control that may be attempted through the exercise of precisely those
powers that are now being used to 'balance' the Bill of Rights out of exis-
tence").
Id.; see also Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 882 (1960)
(discussing the Bill of Rights as it bears on the powers of the federal government).
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spiritual life over the public life, which has often been viewed with
disdain. Traditionally, Germans prize artistic and cultural endeavors
more than political activities." This view contrasts significantly
with American law, which has always preferred political speech
over other forms of expression. Some American commentators have
even resisted extension of constitutional protection to artistic en-
deavors."6
However, despite the apparent textual mandate of Article 5(3),
and despite interpreting artistic freedoms broadly to "guarantee
autonomy of the arts without reservation,"' 67 the Court did not
find that artistic liberty was without limit. 68 Instead, the three-
person half of the Court sustained the injunction, reasoning that
basic rights must be interpreted within the context of the value
order of the Basic Law. Since the Basic Law is founded on the
view "of the human person as an autonomous being developing
freely within the social community,'1 69 artistic freedoms must be
165. See Quint, supra note 4, at 294 n.157 (discussing Mephisto).
166. Compare, Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. LJ. 1, 20 (1971) (arguing that "constitutional protection should be accorded only
to speech that is expressly political"), with Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is
an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245, 262-63 (arguing that literature and art are protected
by the First Amendment because they have special importance).
167. Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE at 191, translated in KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 427. The
Constitutional Court also observed that the essence of artistic freedom is to protect such
creation from state interference. See id. at 190. Artistic freedom also encompasses protec-
tion of distributors or other intermediaries who facilitate the public's access to artistic
works. See id. at 191.
Despite the restrictiveness toward communication freedoms that Mephisto signalled in
comparison to the more protective approach of LUth, Mephisto was a landmark decision in
its own right, especially for artistic freedoms. For example, in Mephisto, the Court set
down the definitive definition of art:
The essential characteristic of artistic activity is the artist's free and creative
shaping of impressions, experiences and events for direct display through a
specific language of shapes. All artistic activity is a mix of conscious and
unconscious events that is not rationally orderable. Intuition, phantasy and artis-
tic understanding all effect artistic creations, such creations are primarily not
informational but rather an immediately direct expression of the individual per-
sonality of the artist.
Id. at 188-89, translated in part in KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 427. From a constitutional
standpoint, Mephisto was a decisive step in the progress of artistic freedoms, emphatically
rejecting an earlier line of more restrictive decisions. See Letter of Professor Dr. Bodo
Pieroth, Professor of Law, Westf-lische Wilhelms-University, to Edward J. Eberle (Nov.
27, 1995) (on file with author).
168. Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE at 192. ("Mhe right of artistic liberty is not unlimited.").
169. Id. at 193, translated in KoMmmS, supra note 5, at 428.
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measured against Article 1 human dignity, the supreme value gov-
erning the objective order of values.7 Artistic or communication
freedoms may conflict with human dignity. For example, in
Mephisto, it might be argued that the tangible effect of Mann's
communication was to tarnish or harm the memory of Grfindgens.
Disparagement of the dead could be thought to be inconsistent with
human dignity.7 "[A]n artist's use of personal data about people
in his environment can affect their social rights to respect and
esteem."' 72 Hence, communication freedoms must yield to the su-
perior value of dignity. In this manner, the Court implied limits on
the seemingly boundless guarantee of artistic freedom, as it previ-
ously had implied limits to the seeming express limitation of opin-
ion rights in Lith. The Constitutional Court thus employed a cer-
tain creativity in interpretation.
In contrast to Liith, however, the Court's approach in Mephisto
imperiled communication freedoms. Since ways can always be
found to recast reputational or privacy interests into the capacious
constitutional concepts of human dignity or personality, the en-
hanced constitutional protection for art may be more apparent than
real. 73 Personality rights can thus have a powerful limiting effect
on art and expression. 74
This reasoning also points to a fundamental contrast with
American law. Anchoring reputational rights in the basic rights of
human dignity and personality allowed the Constitutional Court, in
essence, to imply a constitutional right to be free from defamation.
This could be justified from the "objective" theory of
constitutionalism. By contrast, American law is founded on the
concept that "public" persons are to be treated as "men of forti-
tude, able to live in a hardy climate."'75 Accordingly, public men
170. Professor Quint astutely observes that Mephisto "illustrates what might be called
the 'imperialism of balancing.' Although the Court stated clearly that GG art. 5 section 3
was not subject to the limitations of GG art. 5, section 2, it nonetheless found. that Klaus
Mann's right of artistic expression must be balanced against other possible constitutional
interests." Quint, supra note 4, at 313 n.209.
171. See Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE at 194.
172. Id. at 195.
173. See Quint, supra note 4, at 296-97 (discussing the German balancing of the rights
of artistic freedom and countervailing constitutional interests).
174. See id. at 299 (discussing how the language of the German Constitution gives
"maximum opportunity for casting personal interests of reputation and privacy as constitu-
tional rights of the person affected by the speech or other expression").
175. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (quoting Crain v.
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and women in America are expected to endure the insults and
abuses common to public life. Based on such thinking, the Su-
preme Court has widely immunized speakers from defamation
claims. 76 Under American principles, Grfindgens would qualify
as a public figure, thereby subjecting him to these immunity
rules." On the other hand, German law has gone part way down
the path of American law through the latitude it accords certain
polemic communicated in matters of public significance pursuant to
both the Counter-Attack Theory (Gegenschlag) developed in Sch-
mid-Spiegel,' and by its assumption that public figures must en-
dure sharp scrutiny and critique.'79
A further contrast relates to a substantive right to self-
development. German law has a much stronger justification for
protecting this right, anchored in human personality, than American
law. First, Articles 1 and 2 provide express textual anchors for a
constitutional right to free development of human personality. Be-
cause of scant textual support, such a substantive right has not
been found in the American Constitution. Second, the positive
conception of basic rights obligates the German government to
provide affirmative conditions for the emergence of human person-
ality rights. This is out of character for the more basic American
conception of negative liberties. The absence of these factors per-
haps explains some of the difficulties American law has experi-
enced in striving to realize a right of privacy regime.
A further weakening of artistic rights occurred through the
Constitutional Court's balancing approach. In reviewing the civil
court's balancing of human dignity and expression, the Constitu-
tional Court essentially deferred to the lower courts' determination.
In a marked departure from Liith, the Court concluded that it was
Humey, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947), and discussing published criticism of government
officials, such as elected city commissioners).
176. The leading case is Sullivan. See, e.g., id. at 283 (holding that in order to prove
violation of First Amendment rights of public official, plaintiff must demonstrate "actual
malice").
177. Grindgens would likely be "an individual . . . [who] achieve[d] such pervasive
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (establishing the test for who is
public figure).
178. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
179. See Stern Strauss Interview, 82 BVerfGE 272, 277, 282 (1990) (holding that the
freedom of expression takes precedence over a public figure's right to protection of hon-
or). See also infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
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not authorized to substitute its evaluation of a case for that of the
lower court. 8 Rather it could only determine whether the civil
courts have failed to balance competing constitutional rights or
have fundamentally misconceived the importance of a right. Thus,
there was to be no independent review by the Court. Mephisto,
therefore, posited a substantially restrained view of the role of the
Constitutional Court.'
Mephisto is inconsistent with LUth in a more general way than
its seeming withdrawal of the Court from intensive judicial review.
The Court in Lith deemed expression a preferred right in the ob-
jective ordering of values basic to German society. Freedom to
express opinion was "constitutive" to democratic society, the "very
'matrix' of all other freedoms."'82 By allowing private law values
to be recast as constitutional rights, and then balancing those rights
against expression, the Court in Mephisto essentially placed com-
munication at the level of the private values. Communication no
180. See Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173, 197 (1971).
181. Three Justices disagreed with this deferential approach, arguing that the Court
should have independently assessed the facts to assure adherence to the Basic Law's cata-
logue of fundamental rights. The result in Mephisto, they argued, was inconsistent with
long-standing precedent, especially Lath, where the Court itself determined whether the
ordinary courts had correctly applied the balancing of interests. According to Justice Stein,
the lower courts "ignored the novel's aesthetic aspects" and "overemphasized the detrimen-
tal affects of the novel on the protected sphere of . . . Grfindgens' personality.' 30
BVerfGE at 203, translated in KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 429. There was little danger
that the public would mistake the novel for a biography; thus there seemed to be little
ground for finding defamation. See Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE at 204-08. By giving too much
weight to countervailing personality interests, the Court had failed its role as guardian of
basic rights. See id. at 202.
According to Justice Rupp-von Brfinneck, extraordinary latitude should be accorded
polemic communicated in a matter of significant public concern that contributes to the
building of public opinion. For this proposition, she cited the counter-attack theory
(Gegenschlag) of Schmid-Spiegel and New York Times v. Sullivan. See id. at 224-25. This
can only be accomplished through more thorough judicial review. See id. at 219-21.
To an American observer, the cite to New York Times v. Sullivan is especially apt,
for in this landmark case the Supreme Court reconceived the relationship of First Amend-
ment law to state defamation law. By immunizing persons who polemicize against public
figures from the sanctions of traditional state law, the Court facilitated the "uninhibited,
robust and wide-open" public dialogue that now marks American discourse. New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). To accomplish this objective, the Court
independently assesses the facts at issue and judges their relation to First Amendment
protections. In this way, the Court determines the meaning of the Constitution. The con-
trasting approach of the Constitutional Court, one might argue, leaves communication
freedoms too vulnerable.
182. Lith, 7 BVerfGE 198, 208 (1958) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327
(1937)).
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longer possessed any special or preferred status.183 The view of
expression in Mephisto is thus similar to the prevailing view in the
United States in the 1950s. This view, perhaps most associated
with the position of Justice Frankfurter, held that speech had no
"preferred position" over other constitutional rights. 84
Mephisto's seeming disinterest in the specific results that were
derived from an application of general principles reveals perhaps a
more fundamental difference between European and American
law. 85 In the civil law tradition, there is an emphasis on general
rules, usually set forth in codes, and a relative lack of interest in
the specific application of the rules. The focus is on building an
intellectually coherent system of law. Thus, one tends to look for a
statement of the general principles more than its specific applica-
tion in a concrete case.'86 The abstract general principle has a
life of its own, independent of its application. In German law, this
is manifested as the "objective" order of values, apart from their
"subjective" impact on particular cases. Mephisto seems consistent
with this tradition in its deferential review of civil courts, principal-
ly looking only to see whether the court correctly stated the consti-
tutional principle and brushing over the specific applications there-
of.
The Anglo-American view is, of course, different. Principles do
not exist independent of results. In the common law methodology,
the results of each new case alter the meaning of the principle.
Principles arise inductively from case to case, as compared to the
inverse continental emphasis on deductive reasoning. Hence, in
Anglo-American law, courts pay close attention to case-by-case
applications of principle. The Supreme Court's independent assess-
ment of facts to assure lower courts' fidelity to the constitutional
principle in New York Times is emblematic of this approach." 7
In summary, Mephisto marked the Court's shift from a speech-
protective regime to a speech-restrictive regime. First, the growth
183. See Quint, supra note 4, at 307 (discussing implications of the Mephisto decision).
184. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 526-27, 539-40 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
185. Justice Rupp-von Brflnneck in her dissent scolds the Court for its disinterest in the
specific results reached through its theories. See Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE at 219-20.
186. See Quint, supra note 4, at 311-12 (comparing civil and common law in the use
of general principles and individual cases in arriving at constitutional decisions).
187. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (assessing the lower
court's application of New York Times scrutiny).
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of human personality rights, achieved by anchoring the values of
private law in Articles 1 and 2, significantly limited communication
freedoms. Second, the reassertion of these private law values corre-
sponded with the Court's withdrawal of serious independent review.
Under the deferential approach of Mephisto, the Court essentially
deferred to ordinary courts' fixing of the balance of interests.' 8
B. Post-Mephisto
In the period immediately following Mephisto, the Constitution-
al Court employed its new deferential technique and continued
Mephisto's trend of emphasizing reputational and privacy interests
as limitations on free communication.' In the famous Soraya
case, for example, the Court upheld an award of damages for pub-
lication of a fictitious interview with the former wife of the Shah
of Iran."9 The award was predicated on a newly created constitu-
tional right of personality, derived again from the influence of
objective constitutional principles on the private law.'91 This right
188. The argument for the Constitutional Court's deference to others' determination of
basic rights cases is different than that applicable to the U.S. Supreme Court, as Professor
Quint observes. In the U.S., the argument for deference is usually based on issues of
federalism or out of concern that the Supreme Court will usurp the democratic process.
Neither of these applies to Germany. First, the ordinary courts apply federal law. All the
great German private and public law codes are part of a unified federal legal structure.
Thus, there is no federalism concern. Second, the judgments of the ordinary courts that
proponents would have the Constitutional Court defer to are judgments of courts, not
democratically elected institutions. Thus, deference does not solve the "counter-
majoritarian" difficulty. At bottom, therefore, the argument is that the Constitutional Court
should defer to the decision of another court over a constitutional matter. See Quint,
supra note 4, at 309-10. Perhaps this is because of the traditional respect and prestige of
the civil law, bolstered by German legal science, over the relatively new constitutional
law.
189. See CutRUE, supra note 4, at 198 (discussing restrictions on freedom of expression
in Germany).
190. Soraya, 34 BVerfGE 269 (1973).
191. See id. 281:
The personality and dignity of an individual, to be freely enjoyed and devel-
oped within a societal and communal framework, stand at the very center of
the value order reflected in the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.
Thus an individual's interest in his personality and dignity must be respected,
and must be protected by all organs of the state (see Articles I and 2 of the
Constitution). Such protection should be extended, above all, to a person's
private sphere; i.e., the sphere in which he desires to be left alone, to
make ...his own decisions, and to remain free from any outside interference.
Within the area of private law such protection is provided, inter alia, by the
legal rules relating to the general right of personality.
1997]
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entitles a person to be left fundamentally alone, free from unautho-
rized interference (whether from public or private actors) if so
desired. Moreover, this right is enforceable as a private cause of
action by which one private individual could enforce a right to
privacy against another private individual. In Soraya, these privacy
interests operated as a limitation of communication freedoms. "An
imaginary interview adds nothing to the formation of real public
opinion. As against press utterances of this sort, the protection of
privacy takes unconditional priority."' 92
Later in the year, the Constitutional Court concluded in the
Lebach decision that such privacy interests, including an interest in
rehabilitation, outweighed any public speech interest in publicizing
an individual's role in a crime for which he had already paid the
penalty. 93 According to the Court, the convicted robber's privacy
interest in being let alone was a higher priority. 94 Crucial to the
Court's finding was its implication from Articles 1 and 2 of a right
of "informational self-determination:" a right "exclusively [to] de-
Id.; see also Quint, supra note 4, at 278-81 (discussing the Soraya case).
192. Soraya, 34 BVerfGE at 283-84, translated in CtRRIE, supra note 4, at 198. The
reasoning of Soraya was later picked up in Bill, 54 BVerfGE 208 (1980), where the
Court determined that false quotations are not protected by Article 5. For discussion of
B6fl, see infra text and accompanying notes 213-16. "The degree of care that must be
expended to avoid dissemination of an imaginary interview is never too much to expect."
Soraya, 34 BVerfGE at 286, translated in CURRIE, supra note 4, at 198 n.95. The Ger-
man result contrasts dramatically with American law, illustrating the extraordinary protec-
tion American law accords speech. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine Inc., 501
U.S. 496 (1991) (holding that deliberate falsification of quotations does not rise to the
level of actual malice falsity required by New York Times v. Sullivan; accordingly, it is
protected speech).
193. See Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202 (1973). In Lebach the Court prohibited the showing
of a documentary film depicting, accurately, "the planning of a famous robbery of an
army munitions depot which resulted in the deaths of four soldiers." Quint, supra note 4,
at 299.
194. The film was to have displayed the individual's photograph and mentioned his
homosexuality. The Court noted.
The rights to the free development of one's personality and human dignity
secure for everyone an autonomous sphere in which to shape one's private life
by developing and protecting one's individuality. This includes the right to
remain alone, to be oneself within this sphere, and to exclude the intrusion of
or the inspection by others. It also encompasses the right to one's own likeness
and utterances, especially the right to decide what to do with pictures of one-
self. In principle, everyone has the right to determine for himself whether and
to what extent others may make a public account of either certain incidents
from his life or his entire life story.
KOMMmE, supra note 5, at 414-15 (translation of the Lebach decision).
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termine whether and to what extent others might be permitted to
portray his life story in general, or certain events from his
life."195 Significantly, this privacy right concerning one's image
was determined to outweigh even an accurate, truthful broad-
cast.' 96 These aspects of Lebach illustrate how expression free-
doms might be eclipsed by privacy interests, especially when com-
bined with consideration of social factors. In this way, German law
is more communal than American. Lebach illustrates again the dra-
matic impact of objective constitutionalism on German law.
V. INTERMEDIATE REVIEW: THE COURT'S ATrEMPT TO
RECAruRE THE VALUE OF COMMUNICATION
If communication was to realize again its place as a central
value in the German legal order, a way had to be found to
recalibrate the balance in favor of communication. The case of
Deutschland-Magazin'97 provided the setting for the Constitution-
al Court's attempt to make this recalibration. In Deutschland-Maga-
zin, the Court signaled its move away from its extreme deference
to decisions of the lower courts toward a more intermediate level
of scrutiny. This mid-level scrutiny, however, still fell short of the
probing scrutiny of Lfith.
A. Deutschland-Magazin
Right-wing politics was again the topic of controversy. A labor
union press service distributed an article attacking the conservative
Deutschland-Magazin as "a right-radical hate sheet" (rechtsradikales
Hetzblatt), a form of nasty political epithet in post World War II
Germany. 9 ' Confirming the judgments of the lower courts, the
195. Lebach, 35 BVerfGE at 220, translated in Quint, supra note 4, at 299-300.
196. See Quint, supra note 4, at 300-301 (discussing the implications of the Lebach
case). Under American law, in contrast, expression interests would receive much more
weight. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (First Amend-
ment protects disclosure of rape victim's name obtained from public documents). It is
worth noting, however, that the California Supreme Court has reached a conclusion quite
similar to Lebach. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971) (hold-
ing that a cause of action for invasion of privacy arose when an article was published
disclosing "truthful but embarrassing facts" about an individual's past life); see also
CUtuRta supra note 4, at 199 n.96; Letter from David P. Currie, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Chicago, to Edward J. Eberle (Nov. 3, 1995) (on file with author).
197. 42 BVerfGE 143 (1976).
198. See id. at 144. The term "right-radical hate sheet" has clear historical overtones,
dredging up memories of the Nazi hunting and persecuting its victims. This appears to be
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Constitutional Court ruled that the labor union was entitled to
make the basic criticism, but that it had to express its charge in
words less scurrilous than the ones chosen. The Court viewed the
content of expression as different and separable from the particular
form of expression."
In reaching this result, the Constitutional Court announced a
new standard for judging communication cases as they impact on
the private law:
There are no rigid and invariable limits on the court's
intervention. We retain a degree of freedom to consider the
particular facts of special situations. Important in this re-
gard is the severity of the encroachment upon a basic right:
The Constitutional Court may not disturb the judgment of a
lower court simply because if it had decided the case it
would have balanced the equities differently and therefore
arrived at a different conclusion. The Constitutional Court
may step in to defend an objective constitutional right at
the point where the civil courts have erred in assessing the
significance of a basic right.... The more a civil court's
decision encroaches upon the sphere of protected rights, the
more searching must be the Constitutional Court's scrutiny
to determine whether the infringement is constitutionally
valid; and where the infringement is extremely burdensome,
the court may even substitute its judgment for that of the
civil courts.' °
So stated, the test in Deutschland-Magazin is a variable standard of
review; the Court's level of review rises with the severity of intru-
sion of the right.
In Deutschland-Magazin, the Court did not find the curtailment
of the speaker's rights to be a particularly severe measure. The
speaker was only prohibited from using the phrase "right-radical
hate sheet." The essence of the statement could easily be expressed
in other language. Thus, it might be argued, the Court had not
the basis on which the Court viewed this phrase as particularly ill-chosen. See Quint,
supra note 4, at 319 n.222 (discussing the impact of the Deutschland-Magazin case).
199. Deutschland-Magazin, 42 BVerfGE at 149-50. ("Restrictions on opinion freedoms
which are exclusively limited to the form of expression are less severe limitations....
Generally-if not always-formulations of thoughts may be changed without difficulty
without harming the idea sought to be communicated.").
200. Id. at 148-49, translated in KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 388.
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really prohibited communication of the idea so much as the form
of that communication. Moreover, the sanction placed on the
speaker-the prohibition on repeating the phrase-was thought to
be minor.2"' Accordingly, no high-level review was merited.
Deutschland-Magazin is thus distinguishable from Lfith, where the
injunction against communication of the speaker's idea was a se-
vere limitation that merited searching review.
From an American perspective, the Deutschland-Magazin
Court's restriction of the speaker's chosen communication would
hardly be viewed as mild. Choice of the medium of expression is a
fundamental aspect of free speech in the American view.2" In
America, control of the use or abuse of speech lies primarily with
the people in the exercise of self-government. In Germany, by
contrast, the Court takes a more activist role in circumscribing the
terms of public discourse around a more ascertainable line of pro-
priety. Sharp and caustic speech is permissible, but not reckless or
insulting language.'
B. Echtemach
The Constitutional Court's decision in Echternach,2° a com-
panion case to Deutschland-Magazin, seemed to suggest that the
standard announced in Deutschland-Magazin indeed was sound,
despite its mild application. In Echternach, the Court found that an
injunction against use of the charge that the German Foundation
201. See id. at 151; Quint, supra note 4, at 321.
202. For example, the Supreme Court noted:
[Miuch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function; it conveys
not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise
inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for
their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the
Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has
little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may
often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be com-
municated.
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). The Supreme Court even scruti-
nized expressive conduct to make sure that "the government interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (citations
omitted) (qualifying the more lenient standard of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968)).
203. The Constitutional Court similarly excised a particular use of "cripple" in the Crip-
ple case, 86 BVerfGE 1 (1992), discussed infra at notes 330-38 and accompanying text.
See KoMMEmS, supra note 5, at 381.
204. 42 BVerfGE 167 (1976).
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(Deutschland-Stiftung), the publisher of the Deutschland-Magazin,
was a "nationalistic enterprise in democratic clothing" or words
with a similar meaning, was a severe curtailment of communication
rights justifying searching review.25 "The more a civil court's
decision infringes the predicates of free existence and action that
are protected by a basic right, the more searching must be the
Constitutional Court's investigation to determine whether the in-
fringement is constitutionally justified."20 6
Probing review was justified, the Court concluded, because the
civil court's order "prohibited the expression of a certain thought-
content."' ° This was "a limitation of the speaker's freedom of
opinion which touches the basic right of Article 5 of the Basic
Law not only at the margin, but in its central meaning.""0 8 The
Constitutional Court's review thus encompassed examination of the
lower court's interpretation of general communication principles
(the objective aspect) as well as its specific application of those
principles to the facts before it (the subjective aspect). Perhaps this
is the most notable development in Echternach.
The lower court also erred, according to the Constitutional
Court, in finding that critical value judgments (Werturteil) of mat-
ters of important public interest could not be communicated with-
out displaying an adequate factual basis. 9 "The basic right to
free expression of opinion is intended not merely to promote the
search for truth but also to assure that every individual may freely
say what he thinks, even when he does not or cannot provide an
examinable basis for his conclusion." '21 Value judgments, the
Court would later decide, are the essence of one's right to freely
express opinions, and are protected by Article 5(1). Unlike factual
statements, falsity is no defense against value judgments.2 1
205. Id. at 163, 168-71. The Court also rejected the lower court finding that the Foun-
dation was misusing the name of former Chancellor Adenauer for its own political pur-
poses. See id. at 164, 168-71.
206. Id. at 168. In its probing review of the facts, the Constitutional Court's scrutiny
resembled that of American courts.
207. Id. at 169.
208. Id.
209. See CtuRm, supra note 4, at 203.
210. Echternach, 42 BVerfGE at 170-71, translated in CURRIE, supra note 4, at 203. As
in American law, the basic right also includes the right not to speak. See MAUNZ
CoMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 13. Cf. West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating an action making the pledge of allegiance compulsory for
school children).
211. See NPD of Europe, 61 BVerfGE 1, 7-8 (1982) (removing injunction against call-
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Deutschland-Magazin and Echternach evidence a willingness by
the Court to employ a more heightened review in certain instances
of incursion of basic rights. However, the degree of review varies
with the perceived degree of intrusion. Notably, much depends on
the Constitutional Court's evaluation of the case. Deutschland-
Magazin and Echternach illustrate the difference. The mild scrutiny
employed in Deutschland-Magazin was appropriate, according to
the Court, because the limitation on expression concerned only its
form, and not its content.212 This was thought by the Court to be
only minor curtailment of the right. By contrast, the Court per-
ceived a greater incursion of speech in Echternach because the
limitation concerned the thought-content as well as the form of
expression.213
It is interesting to note that the difference between Deutsch-
land-Magazin and Echternach seems to rest on a distinction be-
tween the content and form of expression. In turn, this bears a
striking similarity to the more general distinction in continental
legal thought between communication of the general principle and
its application to specific cases.214 As noted by Professor Quint,
this reflects the underlining view that "there is an intelligible, but
disembodied 'content' that can remain unimpaired even though its
expression in a particular 'form' is prohibited.' 215 This relates, in
turn, to the view that there is an intelligible abstract principle that
is separable from its specific application. For example, reconsider
the nature of the Court's review in a case like Mephisto. There the
Court looked only to see whether the lower court recognized the
principles of free communication and free artistic expression, while
essentially passing over the specific results reached.
The methodology of common law reasoning is exactly opposite.
In the common law the case is all-important. Deciding the case
yields insight into the relevant factors at issue. Only over time
ing mainstream conservative party, Christian Social Union (CSU), "the National Socialist
Party (NPD) of Europe"). Again, this truth/falsity dichotomy has general resonance in
American law. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1973) ("Un-
der the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However, pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction ...on the competition of other ideas.")
with id. at 340 ("[B]ut there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.').
212. See Deutschland-Magazin, 42 BVerfGE 143, 151 (1976).
213. See Echternach, 42 BVerfGE at 169.
214. See Quint, supra note 4, at 323-24.
215. Id. at 324.
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through case by case application can any general principle be de-
duced. Such general principles themselves change through specific
application. Thus, the view that there could be any abstract princi-
ple separable from its application is quite foreign to the American
system. "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experi-
ence."
216
C. Assessing Deutschland-Magazin
While the variable standard of review announced in Deutsch-
land-Magazin is an improvement, for a system of free expression,
over the deferential test of Mephisto, the variable test poses its
own problems for communication. First, the test itself is vague. It
is not clear which factors trigger higher or lower review. Adding to
this the overall amorphousness of the general balancing of interest
test, we are confronted with a highly uncertain, complex and mal-
leable test.217  Lacking precision of the circumstances justifying
variable review, and the weight to be accorded speech in the gen-
eral balancing of interests test, the test is too beholden to the judge
applying it. The value of communication can too easily be called
into question, depending on the interests asserted in juxtaposition.
216. OLIVER WENDEL HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Deutschland-Magazin pro-
voked again a strong dissent from Justice Rupp-von Brainneck, who favored a higher stan-
dard of review because of the "fundamental" value of communication. Deutschland-
Magazin, 42 BVerfGE at 154. Echoing core American doctrine, Rupp-von Bnnneck for-
warded several arguments: the freedom of opinion guarantee should fundamentally protect
the right to say what one likes in the way one likes; it is the responsibility of the Court
to assure a strong system for communication of ideas; it is inadequate to protect against
only speaker sanctions; and the Court must also see to it that exercise of communicative
rights not be chilled by ordinary courts' decisions placing "negative effects on the general
exercise" of speech rights. Id. at 158-61. Rupp-von Brtnneck concluded that the variable
standard of review set forth in Deutschland-Magazin is too narrow a conception of the
role the Court should play in sustaining communication rights. See id. at 156.
217. See generally Quint, supra note 4, at 329 (noting several problems with an adjust-
able standard of review). Moreover, Professor Quint points out Justice Rupp-von
Briinneck's observation "that the Court's restraint in reviewing decisions of private law
courts appears inconsistent with other decisions of approximately the same period which
greatly expanded the scope of the Court's review of acts of the legislature in certain
areas." Id. at 329 n.258. For this point, Justice Rupp-von Brfnneck cited two controversial
cases, the First Abortion case, 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975) (Court invalidates federal statute
permitting most abortions during first trimester), and the University case, 35 BVerfGE 79
(1973) (invalidating state statute granting students, nontenured faculty members and work-
ers a share in university governance). See Deutschland-Magazin, 42 BVerfGE at 156
(Rupp-von Brnnrmeck, J., dissenting). In its degree of scrutiny of facts, Deutschland-Mag-
azin is also inconsistent with Echternach, as observed above. See supra notes 204-16 and
accompanying text.
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Subjectivity in interpretation and uncertainty in results are likely to
be the outcomes.
A second major defect is the lack of any specific resolution of
the clash between communication and other constitutional rights.
As we recall, the Deutschland-Magazin test was prefigured by
Lebach, where the Court applied heightened review to personality
interests in limitation of expression. What remained unresolved by
Deutschland-Magazin was determination of this conflict between
speech rights and personality rights. Thus, the key determination
ahead for German law was which of these rights would have pre-
cedence and under what circumstances.
D. Employing Deutschland-Magazin
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in the Deutschland-
Magazin test, it continued to be the Court's standard methodology
in the 1980s. However, given its variability, the test could be used
to both support and oppose speech-protective outcomes. For exam-
ple, the enhanced review of constitutional rights signalled by
Deutschland-Magazin could be used to support speech interests. A
good example of this strand is the Art Critic case of 1980,1'
where the Court invalidated a damage award for defamation levied
against radio broadcasters who had criticized a lecture given by a
sculptor. The Court viewed the damage award as an especially
serious sanction of speech as compared to the more typical sanc-
tion of an injunction.219 Because of this severe impact on com-
munication, the Court scrutinized the lower courts' interpretation
and application of Article 5, ulthmately invalidating them.' 0
Notwithstanding speech-protective outcomes in cases like the
Art Critic case or Echternach, the Deutschland-Magazin test paved
the way for speech-restrictive outcomes as well. This was accom-
plished by recasting the private law emphasis on personality inter-
ests as one of constitutional dimension through Article 1 human
dignity and Article 2 personality rights. Thus, the Deutschland-
Magazin's methodology could be employed to provide enhanced
218. 54 BVerfGE 129 (1980).
219. See id. at 135-36. Under German law, injunctive relief is the common remedy as
compared to damage awards, which are unusual. Under American law, of course, the
situation is reversed. See Quint, supra note 4, at 330 n.261.
220. See Art Critic, 54 BVerfGE at 130, 136.
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review of these constitutional rights, even, paradoxically, over
communication rights.2'
The cases of Bdll3 and Wallraj illustrate this speech-
restrictive strand. In these cases, the Court exercised vigorous con-
stitutional review of personality rights to curtail communication
rights, as it had previously in Mephisto, Soraya, and Lebach.2 4
In Boll, a television commentator criticized the Noble-prize winning
author Heinrich B611 for allegedly making statements that aided
terrorism, then an acute problem for Germany.2 In making his
charge, the commentator misquoted Heinrich B611. B611 asserted
that the misquote invaded his sphere of personality. A state su-
preme court agreed with B611, but the Federal Supreme Court dis-
missed the action.Y
Uncovering new ground, the Constitutional Court determined
that the dismissal of the suit violated B611's personality rights
because an individual has a constitutional interest in not being
misquoted:
[A misquote] impair[s] [a person's] constitutionally guaran-
teed general right to an intimate sphere. Among other
things this right includes personal honor and the right to
one's own words; it also protects the bearer of these rights
against having statements attributed to him which he did
not make and which impair his self-defined claim to social
recognition. 27
In comparison to established doctrine, the violation of B611's per-
sonality rights arose from a court's nonaction in foreclosing B611's
221. See Quint, supra note 4, at 331.
222. 54 BVerfGE 208 (1980).
223. 66 BVerfGE 116 (1984).
224. See discussion supra notes 156-94 and accompanying text.
225. The commentator stated- "Heinrich B611 characterized the liberal state
(Rechtsstaat)-against which the [terrorists'] violence was directed--as a 'pile of dung,'
and said that he saw only 'the remnants of decaying power, which are defended with
ratlike rage.' He accused the state of pursuing the terrorists 'in a pitiless hunt."' B6ll, 54
BVerfGE at 209, translated in Quint, supra note 4, at 332 n.265.
226. See B6ll, 54 BVerfGE at 211-13.
227. Id. at 217, translated in KOMMEPS, supra note 5, at 419. The Court continued:
"The use of a direct quotationi'as proof of critical evaluation is ... a particularly sharp
weapon in the battle of opinions and very effective in undermining the personality right
of the person being criticized. Id. at 421. Again, the contrast with American law over the
use of false quotations is dramatic. See supra note 192.
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right to redress, as compared to the more conventional official
action, which invades the right. In German law, this could be justi-
fied from the positive dimension of rights, which obligates the state
to create the conditions in which rights can thrive-here B611's
right to the integrity of his personality. The Constitutional Court
then found that there was no Article 5 protection for false state-
ments such as the misquote. Thus, B611's personality rights pre-
vailed.'
The Wallraf2 9 case is another illustration of how objective
rights can sometimes limit subjective, individual speech rights.
Interestingly, this case involved a clash between objective and
subjective aspects of expression rights. The sensationalistic newspa-
per Bildzeitung, part of the conservative Axel Springer publishing
house, sued Giinter Wallraff, an investigative reporter, for publish-
ing a book that described in a negative way the paper's editorial
practices. Wallraff worked clandestinely, under a fictitious name, as
a reporter for the paper in order to obtain information as to its
workings.23
The Federal Supreme Court dismissed the Bildzeitung's suit,
deciding that the public interest in the information reported by
Wallraff overrode any competing interest. The Constitutional Court
reversed upon its independent scrutiny of the fact pattern:
Editorial confidentiality is one of the prerequisites of a free
press, and it can be infringed not only by the state but also
by societal forces and individuals. To that extent, editorial
228. See BllI, 54 BVerfGE at 217-18; Quint, supra note 4, at 333-34. On remand, the
Federal Supreme Civil Court ("BGIF) upheld the decision in B611's favor. See 1982 NJW
635. The case of Eppler, 54 BVerfGE 148 (1980), provides an interesting contrast with
B6ll. Decided on the same day, Eppler, a well-known politician, "sought an injunction
prohibiting opponents from repeating their charge that Eppler ... desire[d] to 'test the
endurance of the economy' through his social policies." Quint, supra note 4, at 334 n.-
273. The statement implied that Eppler was willing to take undue risks with the economy.
Accordingly, Eppler viewed the statements as an attack on his constitutional right of per-
sonality. As in Bll, a lower court dismissed the suit. Unlike B1l, however, the Constitu-
tional Court found that the remarks did not "pose a severe danger to Eppler's constitu-
tional right of personality. See id. The Court thus applied a low level of review under the
variable standard of Deutschland-Magazin, rejecting the complaint. See id. The contrast
between BllI and Eppler seems a good illustration of the variability, if not inconsistency,
of the Deutschland-Magazin approach. On the other hand, since Bll involved a false
quotation whereas Eppler concerned an opinion, the two cases can be doctrinally distin-
guished.
229. See 66 BVerfGE 116 (1984).
230. See id. at 117-18.
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confidentiality is an aspect of the guarantee of the indepen-
dence of the press as an objective principle which governs
the interpretation and application of the relevant rules of
the civil law....2m
The assertion of a press right to editorial confidentiality contrasts
notably with American doctrine. 32 Moreover, B6ll and Wallraff
point out once again how the objective aspect of basic rights
makes a difference in the two legal cultures. Motivated by its
desire to realize the "objective" constitutional order, the Constitu-
tional Court acted to sustain protected freedoms: objective press
rights in Wallraff, objective personality rights in B6ll. These objec-
tive dimensions to rights can trump even subjective, individual
rights to free communication. B&Ill and Wallraff thus illustrate the
complicated, interrelated ordering of values so central to German
law and so foreign to American law.
VI. THE 1990s: HEIGHTENED REVIEW AND THE
PREFERENCING OF EXPRESSION
With the uneven application of the Deutschland-Magazin vari-
able standard of review, German communication law stood at a
threshold as it approached the 1990s. The value of communication
would depend on the proclivities of the German Constitutional
Court at any one time. In the 1990s, the Court recognized that it
faced a choice: whether to prefer communication or personality
rights.
Ultimately the Court preferred communication rights. In a se-
ries of cases, it commenced the task of building an analytical
framework that would restore communcation's primacy among
societal values, as envisioned in Lith.233 The Court embarked up-
on this task in a remarkable series of decisions at the outset of the
1990s. In two important cases involving the prominent and contro-
versial German politician, Franz Josef Strauss,"34 and in two cas-
231. Id. at 135, translated in KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 423.
232. In American law, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the claim that the
press should have a right of editorial confidentiality. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972).
233. 7 BVerfGE 198, 208 (1958).
234. Stern-Strauss Interview, 82 BVerfGE 272 (1990); Anti-Strauss Placard, 82 BVerfGE
43 (1990). Franz Josef Strauss brought out the furies in people, who often savagely at-
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es involving denigration of national symbols, one involving the na-
tional flag"5 and the other the national anthem, 6 the Court
served notice that communication rights had a more essential role
to play in German society.
A. The Strauss Cases
1. Stern-Strauss Interview
The case marking the shift most dramatically was Stern-Strauss
Interview,"3 which involved an interview with a prominent writ-
er, Ralph Giordano, published in the leading magazine, Stern, to
mark the death of the former Nazi leader, Rudolph Hess. In the
course of the interview Giordano used Strauss as an illustration of
his view that not all German politicians were true democrats; some
were "opportunistic democrats" (Zwangsdemokraten)-those who,
out of political necessity or opportunism, proclaimed democracy
and adopted democratic ideals, even though they might prefer to
act more dictatorially. 5 "For me Franz Josef Strauss is the per-
sonification of this type.... This type-which I want to deperson-
alize, because it in no way concerns only Franz Josef Strauss-is
very active in the Federal Republic." 9 As powerful men and
personalities, these people appeal to the "not yet resolved German
desire for a strong man, the so-called German version (Verschnitt)
of a national socialism Leadercult (Fiihrerkult)."2 ° Giordano, who
was a Jewish survivor of a concentration camp and had a long
history of opposition to the reestablishment of Nazism in Germany,
tacked him. Strauss often resorted to the courts to defend his "honor." See Judgement of
Appellate Court of Hamm, 1982 NJW 659 (Strauss depicted as sweating, stampeding bull,
covered with red arrows, attacking a group of young people); Judgment of Appellate
Court of Munich, 1971 NJW 844 (Strauss caricatured with limbs in form of swastika);
Judgment of Appellate Court of Hamm, 1982 NJW 1656 (depicted as blood-soaked butch-
er, laughing as he sharpens a long knife); Judgment of Munich Court ("VGI") 1984
NJW 1136 (depicted as big bad wolf in scene from Little Red Riding Hood); Georgios
Goundalakis, Freiriume und Grenzen politischer Karikatur und Satire, 13 NJW 809, 810
n.4 (1995). By contrast, current Chancellor Helmut Kohl, himself subject to innumerable
savage attacks, has never sought judicial relief to vindicate perceived slights of his honor.
See id. at 816. Obviously, the granting of judicial relief encourages public figures to sue.
235. See Flag Desecration, 81 BVerfGE 278 (1990).
236. See National Anthem, 81 BVerfGE 298 (1990).
237. 82 BVerfGE 272 (1990).
238. See id. at 273-74.
239. Id. at 273.
240. Id. at 273-74.
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viewed such "opportunistic democrats" as a danger to German
democracy.241 The lower courts accepted Strauss' argument that
he had been libelled, enjoining further use of his name to personify
the term "opportunistic democrat."'242
In exercising constitutional review, the Constitutional Court
signaled its return to the view that communication was special, as
expressed in Liith.243 While it is true that freedom of opinions
rights are limited by the general law, the Court noted that the
general law is subject to the fundamental values of the Basic Law
according to the Reciprocal Effect Theory.244 The lower courts
failed adequately to take this constitutive value of the Basic Law
into account. To assure compliance with the Basic Law, the Court
therefore found it necessary to heighten its scrutiny. Thus, inten-
sive, full-scope judicial scrutiny would be applied to the lower
courts' misinterpretation of the meaning and range of the right.245
This may arise when courts wrongly interpret a communication,
assign a meaning to a communication that it does not objectively
have, or when a court interprets a communication in a way that
leads to a finding of unconstitutionally without adequate substantia-
tion of the reasons underlying its choice, including the reasons why
other plausible, legal interpretations were dismissed. Communica-
tion rights are also improperly denied when courts misclassify
opinions as unprotected factual assertions, libel, or defamation.24
As phrased, this full-range review247 posits a limited, but in-
tensive, role for the Constitutional Court. The role is limited in that
the Court regularly defers to the ordinary courts' fixing of proce-
dure, establishment and evaluation of the facts, and interpretation
of the ordinary law-as is customary in the German constitutional
order. However, the role is intensive in that the Court noticeably
sharpens its review of the lower courts' interpretation of constitu-
tional norms, as described above. This is an important change
241. Id. at 274.
242. Stern-Strauss Interview, 82 BVerfGE at 275. The suit continued even though
Strauss had died before its resolution, illustrating the importance attached to personal
dignity in Germany.
243. See id. at 280 (citing Liith).
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 281.
247. Stern-Strauss Interview, 82 BVerfGE at 281.
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compared to earlier, more deferential versions of judicial review,
such as that in Mephisto 4 or even Deutschland-Magazin."
To an American observer, the standard of review announced in
Stern-Strauss Interview is more reminiscent of American "hard
look" administrative law review than American strict scrutiny con-
stitutional law review. As in American hard look review, the Ger-
man Constitutional Court looks to see whether the lower courts
have correctly fixed the procedure, assessed the facts, interpreted
the general law and the Basic Law accurately, and thoroughly
explained its conclusions." If these factors are correctly applied,
the Court will normally uphold the lower court decision, even if it
would have reached a different conclusion. True to its continental
roots, the German Court will not ordinarily substitute its judgment
for that of the lower courts. This attempt to respect the authority
of ordinary courts and yet uphold constitutional norms probably
explains the Court's choice of this form of intensive review as
compared to the stricter scrutiny of American courts." The Ger-
man Court is somewhat more constrained by its desire not to in-
trude too deeply into the province of the ordinary courts, a hesita-
248. See supra notes 156-88 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
250. Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983). The Court noted.
The scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is narrow
and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Neverthe-
less, the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a "rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made." In reviewing that explanation, we must "consider
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Normally, an agency rule
would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an impor-
tant aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. The
reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies; we
may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself
has not given. We will, however, "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity
if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned."
Id. at 43 (citations omitted).
251. Under conventional American doctrine, violations of individual rights trigger strict
scrutiny, an inquiry requiring government to justify its regulation as "necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v..Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
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tion not always shared by the United States Supreme Court. Still,
by forcing ordinary courts to make their reasoning transparent, the
Constitutional Court better performs its assigned role as guardian of
the Constitution.
Acknowledging the lower court's recognition of the prevalent
view that communication rights are qualified by personality rights,
the Constitutional Court in Stern-Strauss Interview found it neces-
sary to recalibrate speech freedoms within the German constitution-
al order. The Court reasoned that communication freedoms are
essential to the free development of personality, with which they
are closely linked.52 So defined, communication is an important
part of human dignity. The Court thereby reasserted the importance
of the individual component of expression. By this reasoning, the
Court set out to recapture the earlier prominence of communication
as developed in cases like Lith or Schmid-Spiegel. Reemphasis of
this individual component still compliments the democratic compo-
nent of expression, as regulated by the conventional Presumption
Principle favoring political speech 53 Indeed, the Constitutional
Court went on to sketch the contours of public discourse in a way
previously envisioned by the United States Supreme Court in cases
like New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"54 or Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut. 55 "Especially in public dialogue, including political cam-
paigns, criticism must be accepted, even exaggerated and polemical
forms, because otherwise there is a danger of chilling or limiting
252. See Stern-Strauss Interview, 82 BVerfGE at 281.
253. See id. ("The dimension of (Article 5) protection depends, to be sure, on the pur-
pose of the communication. Contributions to the dialogue of publicly important questions
enjoy stronger protection than statements that only serve private interests.").
254. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[W]e consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.).
255. 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). The Cantwell Court stated:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences
arise. In both fields the tenants of one may seem the rankest error to his
neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we
know, at times resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been,
or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the peo-
ple of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essen-
tial to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a
democracy.
Id. at 310.
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the process by which opinion is formed."5 6 Public persons natu-
rally must expect criticism.z
Assessing the facts anew against this revised doctrinal frame-
work, the Court found fault with the interpretation of the lower
court. Certainly the comments about Strauss could be viewed as
denigrating. Labeling anyone a Nazi in post-war Germany is a very
low blow. 8 Measured against the German version of "hard
look" review, however, this was not the only interpretation of the
statement. It is much more likely that the statement was directed to
the German people as a warning that their longing for a "strong
man" was dangerous to German democracy. Strauss was merely an
object of this longing. This seemed especially likely to the Court
because Giordano had previously counted Strauss as an "oppor-
tunistic democrat" and an object of the German longing for a
strong man, but specifically rejected any comparison of Strauss to
Hitler. 9 Moreover, the author had sought to depersonalize the
reference to Strauss. Thus, viewing the statement "objectively," it
simply did not have the defamatory meaning ascribed to it by the
lower court." In fact, the lower courts interpreted the statement
in the worst possible light, leading to a finding that it was unpro-
tected libel. Rather than defamation, the statement was an impor-
tant contribution to the free formation of opinion, protected under
the Presumption Principle because of its value to German democra-
cy.26
1
This reassessment of the communication forced the Court to
redefine libel for purposes of Article 5 freedoms. Purposeful deni-
gration and insult do not themselves constitute libel, the Court
reasoned, in a move in the direction of American law? 2 Rather,
256. Stern-Strauss Interview, 82 BVerfGE at 282.
257. See id. at 277 ("To be sure, people who participate in public life increase the
chance they will be objects of criticism. Those who render harsh judgments in the strug-
gle for the formation of public opinion must be ready to accept sharp reactions"). Of
course, this is the Counter-Attack Theory developed in Schmid-Spiegel, see supra notes
117-18 and accompanying text, and is reminiscent of the New York Times' "public figure"
standard. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (distinguishing between
public and private figures).
258. See Stern-Strauss Interview, 83 BVerfGE at 277.
259. See id. at 283.
260. See id. at 277.
261. See id. at 283-85.
262. See id. at 283. American libel law is governed by the New York Times actual
malice standard. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280 (holding that actual malice exists when
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the line between protected speech, even if sharp or insulting, and
unprotected libel lies at the point at which the statement primarily
defames the person without any other substantive value. Obviously,
such a distinction is not an easy one to make, and one might ques-
tion the ability of the Court, or any court, to work out such an
obtuse standard.263 The Court ought to delineate clearer bound-
aries between protected expression and unprotected libel or defama-
tion. A useful legal transplantation in this context would be the
technique of definitional balancing or categorization employed by
the Supreme Court in cases like New York Times.' In the ab-
sence of sharpening legal definitions, the standard must, most like-
the statement is made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it is false or not").
263. See Stern-Strauss Interview, 82 BVerfGE at 283-84. The indefiiteness of this
standard is problematic for a system of law. See WAssERMANN COMMENTARY, supra note
28, at 441. Unfortunately, there has not yet been a further concretization of the standard.
See Letter from Dr. Bodo Pieroth, Professor of Law, Westfalische Wilhelms-University, to
Edward J. Eberle (Aug. 26, 1995) (on file with author). In the recent case of B6ll Book
Review, 22 NJW 1462 (1993) the Court applied the Stem-Strauss Interview standard and
found that a critic defamed the reputation of the author Heinrich B611 in a book review
of B611's work that, among other things, called B611 "stone-dumb, clueless and talentless."
To an American observer, this is somewhat of a surprising outcome, since the critique
seems no more severe than standard fare in the American scheme. This would seem to
illustrate the manipulability of the vacuous defamation standard, in contrast to the precise
New York Times standard. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 379-80.
More recently, the Court tightened application of the defamation standard in Soldiers
are Murderers II, 22 EuGRZ 443 (1995), discussed at infra notes 417-23 and accompa-
nying text.
264. For example, the right to be free from defamation and libel as mediated by New
York Times was thought by Professor Nimmer to be a classic case of definitional balanc-
ing. See MELVu.LE B. NRMMER, NMMER ON FREE SPEECH § 2.03 at 2-15 to 2-16 (1984).
As Professor Nimmer explains elsewhere:
Times points the way to the employment of the balancing process on the
definitional ...level. That is, the Court employs balancing not for the purpose
of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in the particular case, but only
for the purpose of defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as
"speech" within the meaning of the first amendment
... By in effect holding that knowingly and recklessly false speech was not
"speech" within the meaning of the first amendment, the Court must have im-
plicitly (since no explicit explanation was offered) referred to certain competing
policy considerations.
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 942-43 (1968) (foot-
notes omitted).
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ly, await clarification through case application, not unlike the
American common law method.
Applying this test, the Court interpreted the statement as con-
cerning primarily the role of opportunistic politicians in German
public life, not a defamatory personal attack on Strauss. "In the
foreground was the objective statement and [Strauss] came into
play only as an illustration of the type." 5 The statement was
primarily a warning that it is necessary to protect and safeguard
the German democratic order from threats." Since the appellate
court (Oberlandergericht) had inaccurately interpreted the state-
ments, the Constitutional Court remanded the case with instructions
to reperform the balancing of interests with greater attention to ex-
pression values. 7
2. Anti-Strauss Placard
The second Strauss decision, decided a few months earlier,
illustrates the Court's use of "hard look" review to scrutinize inter-
pretations of communications that lead to a finding of unconstitu-
tionality without adequate explanation of the reasons underlying the
choice. In the Anti-Strauss Placard' case, demonstrators took to
the streets to protest the policies of Franz Josef Strauss, the Bavari-
an minister president at the time. The point of contention was a
display of placards. One placard stated: "Strauss protects Fascists;"
another banner asserted "Strauss, the Fascist's friend, protects
Hoffmann, the Oktoberfest murderer." 9 Offended by these state-
ments, Strauss sued for insult and won in the lower courts. To the
Court it was unfathomable that such simple statements could be
viewed as defamation. "The statement 'Strauss protects Fascists' is
so short, clear and simple, that it would seem impossible to mis-
construe it, as appeared here."270 The Court concluded that the
signs were subject to several plausible interpretations, not just the
265. Stern-Strauss Interview, 82 BVerfGE at 284.
266. Id. at 285.
267. See id.
268. 82 BVeffGE 43 (1990).
269. Id. at 44. The reference to "Hoffmann, the Oktoberfest murderer," concerns a right-
wing extremist who set off a bomb at the Munich Oktoberfest, which killed and wounded
a number of people. Letter from Dr. Bodo Pieroth, Professor of Law, Westfaische
Wilhelms-University, to Edward J. Eberle (Aug. 26, 1995) (on file with author).
270. Anti-Strauss Placard, 82 BVerfGE at 48. The speaker believed that statements
could be supported by certain activities of Strauss that linked him to fascist groups. See
id. at 48-49.
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unfavorable one reached by the lower court. In such situations,
where a court chooses an interpretation that leads to a finding of
unconstitutionality, the court must substantiate and explain the
reasons for its choice.27' If these factors are not present, the Con-
stitutional Court cannot defer to the lower court, as is custom-
ary- 2 Rather than defamation, the Court concluded, the commu-
nication was an important contribution to the intellectual struggle
for the formation of opinion since it dealt with an important public
issue-namely, the policies of Minister President Strauss. The im-
portance of these issues to the general public must be considered
in judging the meaning of a communication, not merely the
speaker's intention.273
In further probing the communication, the Court found that the
lower court had improperly interpreted the protests by attributing
the actions and statements of certain other members of the Anti-
Strauss Committee to the speaker, treating all as in league with one
another, which the evidence did not bear out. For example, the
district court attributed to the speaker the views of certain commit-
tee members that Strauss was the main representative of fascist
forces in the Federal Republic.274 A speaker can only be respon-
sible for the content of her communications, not the views or ac-
tions of others:
Every person has the right to express freely his opinion,
and under circumstances for which he is accountable...
and not for circumstances or events he does not know [or
is not accountable] . . . . The statements of third parties
can be considered only when they are part of the total
communication and so consciously made or obviously sup-
ported [by the speaker].... Otherwise, it would be possi-
ble to curtail an individual's opinions-if opinions of oth-
ers, or opinions that the speaker has [but has not articulat-
ed] or stated on another occasion-were attributed to her
even though they were not made in the concrete case. In
this way, not only individual freedoms would be limited
but also substantially the freedoms of Article 5 as a whole.
271. See id. at 51-52.
272. See id. at 48-49.
273. See id. at 53.
274. See id. at 52-53.
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Even more importantly, this could threaten injury to the
process by which public opinion is formed, when someone
who makes public statements must reckon with the fact
that his statements will be burdened by [the statements] of
those [listeners or] group members present or their
views.275
On these points, Germany has begun to aspire towards develop-
ments in American law: separating the intent of expression from its
content, and separating individual expression from group associa-
tions for purposes of fixing the boundaries of free discourse.27 6
The Court further elaborated the triggers for intensive scrutiny.
Where criminal sanctions are at issue, the Court must itself deter-
mine whether a proper assessment of the facts has been made since
criminal sanctions can gravely harm communication interests. 2'
Additionally, scrutinization of the facts is essential for expression
that might give rise to civil sanction, like defamation, since it may
determine whether statements are protected or not.7 The Court's
increased scrutiny of facts is a notable departure from its earlier,
traditional deference to the authority of the ordinary courts, and
bespeaks the Court's recognition that establishment of the facts is
itself central to protection of a system of free expression. Intensive
review is also necessary when a false fact or personal insult is
involved, since a consequence of those determinations is that the
communication is not protected. It further applies to instances
involving defamation which, in contrast to personal insults, is not
absolutely without Article 5 protection. 9 Finally, intensive re-
view applies when the meaning of a communication is at issue,
because the determination of the content of a communication deter-
mines whether it is classified as a factual assertion (Tatsachen-
275. Anti-Strauss Placard, 82 BVerfGE at 52-53.
276. See, e.g., lustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that delib-
erate vilification of Reverend Falweil is protected); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401
U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that First Amendment protection of association prohibits state from
excluding person from profession based on membership in undesired political organiza-
tions).
277. See Anti-Strauss Placard, 82 BVerfGE at 50.
278. See id. at 50-51.
279. Under German law personal insults are without Article 5 protection because they
involve a violation of personal honor. Thus, the protection of personality outweighs ex-
pression in this context. See StGB § 192. In contrast, defamation may receive some pro-
tection, depending on whether opinion content predominates over the personal criticism.
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behauptung), value judgment (Werturteil), formal insult (Formal-
beleidigung), or defamation (Schmdhkritik)-all categories denoting
specific levels of protection in the German system.'s "In all
these cases, the Constitutional Court must make sure that the clas-
sification of a statement will not prejudice the range and weight of
the basic right, so that free intellectual dialogue will not be curtail-
ed."'281 The Court's enhanced safeguarding of the structure of
public discourse is a notable development of German law in the
1990s.
3. Strauss Political Satire Case
The Strauss cases thus mark a noticeable heightening of the
scrutiny applied by the Constitutional Court. A brief look at an
earlier Strauss case, the Strauss Political Satire caseas 2 illustrates
the difference. There, caricatures of Strauss were published that
depicted him as a sexually active pig, copulating with other pigs
dressed in judicial robes meant to portray justices. Applying the
sliding scale standard of Deutschland-Magazin, the Court found
that this ribald satire exceeded the bounds of propriety.28 The
crude depiction could only be viewed as a sharp, scurrilous attack
on Strauss, the Court reasoned. Sexual acts are intimate compo-
nents of human dignity. Depicting humans as animals, especially in
sexual acts, is a severe intrusion of human personality. By such
reasoning, the Court found a violation of Strauss' dignity as a
person.24 The case thus illustrates the immediately preceding re-
gime: human dignity and personality rights limit individual speaker
rights.
The Strauss Political Satire case contrasts dramatically with
American law. In Hustler Magazine v, Falwell,25 decided around
280. See Anti-Strauss Placard, 82 BVerfGE at 51. Under German law, protection of
factual statements depends on their truth/falsity, whereas value judgments are presumptive-
ly protected, regardless of whether true or false. See supra notes 137-38 and accompany-
ing text.
281. Id. at 51.
282. 75 BVerfGE 369 (1987).
283. See id. at 379.
284. See id. at 380. Technically, this was considered a criminal insult under the German
Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). See StGB § 185.
285. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The comparison of Hustler with
the Strauss Political Satire Case is a popular topic in Germany. See, e.g., Goundalakis,
supra note 234, at 810; Nolte, Falwell vs. Strauss: Die Rechtlichen Grenzen Politischer
Satire in den USA und in der Bundesrepublik, 1988 EuGRZ 253.
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the same time, the Supreme Court protected Hustler's deliberate
insult of Reverend Falwell through its depiction of his first sexual
encounter as occurring between a drunken Falwell and his mother
in an outhouse. This caricature could not plausibly be viewed as a
statement of fact, nor could it reasonably be construed as sufficient
to make out "actual malice." 6 Thus, what was left-damage to
personal reputation, hurt feelings, and asserted emotional
harms-were, according to the Supreme Court, pains to be borne
in service to the American ideal of unfettered discourse. 7 In
these respects, German and American law contrast dramatically
over the limiting influence that personality rights have on expres-
sion.
B. National Symbol Cases
1. Flag Desecration Case
Further dramatic contrasts and similarities between both legal
systems can be seen in the Flag Desecration" and the National
Anthem" 9 cases, which are strikingly similar to the American
flag-burning cases.2 ° The Flag Desecration case concerned the
sale of a satiric book of anti-military prose and poetry. The con-
troversy concerned the back cover of the book. The bottom half
showed soldiers at attention saluting the German flag.29 The top-
half depicted a man, with fly open, urinating. A urine trail was
noticeable behind the flag. Putting the collage together, it looked
like the man was urinating on the German flag. The lower courts
found this to be a violation of the German Criminal Code, which
made it an offense to desecrate the flag.292
286. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56-57.
287. See Eberle, supra note 1, at 1184.
288. 81 BVerfGE 278 (1990).
289. 81 BVerfGE 298 (1990).
290. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989).
291. Flag Desecration, 81 BVerfGE at 280.
292. Section 90a of the German Criminal Code declares:
(1) Whoever publicly, in an assembly or through the distribution of publica-
tions ...
1. insults or maliciously casts into contempt the Federal Republic of
Germany or one of its states or its constitutional order, or
2. defames the colors, the flag, the coat of arms or the anthem of the
Federal Republic or one of its states, will be punished by imprisonment
8631997]
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Although the book cover contained obvious political opinion,
the courts classified the expression as involving artistic, not opin-
ion, rights.293 The assessment of criminal sanctions triggered
heightened review because criminal sanctions can have especially
severe consequences for individual and social interests in expres-
sion.294 Because artistic freedoms were at issue, the Constitutional
Court needed to determine whether the book cover was properly
evaluated as art in addition to policing interpretation of the
right.2 95 Determination of the bounds of art is necessary, since
artistic freedoms, like opinion freedoms, are essential to the free
formation of ideas.2' It was easy to characterize the book cover
as art. The photo collage tangibly involved the artistic process, the
essential standard laid down in Mephisto.297 It did not lose its
status as protected art because it was offensive or opinionated,
since the governrent may not prescribe orthodoxy in art and since
art can express opinion.298
Having found that the book was art did not end the inqui-
ry-despite the absolute language of Article 5(3). Artistic freedoms
can be limited by countervailing constitutional norms, the essential
teaching of Mephisto. These countervailing constitutional interests
can be individual or social. "[A]n orderly human life in a commu-
nity presupposes not only the mutual consideration of the citizens,
but also a functioning state order, which is necessary to secure
effective protection of basic rights in the first place." The
of up to three years or by a fine....
StGB § 90a, as translated in Peter E. Quint, The Comparative Law of Flag Desecration;
The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 15 HASTNGS INT'L & CoMP. L.
REV. 613, 628 n.86 (1992).
293. Flag Desecration, 81 BVerfGE at 291.
294. See id. at 290; accord Anti-Strauss, 82 BVerfGE at 50.
295. Flag Desecration 81 BVerfGE at 289-91; see also Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE at 189,
discussed supra at notes 155-87 and accompanying text.
296. See Flag Desecration, 81 BVerfGE at 291. Theoretically, it should make a differ-
ence whether artistic or opinion freedoms are at issue since art is textually unbounded in
comparison to the textual circumscription of opinion. In practice, however, the Constitu-
tional Court has implied limitations on artistic freedoms as, of course, it previously im-
plied limitations on the express qualifications of opinion freedoms. See, e.g., discussion of
Lfth at supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. Thus, in reality there is no- practical
difference between artistic and opinion freedoms. See supra notes 163-72 and accompany-
ing text.
297. See Flag Desecration, 81 BVerfGE at 292.
298. See id.
299. Id.
[V/ol. 47.797
PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN CONTEMPORARY GERMANY
Court went so far as to assert that the regulation of artistic expres-
sion is not limited to threats of a "clear and present danger."
Works of art that denigrate the constitutionally protected order
cannot be regulated only when they directly threaten the existence
of the state or constitution. Rather, courts must balance artistic
rights against the countervailing constitutional interests. This bal-
ance must involve a concrete working out of the values in context
in an attempt to maximize both.3" The balancing of interests test
applicable in artistic expression is essentially the same as that
applicable to freedom of opinion cases. °1
In contrast to the personality rights at issue in Mephisto, the
competing norm here was protection of the flag, derived somewhat
free-handedly from the Article 22 provision specifying that the flag
must be red, black, and yellow.3" From this straight-forward text,
the Court interpreted Article 22 to presuppose "the right of the
state to use state symbols to self-present itself' in order "to appeal
to the state-feeling (Staatsgefiihl) of citizens."3 3 "As a free state,
the Federal Republic is dependent on the identification of its citi-
zens with the fundamental values symbolized, by the flag. These
protected values are present in the colors of the flag ... which
stand for the free democratic basic order."'3'4 On this interpreta-
tion, "the point of the countervailing constitutional value incorpo-
rated into section 90a becomes clear." '3 5 "As the flag serves an
important means of integration through the state goals it embodies,
so can its denigration injure the authority of the state which is
necessary to internal peace."3 6 Thus, Professor Quint argues, "the
countervailing interest recognized by the Court is the interest of the
state in being free from attack on its basic principles and
'authority'-a freedom from a form of seditious libel that would
injure the authority of the state and endanger 'internal peace.""'3
300. See id. The principle of trying to balance optimally conflicting constitutional values
to achieve some form of harmony is known as concordance (Konkordanz).
301. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
302. See Art. 22 GG.
303. Flag Desecration, 81 BVerfGE at 293.
304. Id.
305. Quint, supra note 292, at 632.
306. Id.
307. Id. "Criminal code section 90a(l)(1) therefore seems to be quite frankly a seditious
libel statute of the type fundamentally rejected in the United States under the principles of
New York Times." Id. at 632 n.113.
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This interest in seditious libel contrasts with American law
where that interest is not accorded much weight unless a "clear
and present" danger of violence is present. Certainly seditious libel
was not a factor in the two flag burning cases, Texas v. John-
son08 and United States v. Eichman.3 9 As compared to Ameri-
can law, German law accords more weight to the values of stabili-
ty and internal peace and grants the state more power to fight
threats to its existence. Underlying this view is the important Ger-
man concept of a "militant democracy," under which the state
actively fights to preserve "the free democratic basic order." '31
Certainly Germany's historical experiences are a major reason for
these views.
The lower court assumed that these state interests outweighed
the artistic values of the collage. Examining this decision, the
Court determined that the lower court had mistakenly interpreted
the photo collage as an attack on the German state." 1 According
to the Court, the "symbolic protection [of the flag] cannot be used
to immunize the state from criticism. A concrete consideration of
the competing interests is necessary."312 It was this consideration
that the lower court neglected. A more plausible interpretation was
that the collage was a protest against militarism. The content of the
message was just "clothed" in the picture of a man urinating. Un-
der German doctrine, the means (Einkleidung) of artistic expression
are judged more leniently than the content (Aussagen) because the
means chosen are the very transformative elements that make it
art.3 13 The mistake of the lower court was to see insult in the
urination rather than value in the protest. Accordingly, the Court
sent the case back to the lower courts with instructions to accord
more weight to the artistic values in performing its balancing of
interests. Like the Anti-Strauss Placard case, the Flag Desecration
case illustrates the hard look prong that a court may not choose an
308. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
309. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
310. Quint, supra note 292, at 633. "Thus protection of the flag forms one of the bul-
warks . . . against subversion of the state." id. at 634.
311. See Flag Desecration, 81 BVerfGE at 294-95.
312. Id. at 294.
313. See id. at 295 (addressing the need to judge the collage more leniently because it
is a means of artistic expression).
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interpretation of a communication that results in an unconstitutional
holding without adequate substantiation of its reasoning.314
One might take issue with the Constitutional Court. Evaluation
of the expression seems to be somewhat in the eye of the behold-
er. Although the Constitutional Court seems correct in its decision,
it presents no rationale for differentiating its view of expression
from that of the lower courts. This failure to lay down a clear
standard is a serious weakness of the general balancing of interests
test, tending to result in a degree of unpredictability in the law.
While an expression-protective outcome was reached here, it is just
as easy to imagine contrary outcomes,--as in Mephisto.315 In this
way, the Flag Desecration case is more of a transitional
case-between the vaguer Deutschland-Magazin regime 16 and the
more precise scrutiny of Stern-Strauss Interview, 317 which was
decided a few months later. Perhaps most notable to an American
observer is that Flag Desecration presupposes that the State can
protect itself against seditious libel.318 In more pathological peri-
ods, the protection of art might be turned against itself.319 Still, it
is worth observing that the Court sought to protect communica-
tion-a trend in keeping with the enhanced protection accorded
Article 5 freedoms in the 1990s.
2. The National Anthem Case
A companion case, the National Anthem case32" illustrates the
same techniques as the Flag Desecration case. An article was
published in a Niirnberg magazine that satirized the German na-
tional anthem, parodying the first two stanzas in biting criticism of
modem German life and aspects of it, such as the crass pursuit of
money, German peep shows, Pershing Tanks, and the plight of
Turks in Germany.32' As in the Flag Desecration case, the lower
court found this to be seditious libel under the German criminal
314. See supra notes 268-74 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 156-87 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 237-67 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
319. For example, in a period of relative insecurity, attacks on state symbols may be
perceived as attacks on the government or social order itself, leading to suppression of
expression.
320. 81 BVerfGE 298 (1990).
321. See id. at 299-300.
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code, justifying police seizure of copies of the books and a four-
month jail sentence for the publisher.3" The Constitutional Court
acknowledged that the national anthem, like the flag, received
constitutional protection, but noted that this protection extended
only to the first verse, and not other verses, which were the subject
of the parody.3" Thus, there was actually no constitutional inter-
est against which artistic expression must be judged. Independently
assessing the communication, the Constitutional Court then found
the parody. to be a satirical portrayal of the "contradiction between
the pretensions and reality" of German society.324 By contrast, the
lower courts had interpreted the expression in the worst possible
light-as a seditiously libel attack on the state.
C. Summary of 1990s Review
These cases illustrate the more preferred position accorded
expression in the 1990s, in marked contrast with the preceding
Deutschland-Magazin regime.325 As we move through the 1990s,
the characteristics of how modem German law achieved this posi-
tion become evident. First, the Court tightened the level of review
applied to expression cases. Under intensive "hard look" review,
the Court subjects the decisions of the lower court to tough scruti-
ny to determine whether the courts correctly assessed the facts,
correctly interpreted the ordinary law and the Basic Law, and thor-
oughly and convincingly explained its conclusions. Second, the
Court spelled out the circumstances justifying such intensive re-
view, an important improvement from the Deutschland-Magazin
approach, thereby lending a necessary degree of clarity and predict-
ability to German law. These circumstances obtain when there is a
fundamentally false interpretation of the right. For example, inten-
sive review applies when a court assigns a meaning to a communi-
cation that it does not objectively have, as in the Stern-Strauss
Interview case,326 or when a court chooses an interpretation that
322. See id. The police acted pursuant to the same statute at issue in the Flag Desecra-
tion case. See supra note 292.
323. National Anthem, 81 BVerfGE at 308.
324. Id. at 307. According to the Court, the parody was actually a portrayal of German
daily life. See id. at 305.
325. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
326. See also supra notes 237-67 and accompanying text.
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leads to unconstitutionality without adequately considering legal
alternatives, as in the Anti-Strauss Placard case.327
Third, the Court demonstrated an increased willingness to as-
sess independently the facts at issue to assure adequate protection
of expression freedoms, as in the Anti-Strauss Placard case, a
notable departure from prior law. Fourth, there is a more conscious
structuring of public discourse to encompass critical, exaggerated,
or polemical communication, and to remove impediments to the
free formation of opinion. For example, the sharp insults of Strauss
held to be protected in the two Strauss cases of 1990 illustrate this
more speech-protective approach in comparison to the caricature
not protected in the earlier Strauss Political Satire case.328 Simi-
larly, the national symbol cases show more tolerance for seditious
libel-always a touchy subject in Germany. Calling into question
the state's identity or substance is perhaps the heart of political
freedom, as long recognized by the Supreme Court.329 Finally,
heightened emphasis of the individual right to speak one's mind is
evident. For example, in both Strauss cases, the Constitutional
Court highlighted the connection of expression to the right of per-
sonal development.33° In these ways, German law is moving in
the direction of its American counterpart.
D. Reconsideration of Limitations on Expression
Although the development of German law in the 1990s is
decidedly more expansive of communication freedoms, it is still
subject to more circumscription than American law. The textual
limitations of opinion freedoms by the general law, youth, and
personal honor still remain in place, as do other long-recognized
exceptions, such as depiction of violence, hate speech, and group
defamation. The status of pure commercial speech remains unre-
solved.331 Still, German law in the 1990s is tightening permissi-
327. See supra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (affixing peace symbol to
displayed flag as protest against Vietnam War is protected expression); West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that free expression
protects against state compelled pledge of allegiance law).
330. See Stern-Strauss Interview, 82 BVerfGE at 281; Anti-Strauss Placard, 82 BVerfGE
at 52.
331. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. For example, the Court upheld a ban
on inappropriate and ostentatious advertising by pharmacists in 1980 on the ground it
limited no opinions, but only certain excesses. See 53 BVerfGE 96, 99 (1980); see also
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ble exceptions to public discourse in a way similar to the journey
embarked upon by the Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan. In contrast to American law, the German focus is not on
reconceptualization of historical limitations, such as New York
Times v. Sullivan's redefinition of libel or Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.'s332
reconception of commercial speech. Rather, the focus is on nar-
rowing the limitations. Thus, the German trend is much more like
the Supreme Court's reconsideration of the clear and present dan-
ger test.333 Several important cases evidence this trend.
1. Horror Film Case
In the Horror Film case,334 the Court acknowledged that
there could be reasonable time, place, and manner regulation of
violence, gruesomeness, or cruelty that appears on films accessible
to youth. Under German law, such violence can be considered a
violation of fundamental human dignity, since it portrays people in
inhumane and socially destructive ways. 335 A complicated rating
system is designed to balance expression values with the state
interest in protecting youth. 336 Despite the Basic Law's concern
with protecting youth, the Constitutional Court tightened the per-
missible range of youth regulation-there must be a close fit be-
CURRIE, supra note 4, at 176.
332. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
333. Compare, e.g., Schenek v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (relying on the clear
and present danger test), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam)
(departing from the clear and present danger standard).
334. 87 BVerfGE 209 (1992).
335. See id. at 217. According to the Court:
The constitutionally important interest in the wholesome development of young
people justifies regulations designed to protect children against moral harm. All
printed matter, films, or pictures that glorify violence or crime, provoke racial
hatred, glorify war, or depict sexual acts in a crude, offensive, and shameful
manner constitute such harm and thus may lead to serious or even irreversible
injury. The legislature may thus adopt measures designed to prevent children
from gaining access to such materials.
Nudist Magazine Case, 30 BVerfGE 336 (1971), translated in KOMMERS, supra note 5, at
423-24.
336. The rating system involves five categories, ranging from admission without limita-
tion to admission only at age 18. See Horror Film, 87 BVerfGE at 212. Classification
within these categories depends on a determination of the threat to youth posed by films
containing racial hatred, violence, sexual acts, or similar content. A board widely represen-
tative of the community makes these decisions.
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tween the end desired and the means used to effectuate that end.
The Court found the state's seizure of an American horror film,
The Evil Dead, an impermissible prior restraint because the film
was confiscated before its classification under the rating system
could be determined. Even if a film were not suitable for adoles-
cent viewing, a distributor of a film could decide to show the film
only before adult audiences. Alternatively, a distributor could cut or
edit scenes in an attempt to meet the concerns of the rating
board.337 The denial of these decisions violated the Article 5 pro-
hibition against censorship.
2. Josefine Mutzenbacher
In a second case, Josefine Mutzenbacher,338 the Constitutional
Court declared that a novel recalling the experiences of a Viennese
prostitute could not be restricted as dangerous to youth, despite its
graphic depiction of sex, promiscuity, and child prostitution, be-
cause the lower court had failed to give sufficient attention to the
novel's artistic merit. The lower courts had assumed that the over-
riding interest in protecting youth justified limiting artistic freedom.
Instead, the Court demanded a concrete balancing of the artistic
merits of the work with its danger to youth and set forth the fac-
tors so to be considered upon remand.339 There were also consti-
tutional deficiencies in the make-up of the rating boards authorized
to make decisions on what is appropriate for youth."
3. Cripple
The last of these cases, Cripple,34' is controversial from an
337. See id. at 230-33.
338. 83 BVerfGE 130 (1990).
339. See id. at 142-47.
340. For example, the board was not provided with adequate direction, and the legisla-
ture had not sufficiently reached core decisions as to the composition of the board. See
id. at 150-52.
341. 86 BVerfGE 1 (1992). Under German law, denigrating speech over race, ethnicity,
gender and physical appearance, among other categories, is outlawed:
Article 130
Inciting to hatred. Whoever, in a manner apt to breach the public peace [public
order] attacks the human dignity of others by
1. inciting to hatred against parts of the population,
2. provoking to violent or arbitrary acts against them,
3. insulting, maliciously making them contemptible, or defaming them,
shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of three months to five
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American perspective because it excises certain hate speech from
public discussion, a solution opposite to the American one.342 In
fact, Cripple illustrates both the increasing freeness of German
public discourse and its distinct limitations. Much of Cripple is
similar in tenor to other speech-protective cases of the 1990s.
43
The Court applied intensive review to a lower court's assessment
of criminal sanctions against published political satirization of a
soldier who had recently been rendered a quadriplegic in an auto-
mobile accident.3 ' Despite his disability, he wanted to serve in
the German army as a Czech translator. In a widely circulated
Sunday paper, Bild am Sonntag, the soldier had asserted: "I don't
know why the army declined my offer to serve: My head is still
o.k... .,,3' A satirical magazine, The Titanic, poked fun at the
years.
Article 131
Representation of violence. Instigating race hatred.
(1) Whoever
1. disseminates,
2. publicly exhibits, posts, presents, or otherwise makes accessible,
3. offers to, leaves with, or makes accessible to a person below
the age of eighteen, or
4. produces, subscribes to, supplies, stocks, offers, announces,
recommends, undertakes to import into, or export out of, the
territory in which this law applies, in order to use them, or piec-
es derived from them, in the manner indicated in 1 to 3 above,
or to enable others to do so, writings (art. 11, para. 3) that incite
to race hatred or describe cruel or otherwise inhuman acts of
violence against humans in a manner which glorifies or minimizes
such acts of violence or represents the cruel or inhuman aspects
of the occurrence in a manner offending human dignity, shall be
punished by a tern of imprisonment of up to one year or by a
fine.
(2) The same punishment shall apply to any person who disseminates a
presentation with the contents indicated in paragraph 1 by means of
broadcasting.
(3) Paragraphs 1 and 2 are not applicable when the act is in the service
of reporting on current events or history.
StGB Art. 130-31, translated in Stein, supra note 128, at 322-23.
342. Compare Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (holding that states may
constitutionally punish hate-inspired conduct), with R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992) (holding that hate-inspired fighting words not beyond First Amendment protection).
343. See e.g., the Strauss cases, discussed supra notes 237-81 and accompanying text,
and the National Symbol cases, discussed supra notes 288-324 and accompanying text.
344. See Cripple, 86 BVerfGE at 2-3.
345. Id.
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soldier by featuring him in a regular column, "The Seven Most
Embarrassing Personalities of the Month," complete with picture,
alongside the designation "born murderer."'3 Text accompanying
the picture stated that it was obscene to imagine that a quadriplegic
would still want to serve in the army. "My head is still o.k., he
says ... Soldiers are still able to act with impunity as potential
murderers."347 The lower courts interpreted these statements in
the column literally to say that the soldier was genetically born to
be a murderer. As such, they violated the former soldier's personal-
ity rights.
On this point, the Constitutional Court found that the lower
court misinterpreted the communication. Rather than an attack on
the former soldier, it was obvious that the piece was intended as
political satire and as an antimilitaristic statement.3  In protecting
these aspects of the communication, the Court displayed sensitivity
to critical speech, noting that such is offensive and prone to sup-
pression, which the Court must guard against.
While these aspects of the Court's decision were speech protec-
tive, the Court's approval of a ban on use of the word "cripple"
was speech-restrictive. In response to the soldier's suit, The
Titanic's publisher printed a reply in the magazine in which he
stated that he found it obscene that the soldier, now a cripple,
would want to serve in the military. "The fact that you, a crip-
ple,... are determined to join ... the German army, whose
purpose it is to cripple or kill people we found obscene and named
you as one of the seven most embarrassing personalities of
March." '349 Use of the word "cripple" is demeaning, the Court
346. The designation "born murderer" was a biting pun. One of the other personalities
featured that month as "embarrassing" was listed with her maiden names which in Ger-
man is "born" ("geb.'). The then-German president, Richard von Weizsacker, also was
listed as "born citizen." Thus, the term "born murderer" was satire directed at this com-
mon usage. Id. at 2.
347. The reference to soldiers as murderers came from an earlier speech by the publish-
er in which he asserted that every soldier is a potential murderer. The German army pre-
pares people to be murderers. The speech attracted a lot of attention, resulting in the
speaker being sanctioned. See id. at 3-4. Indeed, the cultural reference to "soldiers are
murderers" has a long, and infamous, history in Germany. See infra discussion of Soldiers
are Murderers I and II at notes 372-430 and accompanying text.
348. See Cripple, 86 BVerfGE at 11-12. The mistake of the lower court was to inter-
pret the usage "murderer" in a literal sense, applying the criminal code. The magazine
was itself devoted to satire, the Court reasoned. Thus, readers knew what to expect.
349. Id. at 4.
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reasoned, because it connotes that a person is of lesser human
worth. "Today, calling someone a 'cripple' is understood as a
humiliation. It stamps someone as a person of lesser worth....
This is a severe violation of the complainant's personality
rights ... [banning the word] is not a burden on freedom of opin-
ion. '350 As such, it is a formal insult punishable under the crimi-
nal code. Cripple teaches unmistakably that certain words are
prescribable as a violation of fundamental human dignity.
While the strength of personality rights as a restraint on Article
5 freedoms has diminished from its zenith in the 1970s, Cripple
attests to the continuing strength of such rights. The German out-
come contrasts dramatically with American law. Under American
law, words themselves are almost always protected, notwithstanding
their harm, because of the overriding value of speech, a principle
made dramatically apparent in recent battles over hate speech.35 '
Indeed, American law over the last thirty years has sought to place
almost no expression beyond free discourse, while concomitantly
narrowing the range of any such exceptions.
As a matter of comparative law, the divergent German and
American outcomes reveal differences in culture. In Germany, the
integrity of the human person, as protected by Article 1 human
dignity and Article 2 personality rights, is the ultimate legal value.
One might say human dignity justifiably limits certain communica-
tion, such as degrading personal epithets, since these can be viewed
as an attack on the inviolability of human personality. In compari-
son, in American law and American society protection of the integ-
rity of the human personality is less highly valued as a legal value.
Our concern is more with individual and social freedoms, of which
free speech plays a leading role. In turn, this reveals the tremen-
dous amount of importance we place on free speech, a degree of
350. Id. at 13. Use of the term was not even justifiable in the context of describing the
horrors of war. To some, use of the word "cripple" conjures memories of the Hitler era,
since the disabled, viewed as "inferior" stock, were often victims of Nazi persecution.
351. Compare Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (holding that the state
may constitutionally punish hate-inspired conduct), with R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992) (holding that hate-inspired fighting words are not beyond Fst Amendment protec-
tion). For strong arguments favoring excision of hate speech, see Charles 1L Lawrence III,
If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431;
Mad J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
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freedom no other country reaches. We might say free speech is to
us what human dignity is to the Germans.
E. Applying Intensive, "Hard Look" Review
Certainly the Cripple case, the Horror Film case and the
Josefine Mutzenbacher case reveal the continuing strength of Ger-
man circumscription of public discourse. Within those constraints,
however, modem German law has begun to approximate the free-
ness of American law. The most notable developments here have
been the use of intensive, "hard look" review and the heightened
emphasis on the individual component of speech. With hard look
review in place, the Constitutional Court now concentrates on
safeguarding the communicative structure of public discourse and
the integrity of expression. Notable examples of the 1990s regime
are the Hitler T-Shirt case, the Bayer Dissident Stockholders case
and its companion, the Nursing Home case.
1. Hitler T-Shirt Case
The Court reaffirmed the centrality of freedom of expression in
the Hitler T-Shirt case352 by lifting sanctions against a manufac-
turer of a t-shirt that parodied Hitler (and the Germans) by depict-
ing his torso with a swastika wrapped around the map of Europe
under the motto "European Tour." Written above the map were the
names and dates of Hitler's invasions. The lower court had as-
sumed that an average reader would fail to perceive the irony of
the depiction, and instead interpreted the T-shirt to involve an
appeal to Germany's Nazi past, which is illegal under German
law. 53 According to the Constitutional Court, this was a funda-
mentally unsound interpretation. A court may not choose an inter-
pretation of a communication that leads to invalidity without sup-
plying satisfactory reasons for its choice. 4 By then this was a
familiar doctrine.
352. 82 BVerfGE 1 (1990).
353. See id. at 5. Under German law, it is prohibited to display Nazi paraphernalia. See
StGB Art. 86a.
354. Hitler T-Shirt, 82 BVerfGE at 5.
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2. Bayer Dissident Stockholders
More controversial was the Bayer Dissident Stockholders
case,"' where the Constitutional Court applied "hard look" re-
view to protect critical commentary of the Bayer Pharmaceutical
Company. A pamphlet criticized Bayer for damaging the environ-
ment and human health, and "violating democratic principles, hu-
man rights and political fairness in its limitless search for prof-
its. 35 6 The point of contention was the criticism that Bayer spied
upon and pressured critics, and "supported pliable, fight-wing poli-
ticians., 3
57
The doctrinal problem posed was how to disentangle fact from
opinion. Under German law, protection of facts depends on their
truth or falsity. True facts are protected because they contribute to
information which, in turn, aids the formation of opinion. But false
facts are not protected because they do not so contribute to the
development of opinion,35 ' a dichotomy essentially mirrored in
American law.3 59 By contrast, dissemination of opinion is protect-
ed, regardless of whether it is true or false. The relatively free
reign granted freedom of opinion is necessary to assure "everyone
the right to assert and disseminate opinion.' '360 Thus, much de-
pended on classification of the communication as fact or opinion.
The Constitutional Court's review centered on the appellate
court's finding that the statement was not wholly protected opinion,
but opinion that depended on factual assertions (namely, that Bayer
violated democratic principles, and supported pliant right-wing poli-
ticians and spied on critics), which the court had subjected to a
burden of truth that the speaker was unable to meet. The imposi-
tion of the truth burden triggered heightened review, according to
the Constitutional Court, because the burden might unjustifiably
block the free formation of opinion. 6 Applying intensive review,
the Court determined first that instances of mixed fact/opinion, as
here, should be treated as protected opinion to the extent the com-
355. 85 BVerfGE 1 (1991).
356. Id. at 3.
357. Id.
358. See id. at 15.
359. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
360. Bayer, 85 BVerfGE at 14; see also Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 1, at 61 (noting
that opinion rights are to be broadly construed).
361. See Bayer, 85 BVerfGE at 17.
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munication contains elements of personal valuation-the essential
test of opinion 62 This conclusion follows from the Court's de-
sire to interpret the basic right liberally in a speech-protective
manner.
Examining the statements at issue, the Court concluded that the
assertions that Bayer "spied upon" and "exerted pressure" on critics
and "supported pliable right-wing politicians" were to be under-
stood as protected opinion, even if exaggerated or caustic. 63
Thus, it was inappropriate to place a truth burden on the communi-
cation since this hampers the free formation of opinion. The Court
thus remanded the case to the lower court with instructions to
balance concretely opinion freedoms against the opposing legal
interests."
Notable also in Bayer Dissident Stockholders is further evi-
dence of the Court's increasing emphasis on the individual right to
speak one's mind, a theme first introduced in Lith and reasserted
following a hiatus in modem cases like Stern-Strauss Interview.
"Everyone has the right to assert and disseminate their opinion...
regardless of whether it is with or without value, true or false,
grounded or ungrounded, emotional or irrational. Sharp, exaggerat-
ed opinions are also protected."'365
3. Nursing Home
The more overt emphasis of the individual component of com-
munication is also evident in the companion case, Nursing
Home,3 6 where a member of an environmental and peace group
published a fourteen-point report in the form of a questionnaire
raising serious issues about the quality of care being provided in a
nursing home. Applying intensive scrutiny to the lower court's
view that the questionnaire contained facts subject to verification,
the Court found these conclusions ungrounded, as in Bayer Dissi-
dent Stockholders, since the statements at issue in the questionnaire
more reasonably asserted opinion.3 67 To require that a speaker
verify as true all factual assertions of a communication would
362. See id. at 15; see supra note 28 (discussing the difficulty in distinguishing between
fact and opinion).
363. Id. at 18-20.
364. See id. at 20-22.
365. Id. at 14-15.
366. 85 BVeffGE 23 (1991).
367. See id. at 43-46.
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impermissibly curtail public discourse.368 "The basic right of free-
dom of opinion guarantees everyone the right to express freely
their opinion without distinguishing between fact and opinion. 369
"Free expression is constitutionally protected because it is an im-
mediate expression of the human personality, as well as indispens-
able to democratic society. '3 7 "Freedom of opinion is thus not
limited to the protection of individual expression, but also secures
the individual and public interest in the free formation of
opinion.
Bayer Dissident Stockholders and the Nursing Home cases
illustrate the increasingly active role assumed by the Court in po-
licing the structure of public discourse to assure that opinion may
be freely asserted, a role long played by the United States Supreme
Court. Added to the application of intensive review and the in-
creased emphasis of the individual dimension of communication,
the characteristics are present that make the 1990s regime more
expression-protective. The effects of this German liberalization are
discernible in the increasingly more controversial decisions of the
Constitutional Court. Having secured the basis of free expression,
the Court appeared ready to tackle the next step in the develop-
ment of a vibrant system of free expression: protection of critical
and dissident speech.
4. Soldiers Are Murderers I
Few cases have stirred modem passions as much as the recent
Soldiers are Murderers decisions. 72 The controversy resulted,
ironically enough, from a chamber opinion, a procedure reserved
for the issuance of uncontroversial applications of established prin-
ciples. Unlike the official publication of opinions, which involve
the whole Court and is reserved for more important or more doc-
trinally innovative cases, the chamber opinion involves an un-
signed, usually short opinion, issued by a three-judge panel and is
usually reserved for straightforward matters. Conceived as a simple
368. See id. at 34. Whether questions could constitute opinion was an issue of first
impression for the Court. The Court concluded that questions could also raise opinions.
See id. at 46.
369. Id. at 31.
370. Nursing Home, 85 BVerfGE at 31 (citing Liith, 7 BVerfGE 198, 298 (1958)).
371. Id.
372. Soldiers are Murderers I, 45 NJW 2943, 2943 (1994); Soldiers are Murderers II,
22 EuGRZ 443 (1995).
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case, Soldiers are Murderers I reaped immediate and sharp criti-
cism among the German public, necessitating a response by the full
Court in Soldiers are Murderers II only one year later.
At issue in Soldiers are Murderers I was a protest of the 1991
Gulf War. Affixed to the car of the protestor, himself a famous
conscientious objector from the draft, was a sticker "Soldiers are
Murderers." '373 The T in the German word for soldier (Soldaten)
was replaced with a cross. Below the sticker was a facsimile signa-
ture of Kurt Tucholsky, a reference to a famous playwright of the
1930s.374 Another sticker depicted the famous photo by Robert
Capa of a soldier during the 1936 Spanish Civil War shown being
killed by a bullet at the point of impact with hands outstretched
and weapon falling, with the caption, "Why?" '375 A third sticker
pronounced "Turn swords into plowshares."376 The lower court
took the expression "murderer" literally, subjecting it to the crimi-
nal code, and interpreted "why?" and "soldiers" as directed at the
German army, as compared to soldiers or war generally.3" Based
on this reasoning, the lower court ruled that the communication
was prescribable as insulting and as hate-inciting (Volksver-
hetzung).378
Subjecting these findings to "hard look" review, the Court
found that the communications simply did not objectively have
those meanings. Rather, it interpreted the communications as a
general protest against war.379 The use of "murderer" had a
slang, idiomatic sense, not a technical criminal meaning; "why"
and "soldiers" were meant as a general protest against war, not as
an attack on the military. Reflecting conventional doctrine, the
Court noted that such scrutiny of the "interpretation and valuation"
(Erfassung und Wiirdigung) is necessary to assure an effective
protection of the right to freedom of opinion. 381 The Constitution-
al Court thus remanded the case to the lower court to reperform
373. Soldiers are Murderers I, 45 NJW 2943, 2943 (1994).
374. See id. In Germany, "Soldiers are Murderers" is a ready cultural reference to a
famous 1931 work by Kurt Tucholsky. See infra notes 393-94 and accompanying text.
375. Soldiers are Murderers 1, 45 NJW at 2943.
376. See id.
377. See id. at 2944.
378. See id. at 2943-44.
379. See id.
380. Soldiers are Murderers I, 45 NJW at 2943.
1997]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the balancing of interests in light of the Court's holdings on the
value of expression.381
While viewed as an easy case by the Constitutional Court and
to an American observer, the decision provoked a great outcry in
Germany.382 Perhaps this is because German civility norms have
generally succeeded in shielding soldiers and governmental officials
from sharp attack. Perhaps this is because the public recognizes
what is apparent: German law in the 1990s is freer in its individu-
alism, and the change has occurred in a relatively short time,
sneaking up on cat's feet on an unprepared public. The free indi-
vidualism of German law has had the effect of encouraging a
crude or rude tone to German public discourse, as in American
law.
The theoretical underpinning for this enhanced emphasis on
individualism flows from a recalibration of German constitutional
norms. Soldiers are Murderers I illustrates this doctrinal adjust-
ment. The Court defined communication freedoms as "in the inter-
est of the right to personal development, with which communica-
tion is closely linked, as well as in the interest of the democratic
process, for which it has constitutive meaning."383 Since "the pur-
pose of communication is to try to exert intellectual influence on
the world-to effect the formation of opinion, and to convince
[others],"3 4 one can say that to speak freely is essential to the
human condition. So conceived, communication can be linked
integrally to the central values of Article 1 human dignity and
Article 2 development of personality. Conceived as an essential
part of human dignity, communication freedoms have a more solid
theoretical ground than, for example, reliance on self-government.
Thus, communication freedoms in the 1990s have been reconceived
as truly among the most fundamental values of German society, a
realization of the Liith paradigm." 5
381. See id. at 2944.
382. See, e.g., Gerhard Herdegen, Kommentar zum "Soldaten sind Morder," 45 NJW
2933 (1994) (discussing the difficulties in determining the subjective and objective mean-
ing of an expression).
383. Soldiers are Murderers 1, 45 NJW at 2943.
384. Denial of Responsibility for World War II, 90 BVerfGE 1, 14 (1994).
385. These thoughts are echoed in the Court's now common ringing defense of the
individual right to speak one's mind. "The right to freedom of opinion guarantees every-
one the right to assert freely their opinion: Everyone has the right to say what she thinks,
even when she does not provide or cannot provide verifiable reasons for her view." Sol-
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In these respects, the development of modem German law
parallels the movement in America, where the law has recently
also emphasized the individual right to speak one's mind. In cases
like Hustler Magazine, City of St. Paul, or Simon Schuster, one
might say free speech has almost become an end unto itself, pur-
sued for the sake of the ideal of unfettered discourse, notwithstand-
ing serious social and personal consequences that may ensue.
386
5. Soldiers Are Murderers II
Far from resolving the issue, the Constitutional Court's protec-
tion of remarks that "soldiers are murderers" continued to fester
and percolate throughout German society, resulting in serious and
sustained criticism of the Court.387 Attempting to suture this open
wound-more from a social perspective than a legal one-the
Court revisited these issues in Soldiers are Murderers 11.388 The
Court's review, coming on the heels of its earlier "resolution" of
the controversy was an unprecedented gesture. Perhaps sensing its
leadership role was on the line, the Court attempted to quell the
controversy, acting in a manner reminiscent of the Supreme Court
in the great American desegregation and abortion controversies.389
Soldiers are Murderers II typifies certain doctrinal progressions
in German free expression jurisprudence, most notably an intense
focus on the facts and language at issue in the communication, a
narrowing of the group defamation concept, and an expansion of
speaker control over both the content and form of expression. The
case, however, primarily elaborated upon the holding reached in
Soldiers are Murderers I that the remarks are protected within
diers are Murderers I, 45 NJW at 2943. "Even sharp and extreme criticism does not lose
protection. Value judgments are protected, regardless of whether they are 'valuable' or
'worthless,' 'true' or 'false,' 'emotional' or 'rational."' Id. This trend of explicit linkage of
communication to personality rights is deliberate. It is a reaction against tying expression
too exclusively to political speech, which might have the effect of limiting speech rights.
Thus, Article 5 has a certain ethical quality as an end in itself, paralleling the develop-
ment in American law. See MAUNZ COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 18.
386. See Eberle, supra note 1, at 1181-86.
387. See, e.g., Stephen Kinzer, An Old Stab At Soldiers Opens Battle in Germany, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 15, 1996 (citing, for example, Chancellor Helmut Kohl: "We cannot and must
not stand by while our soldiers are placed on the same level with criminals.").
388. 22 EuGRZ 443 (1995).
389. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1), affd by Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1), reaffd by Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 4 (1958); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), affd in part and rev'd in part by
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Article 5, even if they are insulting or sharp. One significant dif-
ference between the two cases is the manner of their issuance.
Unlike the chamber decision issued in Soldiers are Murderers I,
the whole first Senate of the Constitutional Court rendered its
decision in Soldiers are Murderers IL Indeed, reflecting the divi-
sion of opinion prevailing throughout the country, the full Court
split five to three over the disposition of three of the four cases
decided in the consolidated appeal. Only the second case was de-
cided by an unanimous vote."
Each of the above cases involved remarks that "soldiers are
murderers" or "soldiers are potential murderers." In the first case, a
thirty-year old well-known conscientious objector protested a
NATO military maneuver occurring near Rothenburg ob der Tauber
by attaching a placard to a traffic signal that stated "a soldier is a
murderer."391 The protestor was not proficient in English, and
there was a dispute as to whether he meant to say "a soldier is a
murder" or "a soldier is a murderer.' 392
The second case also involved a recognized conscientious ob-
jector. Motivated by an exhibit at a local trade school that carica-
tured the German army (Bundeswehr), the protestor composed an
illustrated pamphlet with text that included:
Are soldiers potential murderers? One thing is clear: Sol-
diers are trained to be murderers. 'You should not kill'
becomes 'you must kill.' worldwide. Even in the German
Army. Mass extermination, Murder, Destruction, Brutality,
Inhumanity, Revenge, Retaliation
That is soldier's work. Worldwide. Even in the German
army.
390. Soldiers are Murderers 1I, 22 EuGRZ at 443, 456. Only Judge Haas wrote a dis-
senting opinion, in which she decried the Court's use of intensive scrutiny, preferring that
the Court defer more to the ordinary courts. She also believed that soldiers, including
their honor, merited protection from the legal system instead of scorn. See id. at 457-58.
Her views thus seemed in accord with a fair portion of the German public.
391. Id. at 443-44.
392. Owing to the speaker's poor English, the district court believed that the protestor
inadvertently used "murder," actually intending to mean "murderer. In part, this confusion
arises from the close similarity of English and German (murder - Mord; murderer -
M6rder). The appellate court believed the protestor, finding that the intended remark was
"M6rder." See id. at 444.
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Militarism kills, even without weapons, even without war.
Therefore, there is only one answer: For peace, disarma-
ment and humanity--decline military service. Resist milita-
rism!
393
The protestor distributed twenty to thirty copies of the pamphlet in
the hall of the trade school and placed additional copies on the
windows of cars parked nearby.
The third case concerned a letter to the editor of a local news-
paper in which the writer expressed solidarity with a doctor's ac-
quittal in a famous judicial proceeding involving anti-military activ-
ities. The letter read, in relevant part:
"There were four long years in which murder was obligato-
ry in every square mile of the land, during which he could
not withdraw from for even one-half hour. I said: Murder?
Naturally murder. Soldiers are murderers." This quote is
from Kurt Tucholsky from the world theater of 1931, for
which the producer, and later Nobel peace prize winner,
Carl von Ossietzky, was himself charged and acquitted, and
which is even today, yes even today actual.
Conscientious objectors are recognized by us only when
they decline military service because they find murder
objectionable... The task of all annies includes prepara-
tion for war ... state legitimated mass murder.
I declare myself in full solidarity with the acquitted and
hereby declare publicly: "All soldiers are potential murder-
ers!
394
The fourth case arose from an exhibition by the German army
showing videos and pictures of German military hardware, especial-
ly military uses of motorcycles.395 The German army had an in-
formation stand at a motorcycle exhibition at the Munich Olympic
hall. Before the information stand, four people distributed anti-
military leaflets .3' Two people then unfolded a large placard that
stated: "Soldiers are potential murderers." Offended by these per-
393. Id. at 445.
394. Id. at 447. The trial of the doctor was known as the "Frankfurt soldier's trial."
395. See Soldiers are Murderers II, 22 EuGRZ at 448.
396. See id.
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ceived slights, the soldiers sued on the ground that their honor was
violated by such insults.397 The other cases heard in the consoli-
dated appeal were also initiated by soldiers seeking to reclaim their
honor.
The ordinary courts in all four cases found the speech
sanctionable as criminal insult or slander, and assessed money
damages.398 The courts reasoned that calling soldiers "murderers"
stamped them as "criminals," thereby dehumanizing and denigrating
them in the eyes of the public.3 9 The courts relied on an earlier
decision of the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtsho), which
held that defamation of a distinct group of people (such as Catho-
lics, auto workers, or the German army) could be implied from
defamation resulting from a more general usage of the term (such
as all Christians, all laborers, or all soldiers).' Construed as an
"insult," the statements were beyond Article 5 protection, since
they fit within a "general law" limitation of opinion rights."1
The reasoning mirrored that of the lower courts in Soldiers are
Murderers I, which the Constitutional Court had overturned in the
chamber decision.'
In deciding to rehear the controversy, the Court was more
interested in addressing the German public, and the judges of the
ordinary courts, than addressing the technical legal merits of the
dispute, which, after all, it had already resolved. The main goal of
the Court was thus educational: to restate the fundamental tenants
of free expression jurisprudence so that these lessons of German
constitutionalism might best be imparted to society. The Court
emphasized a preference for free expression rights over protection
of honor and personality; a confirmation of the "hard look" review
process initiated by the Court in the 1990s; and a general en-
hancement of the individual right to speak one's mind. Soldiers are
Murderers II thus confirms the trend of modem German law as
397. See id. at 448.
398. See id. at 443-49.
399. Id.
400. See, e.g., Soldiers are Murderers II, 22 EuGRZ at 444. The Federal Supreme
Court decision is published at 36 BGHSt 77 (1951).
401. The insult at issue was codified in Article 185 of the German Criminal Code. See
Art. 185 StGB. Additionally at issue was Article 193 of the Code which justified use of
harsh criticism when made in "relation to scientific, artistic or business performance . . .
or in defense of rights or in consideration of justifiable interests." See Art. 193 StGB.
402. See supra notes 379-80 and accompanying text.
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one very much following the pattern of the more absolutist Ameri-
can law.
Because this case dealt with a controversy finding no resolution
in German society, the Court felt compelled to scrutinize the facts
of each case and restate the tenets of modem German law. 3 The
Court began its discussion by confirming that the essence of free
expression is the fundamental right to speak one's mind. Notably,
the Court made clear that this right entails not only freedom to
determine the content of expression, "but also its form."'  Pro-
tected also is choice over the time and place of communication. A
speaker possesses the right not only to publicize his opinion; he
may also choose those circumstances which best afford the greatest
dissemination or the strongest effect for his views.4  In establish-
ing such definitive speaker control over the form and circumstance
of communication, the Court deepened the scope of communication
rights. The development seems to mark a clear break with the
more restrictive approach of Deutschland-Magazin, where the Court
viewed the content and form of speech as separable.'- The
development is another move in the direction of American
law-treating form and content as integrated aspects of communica-
tion.' 7
The Court noted, however, that expression must at times yield
to defamation. To prevent the excessive protection of personal
honor from suffocating speech freedoms, the Court held that the
category of prescribable defamation must be narrowly con-
strued."8 To the extent the speech involves an "essentially impor-
tant question" of public discourse, even personal privacy interests
may have to yield. Questions decisive for public discourse are
presumptively protected.'
403. The detailed recitation of the facts and the elaborate restatement of fundamental
legal premises is a stance somewhat out of the ordinary for the Constitutional Court, as it
is for the Supreme Court.
404. Soldiers are Murderers II, 22 EuGRZ at 449.
405. See id. at 550.
406. See supra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
407. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[We cannot sanction the
view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech,
has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be
the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated").
408. See Soldiers are Murderers I1, 22 EuGRZ at 451.
409. See id.
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Shifting focus from principle to application, the Court next
considered the importance of the words or language actually used.
"The precondition for every legal evaluation of a communication
is ... that its meaning be appropriately discerned. 41 "Failure to
understand a remark may lead to its suppression," which can chill
the assertion of expression rights.411 Thus, it is critical to focus
first on the meaning of the disputed remark. The Court's commit-
ment to discern the "plain meaning" of an expression is commend-
able, and itself significant to a system of free expression. Only by
fairly understanding the content of speech, independent of its ef-
fects, can one determine its worth. Accordingly, the Court ex-
plained the criterion by which to judge expression:
The goal of interpretation is to discern the objective mean-
ing of a statement. The measure for this is neither the
subjective intention of the speaker nor the subjective under-
standing of those affected by the communication. Rather,
this is to be determined from the standpoint of an unbiased
and sensible public. The reference point is always the lan-
guage of the remark itself. But this may not always be
self-evident. One must therefore also consider the context
of the statement and the circumstances surrounding its
expression insofar as indicia therefor are available. An
isolated view of a disputed part of a statement thus does
not meet permissible standards of interpretation.412
With the criterion for interpretation established, the Court applied
"hard look" review to the remarks at issue. Under this intensive
form of review, it may be recalled, wrong or implausible interpre-
tations are to be struck in favor of supportable ones. Since "many
words or concepts can have in different contexts many meanings,"
it is a serious constitutional error to ascribe technical legal mean-
ings to words that are used in a vernacular sense.
413
Considered against these principles, the conclusions reached by
the ordinary courts did not measure up. Even conceding that call-
ing soldiers murderers inflicts harm,414 whether such harm out-
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Soldiers are Murderers II, 22 EuGRZ at 451.
414. Calling soldiers "murderers" inflicts harm because it is denigrating and dehumaniz-
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weighs the value of the speech can only be determined by a full
consideration of the statement, including its context and the cir-
cumstances giving rise to it. The ordinary courts, however, as-
sumed the remarks to be insulting without satisfactorily substantiat-
ing that conclusion.
First, the speakers made reference to all soldiers, not specific,
identifiable ones nor even the defined set of soldiers who were
members of the German army. The reference to the German army
was just to make clear that the "statement all soldiers applied also
to soldiers in the German army. 415 The context thus suggests
that the statement condemned soldiers and war generally. "Use of
the word 'murderer' does not necessarily connote ... its criminal
connotation. It is much more likely that what was meant was that
killing during wartime is not an impersonal event but rather an act
of man."416 Thus, one cannot exclude an interpretation intending
to show that the speaker meant to prick the conscience of soldiers
so that they would assume personal responsibility for their actions
and perhaps become conscientious objectors. In short, the Court
sensed that the remarks were meant more as a type of Brechtian
theater-designed to produce a shock effect and thus focus atten-
tion on an important message-rather than as personal insults.
Second, the ordinary courts' conclusions that the statements
were defamatory did not meet the prevailing definition of defama-
tion. Stern-Strauss Interview held that defamation was sanctionable
only when the communication intended personal harm and any
substantive content receded into the background.417 This definition
is construed very narrowly out of concern that loose interpretation
will detrimentally chill the exercise of expression rights.418 The
Constitutional Court chose to do this by tightening the application
of the definition. By contrast, the Supreme Court has accomplished
the same end by narrowing the definition of defamation itself and
then scrutinizing its application.419 Despite the differing methodol-
ogies, the end result is the same: protecting expression through
ing. See id. at 452.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See id. at 454; see also supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
418. See Soldiers are Murders II, 22 EuGRZ at 454.
419. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 285-88 (1964)
(holding that public official may recover for defamation only after showing actual malice
and then determining that the facts did not support a finding of actual malice).
8871997]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
limiting its restriction to specifically enumerated, narrowly defined,
categories. Thus, the remarks are prescribable only "if they actually
involved defamation."'
Tested against the standard of Stern-Strauss Interview, the
Court did not find the remarks in Soldiers are Murderers I to be
defamatory. "The questions whether war and military service and
their resulting killing of men is morally justifiable or not" is an
important issue.421 Indeed, "resistance to militarism and support
of pacifism constitutes an essentially important question for public
discourse for which a presumption of protection applies."'4 Thus,
the ordinary courts needed to consider whether these substantively
valuable comments were pushed into the background by elements
of defamation, as compared to the courts' approach of assuming
that the statements were defamatory without independently proving
their harm. Lacking persuasive proof of harm, the remarks could
not be defamatory. Further, the Court doubted such proof would be
forthcoming. The remarks were not directed personally at any
individuals or a group of soldiers, but "concerned all soldiers with-
out differentiation."'  It was improper for the courts to imply
harm of individual German army soldiers.
In contrast to American law, German law still provides for a
concept of group defamation, as made clear in Auschwitz Lie424
or Soldiers are Murderers I. Even under the concept of group
defamation, the element of harm to group members must be at the
fore.4' This is likely to occur in two ways. The first is recogniz-
able hate speech, consisting of denigration of characteristics like
"ethnicity, race, or physical or mental attributes." '426 The denigra-
tion of Jewish people in Auschwitz Lie is an example of this.427
The second is when statements denigrate specific people or associ-
ations of people.4' In both situations, proof of harm is necessary,
420. Soldiers are Murderers II, 22 EuGRZ at 454.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. 90 BVerfGE 24 (1990), discussed infra at notes 447-55 and accompanying text.
The individual treatment of defamation under American law is discussed infra at notes
457-60 and accompanying text.
425. See Auschwitz Lie, 90 BVerfGE at 24.
426. IL
427. See infra notes 447-58 and accompanying text.
428. See, e.g., Soldiers are Murderers I1, 22 EuGRZ at 454.
888 [V/ol. 47:797
PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN CONTEMPORARY GERMANY
which was not evident in any of the cases at issue in Soldiers are
Murderers IL Outside of these two categories, it is likely that any
remark involves critical, but protected, commentary on a group's
activities or social function.'
By tightening these definitions and demanding clear proof of
harm caused by communication, the Court delineated legal catego-
ries so that they might be applied discriminately. By separating
communication from harm, each can be evaluated independently.
The relative merits and demerits of each can be compared using
the Court's complete balancing scheme. In these ways, the Court is
following the path of the Supreme Court. The failure of the ordi-
nary courts to do this led to the Court's remand of the cases so
that a full balancing of interests could be performed in view of the
explicit instructions of the Court.4 °
6. Denial of Responsibility for World War II
Two recent cases illustrate the main themes of German commu-
nication law in comparison to American freedom of speech law:
the increased emphasis on individual freedom with a concomitant
circumscription of those freedoms in ways uniquely German. In the
Denial of Responsibility for World War II case,43 the Constitu-
tional Court protected an author's right to publish a book that
denied German responsibility for the cause of World War I. The
decision rested on Article 5(1) opinion rights. The Constitutional
Court did, however, uphold the decision of the Federal Administra-
tive Court denying protection of the book as "history" under the
research and science guarantees because the book exhibited no
"serious search for truth," but was instead a propagandistic, one-
sided presentation.432 By contrast, in the Auschwitz Lie case, the
Court upheld the denial of a group's right to assemble and demon-
strate in order to publicize its assertion that Germany had not
429. See id.
430. See id. at 456.
431. 90 BVerfGE 1 (1994).
432. Id. at 13-14. The Court noted that the right to free scientific inquiry functions as a
negative, subjective right, guaranteeing an individual zone of autonomy to determine the
path of scientific pursuit, free from governmental coercion. See id. at 1. In this way, the
Court's solution very much parallels the American solution: truth is to be determined in
the marketplace of ideas, not the courtroom. However, the Court was competent to decide
whether a work qualified as a "serious search for truth," the essential test for scientific
inquiry. Here the book did not so qualify as "science."
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persecuted Jews nor committed the Holocaust.433 The basis for
this determination was that such assertions were demonstrably false,
and thus beyond Article 5, and that they also constituted individual
and group defamation against Jewish people, a small group of
whom still live in Germany. Notably, World War I, its personali-
ties and its consequences are a persistent and pervasive theme of
German law.
The Denial of Responsibility for' World War II case demon-
strates certain strengths of modem German law. Having set out to
exonerate the Nazis from their worst deeds, the book then depicted
the Nazi regime as harmless and as an acceptable political altema-
tive.4 4 Because of the glorification of the Nazis, the book was
determined to be dangerous to youth and, therefore, subject to the
restrictions of youth law, which included a ban on advertising and
certain limits on distribution.435 Exercising heightened review, the
Court overturned the decision of the lower courts on the ground
that it violated opinion rights.436
The Court concluded that the book constituted protected opin-
ion because it exhibited the author's views on history and Naziism,
views that could not be reduced to verifiably false facts, as the
Federal Administrative Court had done.437 Rather, the book was a
complicated mix of fact, judgment, and estimation of historical
events.438 The mistake of the Federal Administrative Court was to
believe that a book could be restricted merely on account of its
historically false portrait of the Nazi ideology and their responsibil-
ity for the war.439 Certainly the Nazi idealogy-which is filled
with racial hatred, lust for war, and contempt for democra-
cy-could threaten the morals of youth if presented in a glorified
or harmless manner." According to the Constitutional Court,
however, it was as likely that the book dealt with a central ques-
tion of modem German history, even if presented in a controversial
manner."1 As such, "the democratic state fundamentally has faith
433. See infra note 448 and accompanying text.
434. See Denial of Responsibility for World War II, 90 BVerfGE at 1-3.
435. See id. at 18-19.
436. See id. at 18-20.
437. See id. at 20-24.
438. See id.
439. See Denial of Responsibility for World War I, 90 BVerfGE at 20-24.
440. See id. at 20-21.
441. See id.
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that the public dialogue between different opinions will produce a
multifaceted picture, out of which generally controversial views
premised on false facts will not be accepted. The free discussion is
the real foundation of a free and democratic society." 2
The Court next addressed the place of youth in such a demo-
cratic society. Since the book is part of the free exchange of ideas,
youth must learn how to become a participant in this dialogue.
The fostering of abilities of discretion and critical judgment is
essential to young people's education and development as citizens.
If German society is to realize a truly free democratic order, incul-
cation of democratic values and civic virtue is essential. "The
ascertainment [by youth] of historical events and their critical en-
gagement with dissenting opinions can prepare and protect youth
much more effectively for encounters with distorted historical pre-
sentations than can any classification of such opinions as presenting
an improper lesson."'
A similar sentiment was expressed in the Student Article
case"4 in which the Court protected a young apprentice from de-
nial of a job position on account of publication of a controversial
article in a student newspaper. To deny the position on account of
the article would create a severe chill of communication rights, the
Court reasoned, which would impart the wrong lesson about living
in a democratic society. The Court continued:
Also to be considered is that this case deals with an article
published in a student magazine. . . . These constitute a
practice field for [youth's] participation in the formation of
public opinion. The articulation of opinions and exposure
with contrasting ideas must also be learned. Student news-
papers have a valuable role to play in this process. But this
can only be accomplished when students can feel secure
and without fear that participation [in student newspapers]
will not later affect their career opportunities."
442. Id. at 21.
443. See id.
444. Id. One might also attribute the Constitutional Court's concern with the proper
development of youth to its role in realizing an objective order of constitutional values.
Development and the fostering of youth is critical to achievement of these objectives.
445. 86 BVerfGE 122 (1992).
446. Id. at 131-32. These cases thus have a certain parallel with earlier American at-
tempts to inculcate the values of citizenship and respect for fundamental liberties. See,
e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ('[S]tu-
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In view of these expression values, the Constitutional Court re-
manded the case to the Federal Administrative Court with instruc-
tions to perform a more concrete balancing of communication
freedoms with the goal of protecting youth.
7. Auschwitz Lie
If the Denial of Responsibility for World War II case illustrates
the increased freedom of modem German law, the Auschwitz Lie
case 7 shows the continuing vitality of its limitations. Here the
Court approved a prior restraint of a planned demonstration to
publicize the demonstrators' belief that the Holocaust never oc-
curred.' Despite the broad presumption favoring opinion rights,
especially over public matters, the Court reasoned that the demon-
stration was based on the demonstrably false fact that the Holo-
caust never occurred.4 9 False facts are without protection under
German law. Innumerable eye witnesses, historians, and judicial
proceedings have established beyond doubt that the Holocaust
occurred, and that Germany bears responsibility for it.45 The De-
nial of Responsibility of World War 11 case is distinguishable, the
Court reasoned, because there the book dealt with complicated
historical judgment, not verifiable fact.451 Contrasting the two
cases demonstrates the continuing bite of the fact/opinion dichoto-
my.
Alternatively, the Court reasoned, the ban would still stand if
the communication was viewed as a mixed fact/opinion case.4 2
Under German doctrine such cases are presumptively treated as
protected opinion out of concern that otherwise a chilling of ex-
dents .. . [do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the school house gate."). Since Tinker, the Supreme Court has cut back on such pro-
tections. See, e.g. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding
high school principal's exclusion of two stories from school newspaper). Thus, the trend
of the Constitutional Court would seem to be more speech protective in this area then
that of the Supreme Court.
447. 90 BVerfGE 241 (1994).
448. German law allows prior restraint where planned events will likely lead, as per-
ceived here, to criminal acts. See § 5 Nr.4 VerG.
449. See Auschwitz Lie, 90 BVerfGE at 249.
450. See id.
451. See id.
452. See id. at 248-49.
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pression will result.45 3 With such opinion cases, however, a bal-
ance must yet be struck with countervailing limitations. In applying
the balance, opinions based on false facts receive little weight. By
contrast, the law prohibiting group defamation and incitement of
racial hatred, acting as a "general law" limitation on opinion rights,
is a strong interest.454 For Jewish people, the Holocaust is inextri-
cably part of their identity and personal dignity. Respect for their
dignity, a fundamental principle of Germany, is a key guarantee
that such persecution will not take place again. On such reasoning,
the demonstration will produce group defamation, which outweighs
the minimal communicative value at issue.4 5
In modem Germany, group defamation, especially when based
on incitement of hate against race or ethnicity, is taboo.456 Obvi-
ously, this reflects the catastrophe of World War II, never far from
the minds of modem Germans. That lesson has now been incorpo-
rated into the objective ordering of values in Germany, subsumed
within constitutional concepts like Article 1 human dignity and
articulated by the Constitutional Court in Auschwitz Lie. The recent
rise of neo-Nazi groups and other extremists following the reunifi-
cation of Germany, and their persecution of German minorities,
fortifies this conclusion. These cases illustrate vividly the distinct
circumscription of German communicative freedoms, notwithstand-
ing its flowering in recent years.
It is hard to imagine the case coming out the same way under
American law. First, American fundamental rights are conceived as
individual, personal rights, not group rights. On this reasoning, a
right to be free from group defamation has long been rejected,
despite herculean efforts otherwise.45 7 Second, even conceived as
individual rights, the United States may be the only land which
tolerates hate speech, and other extremist speech, to such an extent.
453. Id. at 248 (citing Bayer Dissident Stockholders, 85 BVerfGE 1, 15 (1991)).
454. See Auschwitz Lie, 90 BVerfGE at 243.
455. See id. at 252-54.
456. See §§ 130-31 StGB, discussed in Stein, supra note 128, at 281-86, and note 341
and accompanying text.
457. It is fair to say that New York Times overrules Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952) on this point. In Beauharnais, the Court affirmed the conviction under a
group libel law of a speaker who demeaned black Americans. For arguments favoring
group defamation approaches, see Charles R. Lawrence HI, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE LJ. 431; Mar J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2320
(1989).
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Cases like RAY. v. City of St. Paul"8 or Collin v. Smith4 9 are
explainable only as commitments to the American ideal of unfet-
tered public discourse. These ideals are worth adhering to, in the
American view, despite the painfully high price to be borne in
service to them. Third, American concepts of human dignity and
personality rights are underdeveloped in relation to Germany. Thus,
in the United States, expression has a relatively free reign, less
encumbered by such civility norms. Freedom to speak one's mind,
however crudely or rudely, is quintessential to being American.
Fourth, prior restraints are so highly disfavored in the United
States, that it is virtually impossible to meet the high burden of
proof necessary to sustain one.' In the United States, punish-
ment of subsequent conduct is preferable to prior restraint.
VII. COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS
The communication law of Germany and the United States has
developed similarly after World War II. There is much the two
laws have in common. Both view expression as essential to indi-
vidual development, democratic self-government, and the formation
of public opinion. Both accord wide scope to an individual's right
to speak one's mind, protection of which does not depend on pop-
ularity or utility. Both countries centrally protect political, literary,
artistic, and scientific speech. 1 The Courts of both countries
consider communication freedoms to be fragile and, accordingly,
scrutinize proposed restrictions and actively police the structure of
public discourse to facilitate its exercise.
Notwithstanding these similarities, a closer look at the two laws
reveals differences. First, American law is freer in its individualism
and more zealous in its protection of expression. Over the last
thirty years especially, the Supreme Court has sought to realize an
458. 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that state may not selectively proscribe racist fight-
ing words).
459. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (state may not
prohibit demonstration of neo-Nazis seeking to publicize that Holocaust was fictional). In
this way, Collin and Auschwitz Lie illustrate the contrasting approach of the American and
German Courts on this question.
460. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding that
government did not meet its burden of showing justification for the imposition of a prior
restraint of expression).
461. See Kommers, supra note 21, at 692 (discussing common themes between German
and American law).
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ideal of unfettered discourse, freeing individuals to think as they
like, speak as they like, and discourse freely, independent of gov-
ernmental or community control.462 By contrast, German individu-
al freedoms are more circumscribed, notwithstanding the recent
pronounced emphasis on the right to say what one likes, whether
"valuable or valueless, true or false, rational or irrational." 3 For
example, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,' the Supreme Court pro-
tected the right of white individuals to express hatred by placing a
burning cross in the dead of night in the fenced-in yard of a black
neighbor. In the Auschwitz Lie case, the Constitutional Court
banned a demonstration intending to assert that the Holocaust never
occurred. Certainly one may doubt the wisdom of the relative
freeness of American discourse. But, comparatively speaking,
American law is freer than German law.
Second, and ironically, German law has a broader influence on
society than American law. This is on account of the "objective"
ordering of values in the German Basic Law, which obligates the
state to realize the fundamental values of the Basic Law in the
German legal order.' In this way, the value-ordered Basic Law
is a blueprint for society, whereas the value-neutral United States
Constitution is a framework for government. The German system
requires a closer fit between the text of the Basic Law and soci-
ety. 4
6
The way to realize these values is the Reciprocal Effect Theo-
ry, devised in Liith, under which the general law must take into
account basic constitutional norms in adjusting private law relation-
ships. The result of this is that German basic rights, such as ex-
pression freedoms, effect all legal relationships, not just public law
relationships as in the United States. The "indirect" effect of the
Basic Law on private law relationships is fundamentally a German
concept, without a real analogue in American law. 467 Most of the
462. See Eberle, supra note 1, at 1212 (discussing the goals of the Supreme Court in
the twentieth century).
463. Denial of Responsibility, 90 BVerfGE at 15; Soldiers are Murderers I, 45 NJW
2943 (1994).
464. 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (state may not selectively proscribe fighting words).
465. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
466. See KoMMERS, supra note 5, at 45 (speaking of the "steering" or "integrating"
function of Basic Law).
467. The closest American analogue would be Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
in which the Court found state action in a state court enforcement of a private racially
restrictive covenant Lilth and other German cases similarly involve purely private actions.
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major German expression cases are products of this "indirect"
influence of the Basic Law on fundamentally private law rela-
tions.' Thus, if American law penetrates more deeply into soci-
ety, the impact of German law is wider.
Third, the contrasting influence of the constitutions in private
law reveals a fundamentally different view concerning the distinc-
tion between public and private law, and the impact of the consti-
tution on society. In the United States, the assumption is that there
is a clear conceptual difference between the public and private
realm. Private actors are free to act beyond the influence of the
Constitution, their conduct shaped primarily only by the standards
of statutory or common law. Only public actions must adhere to
the Constitution, together with those private parties acting on be-
half of government under the state action doctrine. Thus, the opera-
tive question in the United States for determining the reach of the
Constitution is who is acting: state action is a prerequisite to appli-
cation of the Constitution. These doctrines, in turn, reveal the per-
vasive American concern: limiting the reach of state authority in
order to preserve private liberty.
In Germany, by contrast, no clear conceptual line is posited
between the public and private sphere. This position is ironic in
view of the traditionally clear distinction between public and pri-
vate law in German legal theory. 9 The German view rests on
the assumption underlying the Basic Law that certain basic values
are so fundamental that they "should permeate state and soci-
ety. .. ,47o Constitutionally, there is to be no absolute distinction
between public and private law. Under German doctrine, the status
of a person, whether public or private, is of no particular rele-
vance, in contrast to American law. Rather, the operative question
is whether the basic right is being curtailed. Private and social
forces can threaten rights just as severely, if not more so, than
state actions. There is an affinity between German doctrine and the
views of the American legal realists.47'
The Constitutional Court steps into this dispute only to assure that constitutional values
are adequately taken into account in the ordinary courts' adjustment of the legal relation-
ship. In this way, Germany is striving for a more comprehensive approach to rights.
468. See Stern-Strauss Interview, 82 BVerfGE 272 (1990); Deutschland-Magazin, 42
BVerfGE 143 (1976); Liith, 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958).
469. See Quint, supra note 4, at 340.
470. Id.
471. See id. at 341; see, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L.
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Fourth, German civility norms of privacy and reputational
interests are a stronger limiting influence on communication free-
doms than American ones. This is the most important doctrinal
difference between German and American law. For example, one
can say "white son of a bitch, I'll kill you"' in America, but
one cannot call someone a "cripple" in Germany.473 Or one can
parody a politically active preacher in America by describing his
first sexual experience as occurring in an outhouse with his mother
while drunk,4" but one cannot caricature a prominent politician
in Germany as a sexually active pig, cohabiting with justice.47
Yet, this last difference also points out an important similarity
between the two laws. A key demarcation point in both societies is
where communication interests intersect with recognized privacy
interests. The working out of this tension determines the scope of
public discourse. The difference, restated, is that German privacy
and reputational interests exert stronger force than in American
law, resulting in a concomitant limitation of public discourse. Per-
haps the more interesting question is why the two laws differ in
this respect. Partly, of course, the difference is textual: the German
Basic Law expressly circumscribes communication freedoms and
orders more highly personality rights, in comparison to the textual-
ly unbounded First Amendment, which encounters no other express
constitutional limitation. Yet, this just focuses attention on the
reasons for the deliberate ordering of values in Germany in com-
parison to the United States' value-neutral structure.
In Germany, this question goes back to the prioritization of
human dignity and its corresponding right to free development of
personality as the highest legal and cultural values. The silhouette
of the German person is thus one of the integrity of personhood,
including the right to shape one's character, a shaping to occur
within the social community.476 Obviously, this partly reflects the
REV. 553 (1933); Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and
"Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLuM. L. REv. 149 (1935). The affinity between German
doctrine and American legal realism should not be surprising, since German legal theory
was the major influence on the American movement. See e.g., James E. Herget & Ste-
phen Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Real-
ism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399 (1987).
472. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (holding the Georgia law at issue over-
broad and therefore unconstitutional).
473. Cripple, 86 BVerfGE 1, 8 (1992).
474. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
475. See Strauss Political Satire, 75 BVerfGE 369 (1987).
476. See Kommers, supra note 21, at 675 (discussing the German Federal Constitutional
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deep desire to protect the integrity of the human person, a lesson
learned bitterly from the horrors of Naziism. It also reflects the
influence of Kantian idealism and its emphasis on inner personal
autonomy. It is worth pointing out, however, that Kantian autono-
my is to unfold in a manner consistent with moral obligations, as
compared to the American view of autonomy as seemingly the
value itself. In modem Germany, these ideas are rooted in the
value-ordered Basic Law, which emphasizes positive and negative
liberties, rights, and responsibilities, as compared to the United
States Constitution's provision only of negative liberties and em-
phasis only on rights.
By contrast, American law has had a tortured relationship with
the development of personality rights, known on this side of the
Atlantic as rights of privacy. American law has never really accept-
ed the call by Warren and Brandeis for a fundamental right to be
let alone.'l In part, this reflects the absence of any concrete tex-
tual anchor in the Constitution, as compared to the German enu-
meration of those freedoms. In part, this reflects the general resis-
tance to usurpation by the Supreme Court of a value structure
beyond control of the majoritarian process. Perhaps these difficul-
ties have cleared the way for the full assertion of speech freedoms.
American free speech law has certainly encountered fewer obstacles
to development as compared to German law.
Another explanation for the comparatively free development of
American law is the relative lack of cultural restraining norms.
Unlike Germany, we have never had an aristocracy, monarch,
dominant state church, unified educational system, or relatively
homogenous population. For Germany, these factors have led to
more of a shared sense of cultural norms which, in turn, have led
to a greater constraining influence on expression freedoms. For
example, the sense of personal honor in Germany is still quite
highly regarded, reflecting Germany's aristocratic and feudal past.
Thus, insulting or degrading speech is likely to be viewed more
seriously as a personal affront, finding sanction in the law. In this
Court's human dignity jurisprudence).
477. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193 (1890) (arguing that the right to privacy rests on notion of "an inviolate personali-
ty."). Professor Quint notes that the Warren-Brandeis theory might have guided evolution
of American law along the lines of post-World War II German law, although there would
have been serious conceptual difficulties for American law along this path. See Quint,
supra note 4, at 279 n.106.
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way, cultural norms link freedoms to a greater sense of responsibil-
ity, braking the excesses of freedom. By contrast, here the empha-
sis is more on people's free self-determination of the very norms
that constitute society, free from almost any official constraint-a
quest for which free speech has been indispensable. Our free
speech law, in fact, maps out our quest to be free-from conven-
tion, order, and control.
If American law can thus be characterized as pursuing freedom
for its own sake, German law defines freedom as realizable only
through the social community and its value structure. Historically,
the German state has been viewed as the corporate representative
of community, and its protector of basic values, as compared to the
American continual rebellion against authority. In this way, there is
a more amicable relation between freedom and authority in Germa-
ny.47 In turn, this frees the German state to play a more active
role in helping achieve a society in which rights can thrive. A
notable example of this is the Constitutional Court's active support
of institutional press freedoms in Wallraff, where the Court protect-
ed editorial confidentiality over individual expression.479 By con-
trast, American law posits no role for the state.
From an individual's perspective, German law empowers a
person with both rights and responsibilities. In communication
freedoms, this view is most evident in the Constitutional Court's
active valuation of expression to determine whether it makes a real
contribution to the formation of public opinion and does not violate
other community values, such as imperiling the state or intruding
on another's privacy rights. In this way, the Constitutional Court
judges speech by its content, pursuant to its value according to the
objective order of values, as compared to the Supreme Court's
quest for absolute content-neutrality. ° Stated another way, Ger-
man expression is valued more for its ability to create and sustain
community"1 in comparison to the American search for absolute
478. See Kommers, supra note 21, at 694.
479. Wallraff, 66 BVerfGE 116 (1984).
480. Professor Kommers notes: "The Supreme Court demands a legal posture of neutral-
ity toward all political ideas uttered in the public forum; the Federal Constitutional Court
envisions a polity capable of legally defending those fundamental political values and
principles of the Basic Law." Kommers, supra note 21, at 693.
481. For example, Germany's proscription of group defamation and hate speech out of a
desire to curb discord in society. See Cripple, 86 BVerfGE 1 (1992).
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individual freedom. The contrasting treatment of group defamation,
hate speech, and seditious libel evidences this."2
From these differences, we can extrapolate some deeper cultural
differences. In the United States, free speech is the preeminent
value. It is what links us to our fellow Americans, our country,
and our own identity. Through public discourse, we decide who we
are as a people, what values we hold, and what ends are worth
pursuing. 3 In this way, American law is self-deterministic, indi-
vidualistic, and absolutist in orientation. One might say that Ameri-
can law is radically individualist. American law represents freedom,
near absolute freedom, freedom striving to transcend the social
order.
In Germany, by contrast, communication freedoms are an im-
portant, but not the preeminent value that human dignity is. Care-
fully circumscribed by the variant values of human dignity, Ger-
man law channels conduct along more distinct civility norms. In
Germany, more than in the United States, communication freedoms
are exercised, or ought to be exercised, within the constraints of
the social order. One ought to speak in a way cognizant of the
impact of speech on others and society. Individuals should attempt
to be in accord with the sense of society. In this way, German law
is more communal in approach.
These differences in treatment of speech may simply reflect the
contrasting confidence and maturity of the two societies. Never
having truly faced undemocratic or totalitarian regimes and being
relatively well acclimated to a multi-cultural, pluralistic society, the
United States may simply exude more confidence in individuals'
ability to perceive their own best interests and govern them-
selves."s Certainly this is an ideal on which the country is found-
482. See supra notes 453-60 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between
German and American law).
483. See Eberle, supra note 1, at 1137 (discussing the vision of the Supreme Court
regarding First Amendment jurisprudence).
484. Obviously, this is more an ideal than reality. Events such as the bombing in Okla-
homa City on April 19, 1995 might give one pause about the viability of such faith.
Nevertheless,
[t]he constitutional right of free expression ... put[s] the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that
use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more
perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
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ed. The current individualistic trend in Germany may likewise
reflect the country's greater self-confidence along these lines.
Alternatively, American law may reflect the uncoupling of
freedom from responsibility. Perhaps the United States needs a
stronger rooting of its freedoms in a broader social construct in
which one shares common goals with, and common obligations to
one's fellow citizens, as in the German Social State. Perhaps the
United States needs to define freedom less as a value onto itself,
and more as a value in relation to community. Such a fundamental
reconception would obviously take a radical change in thinking.
Despite these differences, there is much to learn from the two
laws and much the two countries can learn from each other. For
example, an important lesson to be learned from German law is the
premise that threats to free expression can come from private as
well as public sources. If free speech is truly the most prized free-
dom in the United States, it would make sense to guard against all
threats to its exercise. Thus, there may be something to the call for
a New Deal for Speech. 5 Conversely, if one justifiably takes the
position that expression freedoms are highly valued but also fragile,
then the Constitutional Court might profitably transplant many of
the techniques used by the Supreme Court to safeguard a vibrant
system of free expression. Use of tools like strict scrutiny, categori-
cal or weighted forms of balancing, and the overbreadth doctrine
could help lend needed clarity and coherence to German law.
These concepts might profitably transplant across cultures, albeit
with some adjustments.
Still, most remarkable is the growing convergence of the two
laws. The similar development of expression in two different legal
cultures suggests something transcendent about the value of com-
munication. We might say that communication rights are an essen-
tial part of a just and free society. Let us hope both countries can
remain faithful to that ideal.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
485. See CAss R. SUNSTEN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 16
(1993).
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